





LEO XIII

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
MODERN CIVILIZATION

BY

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ENGLISCHE RECHT UND DAS RÖMISCHE RECHT ALS
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From BISHOP POTTER :

"Accept my thanks for your 'Leo XIII and Modern Civilization.' It is a very timely and suggestive book, not merely because it traces the principles of a great ecclesiastical policy to its pagan source, but because it reveals the hostility of that policy to American ideals, whether of the state, the family, or the freedom of the individual. It is a book for statesmen, for workingmen, for parents, for all loyal citizens to read and ponder; and its temperate tone and wide range of authorities ought to make it a handbook for all who are concerned for the integrity of our institutions and the maintenance of our liberties."

From BISHOP DOANE :

"I commend to the attentive study of our citizens the startling and important facts collected in 'Leo XIII and Modern Civilization.'"

From PROFESSOR BODY
of the General Theological Seminary :

"I have been much interested in your work on 'Leo XIII and Modern Civilization.'"

"It places the reader in possession of a mass of material relative to the aims and policy of the Roman Catholic Church, selected from original sources, of great interest and information to all American citizens. The importance of the subject can hardly be overrated, and it is treated in a way intelligible to all. I was especially struck with the arguments on astrology as an original factor in Roman philosophy. This opens up an apparently new line of historical investigation well worthy of attention."

INDEX.

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION.....	5
THE CHURCH AND THE STATE.....	28
THE CHURCH AND THE WORKINGMAN.....	90
THE CHURCH AND THE FAMILY.....	111
THE CHURCH AND THE INDIVIDUAL.....	126
THE CHURCH AND SCIENCE.....	155
CONCLUSION.....	186

INTRODUCTION.

While the booming cannons and pealing bells were announcing during the past year that a quarter of a century had fled since the defeat of the temporal power of the Papal Government by force of arms at the Porta Pia, is it not an appropriate time to give a few thoughts also to the victory which the Papacy won in that same year, in the spiritual field?

The war concerning the prerogatives of the Pope which was ended by this victory in favor of infallibility was a long one, extending over centuries, prosecuted on one side against enormous odds with all the sagacity and vigor which has become identified with the name of the Society of Jesus, and on the other hand with all the learning and piety associated with the name of Gallicanism.

Twenty-five years may seem perhaps too short a time to estimate the full effect of a victory, so important that men have been willing to toil through centuries for its achievement; but the task is lightened by the fact that the Roman Catholic Church, during the greater part of this time, had for its head a pontiff of the extraordinary enterprise, vigor and learning of Leo XIII., who has not hesitated to use to its fullest extent what was probably the greatest opportunity for the exercise of power ever given to mortal man, by outlining the future of Roman Catholic thought, in all the chief departments of human life.

As Leo XIII. possesses also the unrestricted power of selecting the men who will nominate his successor, and has had the similar right of nominating directly or indirectly the bishops, clergy and teachers for the whole Church during the long period of his pontificate, it seems most improbable that any attempt to alter the plan laid out by him for the Church's development would be made, even if the very idea of the infallibility of its author did not negative the possibility of a retreat or of even a criticism. Moreover irresolution is certainly not a vice of the school which has struggled so long and successfully for papal predominance, and when we see the first use made of this power to be in furtherance of the primary doctrines of De Maistre, Cortes and Gousset, we can safely assume that this course will not be changed until the attempt has been made to realize in practice their ultimate conclusions.

Cortes, the revivor of Catholicism in Spain and director of the studies of Queen Isabella of Spain, whose "Essay on Catholicism" was translated into French, with the approval of Pius IX., says: "Catholicism is a complete system of civilization. It is so complete that in its immensity it includes everything—the science of God, of angels, of the universe and of men. Catholicism controls the body, the senses and the souls of men. Its dogmatic theology teaches men what they must believe; its ethics instruct them as to the duties of life. Without Catholicism there can be neither good sense among the lower ranks nor virtue among the middle classes nor sanctity among the eminent."

The details of this plan of civilization had not however been authoritatively announced by the predecessors of Leo XIII. The controversy between Mr. Gladstone and Cardinal Manning, which sprang up at the time of the promulgation of the Vatican Decrees, ended with the declaration on the part of the Cardinal: "But what has this to do with Civil Allegiance? There is not a syllable on the subject (in the Vatican Decrees); there is not a proposition which can be twisted or tortured into such a meaning. For the present it will be enough to give the reason why the Vatican Council did not touch the question of the relations of the Church to the Civil Powers. The reason is simple. It intended not to touch them until it could treat them fully and as a whole. And it has carefully adhered to its intention." ("Vatican Decrees," pp. 20 and 35.)

Pius IX. never attempted to supply this omission; his Syllabus of Errors was published long before the Vatican Decrees, and besides, being merely in a negative form, it was not promulgated by him as a whole in the form of an encyclical. He was apparently content to supply the material—like another David, leaving the construction of the temple to his successor, the Solomon of the Church. The noiseless manner in which the latter has carried on his part of the work has concealed it from public attention—many would even deny that it had been begun.

How faithfully Leo XIII. has striven to carry out this great undertaking appears from the testimony of his most ardent admirers; in the words of Cardinal Satolli: "With regard to sociology, it is an-

other of the Holy Father's (Leo XIII.) glories at this latter end of the 19th century, his Encyclicals are regarded as so many admirable parts of a grand doctrinal system, comprehensive and universal, embracing all the social sciences, beginning with the fundamental theorems of natural law and going to the consideration of the political constitution of States and every economic question." ("Loyalty to Church and State," p. 246.)

In an article by the Rev. J. A. Zahm in the *North American Review* for August, 1895, entitled "Leo XIII. and the Social Question" we read: "In 1891, Leo XIII. promulgated a new economic charter—Leo XIII. chose this prophetic hour to make known the social evangel to the combatants on both sides. As in the politico-religious order Leo XIII. has through his Encyclical *Immortale Dei*, preached the code of reconciliation, so has he in the economic order, promulgated the charter of social harmony."

How binding on Roman Catholics these opinions of the Pope on social and political questions are intended to be, appears from the Encyclical of Leo XIII. to the Belgian Episcopate on the Social Question, dated July 10, 1895: "Even amongst the Catholics of Belgium, whose zeal in carrying out teachings of this kind (of Leo XIII. on the social question) is most notable, this good fruit has been apparent; not however to such a degree as might have been expected from a country and a race so well qualified to profit by such teachings. What the obstacle has been is well known. Differences of view, entertained no doubt with good intention, have been ad-

hered to and maintained in such a manner that the full effect of our teachings could not be felt, and harmony could not remain complete amongst the Catholics. In our opinion, then, the best step to take, and one which we most strongly recommend, is that you (the Bishops) should meet in congress with as little delay as possible. For this social question should not be regarded merely under one aspect. It ~~x~~ certainly is concerned with material welfare, but it specially affects religion and morals, and naturally comes into relation with the legislation of states ; so that in a word, broadly speaking, it has to do with the rights and duties of all classes. There can undoubtedly be no Catholic, loving alike his religion and his country, who will not be willing to accept and observe your prudent decisions.

“Wherefore, venerable brethren, we desire you to exhort and admonish the Catholics in our name in order that henceforth, in matters of this kind, whether in the journals, or similar publications, they may refrain from all controversy and disputes among themselves; still more that they may avoid mutual reprimands and may not presume to anticipate the decisions of legitimate authority.” (Catholic Review for 1895, page 118).

We see, therefore, that the laity may be prohibited from even discussing a matter of such deep ramifications as the social question when once it has been passed upon by the successor of St. Peter, but that they must quietly “accept and observe” the decisions of his appointees. As Professor Nitti says in his “Catholic Socialism” (p. 381): “A Papal Encyclical

bears a truly absolute character of moral obligation, for it is the declaration of a voice which has the weight of an absolute moral and spiritual law for over two hundred and thirty millions of Catholics."

In the official edition of the Encyclicals, by the Order of St. Augustine, published at Bruges, in 1887, in the introduction they are termed "the Oracles of the Infallible Master."

The sincere Romanist of to-day has therefore many things to believe which were not absolutely necessary in the days of the Oxford movement or even in those of the Gladstone-Manning controversy. Before the declaration of the doctrine of infallibility, there was room for various opinions as to whether the claims for universal sovereignty of the mediæval Popes need be accepted by the faithful; and even after the declaration of that doctrine, there might still be doubt as to the exact nature of those claims, and as to whether they were applicable to modern nations which had thrown off all obedience to Rome, as was so earnestly asserted by Cardinal Manning in his answer to Mr. Gladstone ("Vatican Decrees," p. 79). But since the encyclicals of Leo XIII. have announced a definite scheme as to the relation of Church and State, there can be no doubt on this subject.

In the same way, Cardinal Manning could write to Wilberforce in 1852 (*Life of Manning*, vol. II., page 31):

"It (the Church) has no jurisdiction in science or philosophy. The office of the Church is Divine and unerring within the sphere of the original revelation.

But ontology and metaphysics are no part of it. There are many philosophies about 'matter' and 'substance,' etc., but none are authoritative. They are many because no one has been defined." Since, however, the philosophy of one of the Scholastic Doctors has received the official sanction of the Infallible Head of the Church, this uncertainty no longer exists.

As Cardinal Vaughan declares, concerning the recent movement for a reunion of Christendom :

"The essence of the Anglican position on the other hand, and the *raison d'être* of the Anglican Church, is the negation of the Roman claim. It declares (1) that the Pope has not authority by a divine right bestowed by Christ on blessed Peter, to teach and rule the whole Church of God ; (2) that the Pope has no jurisdiction in England. The whole question of reunion lies, therefore, within a nutshell. It is not a question of examining and accepting a long list of Catholic doctrines. It is simply a question of the fundamental and essential constitution of the Church. Did the Divine Founder give to His Church a visible head upon earth, with power to preach, define, settle controversies, and govern? I fail to see the use of discussing any other subject. Settle this matter, and everything falls into its proper place and becomes easy. Reject this, and there is no basis on which reunion is possible, even though men were prepared to affix their signature to every other doctrine taught in the Creed of Pope Pius IV."

Moreover, not only has this plan of world-wide government been announced, but a most active

propaganda has been started in its favor. Leo XIII. and his school are perfectly sincere in their belief that their plan will certainly make earth as nearly as possible resemble Heaven. They throw back the charge of ignorance and stupidity, so often hurled against their Church, with the greatest vigor and honesty, and have not the least fear of their victory in an intellectual contest, if the argument be carried to its full and fair conclusion. The new University at Washington and the Summer Schools throughout the country are founded for the express purpose of spreading these theories of Church and State. As Cardinal Satolli announced in his remarks on the Catholic Summer School ("Loyalty to Church and State," p. 92): "And I should be very much pleased to see the Catholic Summer School incorporate with its object another point of very great importance, namely, the presentation to the American people of the precise idea of the relations between the Church and State. In this matter I find a surprising want of knowledge in America. I am speaking about what is commonly called Ecclesiastical Law, which precisely deals with the fundamental, or rather the essential constitution of the Church and the State, and determines the limits of action of both authorities in such a way as to prevent the conflicts that unfortunately disturb the social peace and retard social progress."

In the words of Professor Nitti, whose work on Catholic Socialism is said by Roman Catholic newspapers to have been largely consulted by the Pope for his Encyclical on the Labor Question (p. 160):

"Now, it is not enough that the teachings and examples of Christ be the foundation to our private and public life. We must strive to restore to our public and social institutions their former Christian character, raising up on the ruins of our present pagan legislation another and better, which, like that of Charlemagne, may merit to be called the faithful follower of canon law, *Canonum pedisequa*."

The French Monsignor Mermillord in presenting to the Pontiff the representatives of the Union Catholique d'études sociales et économiques expressed himself to the same effect:

"Not only does modern law make no account whatever of the laws of the Church, but the ideas that had their origin in these laws have been cancelled from the public spirit; the principles borrowed from the Gospel, and elucidated by the doctors of the Church, especially St. Thomas Aquinas, have been obscured; all just notions in labor and property have been forgotten, decaying, alike the obligations of the latter and the rights conferred by the former."

Leo XIII. is equally positive that the only true remedy for all evils of society has been confided to him; thus he says in his Letter to Cardinal Rampolla, dated June 15, 1887: "The Church possesses this great wealth, not only for the eternal salvation of souls, which is its first work, but also for the safety of all human society." To the same effect is his letter of April 30, 1890, addressed to Italian citizens, and the introductory sentences in the Encyclical beginning with the words "Immortale Dei."

Whence did Leo XIII. derive his social ideal which is being so widely welcomed? The answer is indicated in the extract from the address of Monsignor Mermillord, above set forth, where he cites St. Thomas Aquinas as the great elucidator of those principles whose neglect has caused all the woes of modern society.

Leo XIII. himself has left no doubt as to whom he considers the great teacher of the world. In the second year of his pontificate, he issued the encyclical beginning "*Æterni Patris Filius*," in which, after extolling philosophy in general, he continues as follows:

"Now we say that all these admirable and wonderful prophecies are only to be found in a correct use of that philosophy, which the scholastic masters, after much painstaking and wise counsel, were accustomed to adopt even in theological controversies. . . . Now, as prince and master, Thomas Aquinas far outshines every one of the scholastic doctors. . . . There is no part of philosophy that he has not handled fully and thoroughly. . . . One can hardly imagine what strength, light and help this philosophy can give, especially to the study of natural sciences. . . . Even the Ecumenical Councils, in which shone the most brilliant wisdom of the world, vied in doing honor to Thomas Aquinas. In the Councils of Lyons, Vienna, Florence, and that of the Vatican, Thomas assisted, and you might almost say presided at the deliberations, and decrees of the Fathers; contending with irresistible power and happiest results against the errors of Greeks, heretics and

rationalists. But Thomas's chiefest and special honor, and one he shares not in common with any of the Catholic Doctors, is, that the Tridentine Fathers, in the midst of the conclave for order's sake, desired to place the Summa of the Aquinate on the Altar beside the books of Sacred Scripture and the decrees of the Sovereign Pontiffs, that they might seek therein counsel, guidance and light. . . .

“Again we see the great danger which now threatens domestic and civil society from the plague of perverse opinions, and how much more peaceable and secure would either be if a sounder doctrine were taught in the academies and schools, and one more in conformity with the general teaching of the Church, such as is found in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas; and then his treatises on the modern system of liberty, which in our time is tending to license, on the Divine origin of authority, on the laws and their binding force, on the fatherly, just government of sovereign princes, on obedience to the higher powers, on mutual charity to all; these, to wit, and other subjects of a like nature, treated of by Thomas, have a great and invincible influence in rooting out these new principles of right, which are recognized as dangerous to order, peace and public safety. . . . Meantime, let the teachers intelligently chosen by you, study the doctrine of S. Thomas Aquinas, with a view to gently instill it into the minds of their pupils, and above all things to set forth conspicuously its solidity and excellence; and that the academies, either now instituted or hereafter to be instituted by you, defend, explain and

use it in refutation of the hardiest and most wide-spreading errors."

In the succeeding year his Holiness issued another proclamation on the same subject, from which the following extracts are taken: "Now, here is the chief and summary of the reasons by which we are actuated: it is, that St. Thomas is the most perfect model Catholics can propose to themselves in the various branches of science. In him, indeed, are centered all the lights of heart and mind which justly commend imitation. . . . His learning is so vast that, like the sea, it contains all the wisdom that comes down from the ancients. . . . For these reasons, we deem the Angelic Doctor in every respect worthy to be chosen as the patron of all students. . . . We have been pleased also to ask the advice of the Sacred Congregation of Rites upon the subject, and their unanimous opinion being fully in accord with our wishes, by virtue of our supreme authority, for the glory of Almighty God and the honor of the Angelic Doctor, for the increase of learning and the common advantage of human society, we declare St. Thomas the Angelic Doctor, the Patron of Catholic Universities, Academies, Faculties and Schools, and we desire that he be by all regarded, venerated and honored as such."

The foregoing citations are taken from "Pope Leo XIII.," by Rev. James F. Talbot of the R. C. Cathedral of the Holy Cross, in Boston, (published by Garrison & Co., Boston, 1886.)

On February 20, 1880, Cardinal McCloskey of New York, Archbishops Williams of Boston and Wood of

Philadelphia, together with their fourteen suffragan bishops, united in writing Pope Leo a letter, in which they said, with reference to the foregoing Encyclical: "On our part we promise to second your desires to the best of our powers. We will see that no school or seminary of higher studies in our dioceses shall fail to imbue its students with the pure doctrine of St. Thomas; and we thank you, Most Holy Father, for your vindication of the great Doctor of the Church, and for your efforts to promote the true progress of all science."

Father Beckx, the head of the Jesuits, in solemn audience, announced the thanks and obedience of his order.

This high appreciation of the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas on the part of Leo XIII., was no new thing. As Archbishop of Perugia, in 1872, he had established for the study of the works of the Angelic Doctor, an Academy which published a series of scientific transactions. Immediately after the Encyclical was published, by writing addressed to Cardinal de Lucca, dated October 15, 1879, he founded a similar institution in Rome and directed the publication of a new edition of the writings of St. Thomas. In all of his later writings, no chance to praise St. Thomas is omitted.

Great as were these compliments which the infallible Papacy at its first opportunity showered upon the Angel of the Schools, they were not undeserved; for, as this book will endeavor to show, it was he who six centuries ago forged the weapons by which the victory for infallibility was won and by which the

Papacy hopes in the future to gain universal empire. Whence had the Pope his admiration for the Angelic Doctor?

As the learned Jesuit, Father Harper, says in his "Metaphysics of the School" (Introduction, p. LXX.): "But I may not omit a special reference to that Order to which I belong—the Society of Jesus. It tells its members, and particularly its professors of Scholastic Theology, that 'Ours are to follow entirely in Scholastic Theology the teaching of St. Thomas, and to consider him as their own Doctor; and they are to use their utmost exertions to render those that follow their lectures as well disposed towards him as possible.' He who has charge and supreme supervision in these matters is thus admonished: 'Let him above all things bear in mind, that those who are not well affected towards St. Thomas are not to be promoted to the chairs of Theology; and that they who are adverse to him, or are even not sufficiently given to the study of him, are to be debarred from the office of teaching.'"

According to Father Talbot ("Leo XIII.," p. 187), "the 'Spiritual Exercises' of St. Ignatius is so penetrated with the Thomistic tradition that we may say that without the Summa it would have been impossible."

As Leo XIII. was educated by the Jesuits, first at Viterbo and then at the Collegio Romano in Rome (McCarthy's "Pope Leo XIII.," p. 26), and was afterwards ordained in a Jesuit church (an honor said to be reserved for members of that order only), his glorification of St. Thomas was but the act of a

docile pupil of Ignatius Loyola. By Brief of July 13, 1886, he confirmed to the Society of Jesus all their powers and privileges, praising them particularly for spreading the theological and philosophical discipline of the Angelic Doctor.

As Leo XIII. himself declares in his Encyclical above mentioned: "It is admitted that nearly all the founders and lawgivers of the religious orders have directed their subjects to study, and most conscientiously, the doctrines of St. Thomas, and with this warning, that no one depart with impunity one tittle from the footsteps of so great a man. To omit the Dominican Family, who glory in this great master as by right their own, we find that Benedictines, Carmelites, Augustinians, the Society of Jesus and many other Holy Orders are bound by this law as their statutes prove." Nothing can exceed the adulation which the Roman Catholic writers apply to him; Plassman, the learned professor in the college in Rome, says ("Philosophy," vol. I., p. 29), "He is the finger of God," and on page 18 *id.* he asks: "Is it exaggerated to say that to defend St. Thomas means to defend the Church?" All of the biographers of the Aquinate tell of the appearance of our Saviour to him with the words: "*Bene dixisti de me, Thoma*;" of course, none of the writings of the Bible could have a stronger confirmation.

How highly Cardinal Vaughan appreciates St. Thomas Aquinas is shown by the following extract from his "Life" (page 347):

"And in fact the ruling minds at Trent were those which had been molded by the great principles

embedded in the Summa. The spirit of St. Thomas lived in its Sessions and seems to have formulated its Decrees. . . . On the table of the Council were placed conspicuously three books: the Holy Scriptures, the Decrees of the Popes and the Summa Theologica of S. Thomas."

Cardinal Gibbons, in "Our Christian Heritage," says in a manner equally emphatic:

"St. Thomas Aquinas was, perhaps, the most profound thinker the world has produced since the dawn of Christianity. His vast mind ranges over the entire field of philosophy and theology."

But St. Thomas Aquinas in turn lays little claim to originality; he continually appeals to "the Philosopher," under which title the mediæval world always understood Aristotle, as furnishing the philosophical groundwork to which the teachings of the Bible must be applied. To understand the Aquinate, and in turn Leo XIII., it is, therefore, necessary to begin with a study of Aristotle, and in order to fully appreciate the latest teachings of the Roman Pontiff we must often turn to the Prince of Philosophers.

As Harper in his "Metaphysics of the School" (Introduction, p. LXXII.) says: "I ought not to omit another characteristic of St. Thomas—his admiration and (it is not too much to say) his reverence for Aristotle as a philosopher. His moral Theology—to repeat what I have said before—is built upon the Ethics of the great Stagyrte; just as the morality of the Gospel is based on the natural Law. He rarely, if ever, determines a problem in

philosophy without summoning the authority of the Greek Philosopher to his support ; and whenever he quotes him, it is always by the distinctive title of *the* Philosopher. . . . They stand absolutely alone ; the one the giant of the old world, the other the giant of the new."

As Dr. Plassman says in his first volume (above cited), p. 175 : "She (Aristotelian Philosophy) could not be separated from the *Summa Theologiæ* and the *Summa Contra Gentiles* of St. Thomas. Where the theology of St. Thomas rules, there rules also the philosophy of the Peripatetic School."

Without attempting here to enter upon the question of the merits of this particular philosophy, no reader of Roman Catholic controversial literature can have failed to note the great advantage which familiarity with this philosophical system—extending as it does from the mistiest metaphysics to the most practical questions of to-day—gives to the Roman Catholic theologian in presenting his side of the case, even when it is intrinsically weak.

The fact that the successors of the original reformers of the sixteenth century have had comparatively so little influence in continuing the conversion of Roman Catholics to Protestantism, is probably largely due to the ignorance of these successors of scholastic philosophy.

To appreciate the persistence and continuity of scholastic teaching we need only remember that the race of schoolmen originated in the schools established by the Roman Emperors to prepare men, fit for the service of the Roman State. With

the fall of the Empire, the control of these schools passed into the hands of the Church, and men were educated then to become fit for the service of the Roman Church. The decrees of the Codex Theodosianus (Lib. XIV., tit. 9), with its provisions for full reports to the Emperor on each individual student, for the universal study of Latin as the medium of communication, etc., present a curious parallel to the rules prevalent in the Jesuit schools of to-day, the object of the one having been the maintenance of the Roman Empire, and the object of the other the maintenance of its successor, the Roman Church. See Hampden on the Scholastic Philosophy of the Middle Ages.

From such schooling independent thought was of course not to be expected; they were trained to defend what the Church taught; they may well be described as the intellectual Praetorean Guards of the Papacy. Archbishop Trench, in his *Mediaeval Church History*, says:

(P. 273.) "The true hearted in every Christian land were yearning more and more after a Reformation of the Church in its head and in its members. But the Schoolmen were not Reformers; they were and always had been defenders of that which was. . . . There was nothing which, if it formed part of the Church's accepted system, they had not at all times shown themselves ready to defend; the most baseless pretensions, the grossest superstition, the abuse which was the mushroom growth of yesterday equally with the truth which had been once delivered to the saints. The withdrawal of the cup

from the laity ; transubstantiation, simony if practiced by a Pope ; purgatory ; indulgences ; the burning of heretics . . . they found reasons, and in some sort of fashion, Scripture for all."

Nevertheless, every one who would understand modern philosophy ought to familiarize himself with the scholastic system. It is impossible to understand Des Cartes and his followers, if we have no idea of the school in which they were brought up, or of the errors which they intended to combat. Without understanding Des Cartes, it is in turn impossible to understand the philosophers of the eighteenth century and of to-day ; without a satisfactory philosophy, it is impossible for a thoughtful man to arrive at definite conclusions on the most essential points of his own religion or to convince any, except the most superficial, of its truth. As our country becomes old enough to produce a leisure class, many will be found who will not rest content without at least attempting to solve the great riddles of our being which have attracted the strong minds of all ages. The study of Roman Catholic philosophy, therefore, even if we cannot agree with it, will at least make us appreciate the necessity for some philosophy and the utter inadequacy of our Protestant teaching in this respect.

Moreover, the Roman Catholic Church is not the only one which is infected with the philosophy of the heathen Aristotle ; none of the churches, founded in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, are free from it, although in some respects, on this account, it may be questioned whether Geneva be not nearer to Rome than Canterbury.

The churches founded in the eighteenth century have gone as far in the opposite direction, in consequence of a natural reaction, so that they, too, may ascribe many of their defects indirectly to the Stagirite. Hence, if we would have Christian unity, one necessary prerequisite seems to be an acquaintance with scholastic philosophy, as illustrated on a few points by Fairbairn's "Unity of the Faith."

Another advantage of this study is to make one appreciate how intelligent Roman Catholics can honestly love their church and work for its extension from pure and unselfish motives. Their philosophy is certainly wrong, but it is a philosophy which does not shrink from the most difficult and fundamental of life's problems, and therefore compares favorably with many superficial and uncertain systems, prevalent among Protestants.

The author has cited mainly Dr. Plassman's German works on the Philosophy of St. Thomas (published at Soest, in Germany, 1860, by Nasse), which have been recommended by the Rector of one of the largest Roman Catholic parishes in this City, a Monsignor of the Roman Court, as containing the best summary of Thomistic doctrine, and also the only English work on the subject, entitled "Metaphysics of the School," by the Jesuit Father Harper (published by Macmillan, but now out of print). A copy of this book was kindly loaned to the author by His Grace Archbishop Corrigan of New York, to whom the author is also indebted for the loan of the publication containing the official texts of the

writings of Leo XIII., known as "Leonis Papæ XIII. Allocutiones," published by Desclée, De Brouwer & Co., Bruges, Belgium. The translations of the Encyclicals in the following chapters have been taken, as indicated, from Roman Catholic sources, and they have also been compared with the official texts and found substantially correct. The Jesuit Stonyhurst Series of books on Catholic Philosophy (published by Benziger Brothers in New York, Cincinnati and Chicago) to which frequent reference is also made, is very ably written but is much more condensed than Plassman's work. The Catholic Review, which is frequently cited, is stated to be "commended by his Holiness Leo XIII., the Archbishop of New York, the Bishop of Brooklyn and many other prelates."

The object of the author is not to attempt to confute the theological teachings of the Roman Catholic Church which are not directly derived from scholastic philosophy, such as the doctrine of the Infallibility of the Pope, although he can not forbear in passing to refer any one in doubt on this subject to the immense Ante-Nicene Literature, translated into English within the last few years for the first time; it is submitted that it appears from this plainly enough that the few passages therein contained, concerning pre-eminence of the See of Rome, indicate by their context that it was a pre-eminence due to the fact that "all roads lead to Rome," and that hence, in the days before the Canon of the Scripture was fixed, all traditions were brought to the Capitol of the World to be sifted, compared and

agreed upon. Neither is it the author's intention to attempt to set forth and refute the scholastic philosophy as a whole. This is a far greater task than the author would presume to undertake.

The object of the following chapters is to show merely how that system affects the State by grinding that institution between its theories of the Church and the Workingmen's Guild, as it were an upper and a nether mill-stone, and then repeating the process with its conceptions of the Family and the Individual, until the State is reduced to an institution intended only to raise taxes and execute criminals. How successful this movement has been and how important it promises to be may be ascertained by consulting Nitti's Catholic Socialism, or Nippold's Kirchengeschichte (volume second), or Lecky's Liberty and Democracy.

The chapter on the Church and Science is added for the purpose of showing the fallacy of the main theory of the scholastic physical system, *i. e.*, that all motion must come from above,—from beings of a higher order than the thing moved,—for it is by analogy to this alleged universal principle that the dependence of the Individual, Family, Guild, and State (in short, of all laymen) upon the Priest-hood and of the latter upon the Papacy, is proved.

The importance of this inquiry will be at once appreciated when we remember that the Supreme Pontiff in this country has the unlimited right of appointment of all bishops, who in turn control the teachers of all schools under Roman Catholic influence, while on the continent of Europe the various

Concordats give the several governments more or less control over nominations of bishops, pastors and school teachers.

That these teachings are really believed in by all Roman Catholic laymen or even priests, in spite of their proclamation by the highest authority in the Church, is not so very probable; those who were educated in former days, when a more liberal spirit prevailed, will give them at most only a formal assent. But enough time has now elapsed since the proclamation of the doctrine of the Infallibility and of the main principles of the teachings of Leo XIII. to allow a new generation, which has been brought up on these doctrines, to grow up and enter our schools as teachers, and the question becomes now an important one, if these principles are dangerous to our modern civilization, will Roman Catholic schools make good citizens?

“Who has the schools, has the future.”

CHAPTER I.

THE CHURCH AND THE STATE.

According to recent statements of the press, large numbers of our citizens are enrolling themselves in an organization, the object of which is to exclude Roman Catholics from public offices. The fact that the Roman Catholic press is teeming with denunciations of the order, makes it very probable that the movement is a large and growing one. A recent article in the most conservative of Roman Catholic magazines urged its readers to leave one and join the other of the two great political parties, and Cardinal Gibbons, in an open letter (published in the Catholic Review for May 23, 1896), has threatened that all Roman Catholics will take this course, unless opposition to them, as such, ceases. This suggestion has already been followed by the institution of the Order of Catholic Americans, with the object of questioning all candidates as to their opinions concerning the right of Roman Catholics to hold public office.

According to the published statement of the leader of one of the great political parties in this State, the recent murder at the election in Troy was due to a feud which grew out of this antagonism. In many cities the municipal elections were conducted avowedly on these lines, especially where the choice of officials having charge of public education, was

involved ; in some States, the nominations for State officers are made with reference to this issue, and a presidential candidate has been denounced on account of his alleged friendliness to Roman Catholics in politics.

Has this Anti-Roman Catholic movement any justification? Is it destined to spread and grow? Or, is it merely a revival of the old Know-nothing spirit, which will shortly disappear on account of its own folly?

According to the statement of Roman Catholics, there was never a time when such an attack had less excuse. Leo XIII. is represented as being favorably inclined to the modern liberal spirit ; in France he has declared himself in favor of a republic, and broken off the long-standing alliance between the Papacy and the royal factions ; in our country his Ablegate has consorted mainly with the priests who represent the liberal American tendency in the Church, and his Holiness has expressed himself as well pleased with the course of his representative.

What, then, have the enemies of this Church to complain of at this time?

Has anything happened since the Know-nothing party was laid to rest in its forgotten grave?

Is all this show of liberalism of the present Pontiff and his accredited representative a false pretense and a blind, intended merely to cover up designs upon our national institutions, so dangerous as to require citizens to drop their former party affiliations and range themselves in opposition to every candidate for public office, who holds the Roman Catholic faith?

Let us glance at the principal events in the history of the Church of Rome since the days of the Know-nothing party.

At that time Roman Catholics could cite the Declaration in 1826 of the Vicars Apostolic who with Episcopal authority governed the Roman Catholics of Great Britain, as follows :

“The allegiance which Catholics hold to be due and are bound to pay to their Sovereign, and to the civil authority of the State is perfect and undivided.

“They declare that neither the Pope, nor any other prelate or ecclesiastical person of the Roman Catholic Church has any right to interfere, directly or indirectly, with civil government, . . . nor to oppose in any manner the performance of the civil duties which are due to the King.”

Moreover there was the Pastoral Address of Roman Catholic Hierarchy of the same year; they declared on oath their belief “that it is not an article of the Catholic Faith, neither are they thereby required to believe that the Pope is infallible.”

In this country, they could also point to Keenan’s Doctrinal Catechism, approved by Bishop Hughes, which contains the following (p. 305): “What if a General Council or Papal Consistory should undertake to depose a king, or absolve his subjects from their obedience ?

“Answer : No Catholic is bound to submit to such a decree. Indeed every Catholic may renounce upon oath any such doctrine, and this without the least breach of Catholic principle.

“Question: Must not Catholics believe the Pope in himself to be infallible?”

“Answer: This is a Protestant invention, it is no article of the Catholic faith.”

Pius IX., as above set forth, published no positive plan on the general subject of the relation of Church and State; the Syllabus of Errors being merely a negation of certain doctrines, and, moreover of uncertain authority. Has Leo XIII., the omnipotent superintendent of Roman Catholic schools, advanced or receded from the position of the Irish Bishops and Bishop Hughes?

In the first place, what are the teachings on the relation of Church and State of the Angel of the Schools, St. Thomas Aquinas, whom Leo XIII., as above set forth, has lauded so highly, and whose doctrines, according to his directions, all Roman Catholic teachers are “to gently instill into the minds of their pupils”?

In the passage from the Encyclical above cited, in which St. Thomas is extolled as offering great safeguards to the modern Family and State, particular mention is made of his treatise “on the fatherly, just government of sovereign princes.”

The treatise “De regimine principum” is evidently intended; what are its teachings concerning the science of government, and particularly on the relations of Church and State?

After setting forth the advantages which render a monarchy the most desirable form of government + (“since states which are not ruled by one, labor under dissensions and are tossed about without peace”)

he proceeds in Chapter XIV. of the First Book to state the relation of Church and State as follows:

“ If indeed men could attain this end (heaven) by human nature, it would be necessary that it should be the king’s duty to guide men towards this end. . . . A government is higher in proportion to its aim. . . . But since man attains the end of divine enjoyment not by human but by divine virtue, to guide toward that end will be the duty not of human but of divine government. Therefore the administration of this government, in order that spiritual matters should be distinct from earthly matters, is committed not to earthly kings but to priests, and especially to the highest priest, the successor of St. Peter, the vicar of Christ, the Roman Pontiff, to whom all kings of the Christian people should be subject as to our Lord Jesus Christ himself. For thus those who direct towards inferior ends should be subject to him who directs to the ultimate end. . . . Hence in the law of Christ, kings shall be subjects to priests.”

In Chapter X. of the Third Book, he treats of the rank of dignitaries as follows: “ If then our Lord Jesus Christ is so called (priest and king) as Augustine proves (7 de Civit. Dei) it does not appear incongruous so to call his successor . . . In the Supreme Pontiff is all grace, for he alone confers full indulgence for all sins . . . This cannot be referred merely to spiritual, because the corporal and temporal depend from the spiritual and eternal, *as the operation of the body from the virtue of the soul.* As, therefore, the body has through the soul, virtue

and movement, as appears from the words of the Philosopher (Aristotle) and Augustine on the Immortality of the Soul, so the temporal jurisdiction of princes depends on the spiritual jurisdiction of Peter and his successor. Which argument, indeed, we can assume from those things which we find in the writings and deeds of the Supreme Pontiffs and of the Emperors, because they (the Emperors) yielded to the latter in temporal jurisdiction. First, this appears, indeed, concerning Constantine, who yielded to Sylvester in the Government . . . But from the deposition of princes, made by apostolic authority, sufficiently appears their (the Popes') power. First, indeed, we find this power to have been exercised by Zacharia over the King of the Franks, since he deposed him from the throne and absolved all his barons from the oath of fidelity. . . . The same we find concerning Innocent III. who took the empire from Otto IV. And the same happened to Frederick II."

These teachings are repeated in the most celebrated work of St. Thomas, the "Summa Theologiæ."

Thus he says in Summa II., II., q. 10, a. 11: "Human government is derived from divine and should imitate it;" and again in Summa II., II., q. 60, a. 6: "For the temporal power is *subject to the spiritual as the body to the soul*, therefore it is not a usurpation of jurisdiction if a spiritual prelate intrude himself into temporal affairs;" and again in Summa I., II., q. 96, a. 4: "And such laws (which are opposed to the divine law) should in no way be observed."

Assuming that the foregoing extracts show suffi-

ciently the teachings of St. Thomas, on the manner in which Roman Catholics should regard the relations of the Church to the State, let us consider a few passages which throw light upon the manner in which they should treat their fellow citizens of other religious beliefs.

Summa II., II., q. 11, a. 3: "Heresy is a sin on the part of heretics for which they deserve not only to be separated from the Church by excommunication, but also to be killed . . . Although heretics on account of their sin are not to be endured, yet until their second relapse from the faith one should wait, in order that they may return to the faith; but they who after a second relapse remain obstinate in their error, are not only to be excommunicated, but also handed over to the secular princes to be exterminated."

Summa II., II., q. 39, a. 4: "A schismatic commits a double sin. First because he separates himself from communion with members of the Church, and for this the proper punishment of schismatics is that they should be excommunicated; secondly, because they refuse to be subject to the head of the Church, and therefore because they will not be coerced by the spiritual power of the Church, it is just that they should be coerced by the temporal power."

Summa II., II., q. 10, a. 8: "And therefore heretics are to be compelled to remain in the faith. . . . No one of us wishes any heretics to perish. But the House of David did not deserve peace unless Absalom his son was killed in the war which he was carrying on against his father. So the Catholic Church, if by the destruction of

some it collects others, heals the sorrow of its motherly heart by the liberation of so many people." The last sentence is in answer to the objection: "In Ezekiel, Chapter 18, it is said from God: I desire not the death of a sinner. But we should conform our will to the divine. Therefore we ought not to wish that infidels be killed."

Summa II., II., q. 10, a. 9: "The Church under punishment, forbids the faithful to have intercourse with infidels, who deviate from the received faith, either by corrupting it, as heretics do, or by completely leaving it as apostates do."

Summa II., II., q. 10, a. 10: "Infidels are not to assume government or leadership of the faithful; this would be a danger and scandal to the faith; but if such governments exist they may be endured to avoid scandal. . . . But such rule can justly by the sentence or decree of the Church be ended; because infidels on account of their infidelity worthily deserve to lose their power over the faithful, who are the sons of God."

Summa II., II., q. 10, a. 11: "Because the Jews observe rites in which the truth of the faith is predicted, their worship is to be tolerated. . . . The rites of infidels which contribute something of use or truth to the faithful are to be tolerated; but other rites are in no manner to be tolerated, except to avoid scandal."

The fate of our Hebrew fellow citizens, however, is not altogether a happy one, as appears from the following extract from a letter of the Angelic Doctor to the Duchess of Brabant:

“In the first place your Excellency inquires whether it is lawful at any time, and if so at what time, to make exactions from the Jews. To which question, so absolutely proposed, one can reply that, as the laws teach, the Jews on account of their sin are liable to perpetual servitude and their terrestrial lords can take the property of the Jews as their own; but in this, moderation should be observed so that the necessities of life should not be taken from them. . . . Lastly you inquire whether throughout your Province Jews should wear a sign by which they could be distinguished from Christians. To which the plain answer is that according to a statute of a General Council, Jews of either sex in all Christian lands and in all times ought to be distinguished by some dress from the rest of the people.”

Many Roman Catholics will of course say that these doctrines of Thomas Aquinas are antiquated and that they no longer are applicable, in this nineteenth century. Let us consider them in turn and see if they have not been in principle reaffirmed in our day.

To begin with the claim of St. Thomas that Popes can depose princes: Pius IX. expressly recognized the right of the Popes so to do, in his address to the Academy of the Catholic Religion, July 20, 1871 (*Discorsi del Sommo Pontifici Pio IX.*, p. 203): “Among the other errors, the most malicious is that which would attribute to it (the doctrine of infallibility) the right to depose sovereigns and free a people from its oath of fidelity. *This right*, without doubt, has at some times in extreme circumstances been exercised by the sovereign Pontiffs, but this

has nothing to do with Papal infallibility. Nor is its source the infallibility, but . . . *the Pontifical authority.*"

In this declaration, the late Pontiff was only following the leading Roman Catholic publicist of this century, De Maistre, who in his "Du Pape" (page 176) declares: "The Sovereign Pontiff in freeing subjects from their oath of allegiance would do nothing against the divine law."

Let us next consider the last extract from the opinions of St. Thomas, showing his antipathy to the Hebrews. That this spirit is not dead is proved by the fact that the Anti-Semitic party in Austria is in fact a Roman Catholic party and receives its name only from its first demand, *i. e.*, the restriction of Hebrew enterprise by special laws.

The following recent incident in the Austrian Reichsrath is characteristic of the movement and the statements of Dr. Lueger have not been denied by papal authorities, although ample time to do so has elapsed.

"One of the members, Herr Noske, said that there were priests in Vienna who preached from the pulpit, exciting the people against their Jewish fellow citizens. A poor woman living in the country had adopted a foundling from Vienna, who happened to be a Jew. She informed the parish priest of the circumstance, and was roundly abused by him for bringing a Jew to the locality. The child subsequently died. The priest refused to bury it in the graveyard. It was consequently interred in a field, and only transferred to the graveyard through the

intervention of the authorities. Herr Noske asked when some Primate of the church would raise his voice against such practices and preach that religion which taught men to love their neighbors as themselves. He reminded the House that the Prime Minister had recently affirmed the government to be of the opinion that true Christianity demanded tolerance. Herr Lueger, in response, declared that not a single bishop would be found to condemn the Anti-Semites. He said: 'We are proud to say that our movement has revived religious feeling in Vienna. . . . If a bishop could be found to approve of your party and to oppose the efforts of the Christians, such an ecclesiastic would be capable of crucifying our Lord a second time; he would be perpetrating the blackest crime against religion, and would be doing what the Pope must condemn. You may rest assured that the Holy Father in Rome is well enough informed as to the situation in Vienna to know on which side are the friends of the Catholic religion. We are quite reassured on that score, and are sure of the Pope. We know that he will not desert us in the holy war which we are carrying on in Vienna and in Austria generally.'"

Since this event, Dr. Lueger has been elected again to the Burgomastership of Vienna, as the Anti-Semetic Candidate—a movement which the Catholic Review of May 16, 1896, declares to be "largely recruited from the Catholic party." See also to the same effect the chapter in Professor Nitti's "Catholic Socialism," entitled "Antisemitism and Catholic Socialism in Austria."

Evidence that the persecuting spirit of the Church in general still survives is given by the manner in which Leo XIII. has condemned the Freemasons to suffer temporal punishments for their beliefs. In his Encyclical "*Humanum genus*" (cited in "*Pope Leo XIII.*," compiled by Rev. James F. Talbot, D.D., of the Cathedral of the Holy Cross, Boston, Mass., and printed by Martin Garrison & Co., Boston, 1886), the Holy Father says: "The first to denounce this danger (Freemasonry) was Clement XII., in the year 1738; and his Constitution was confirmed and renewed by Benedict XIV.; Pius VII. followed in the footsteps of these Pontiffs; and Leo XII. in his Apostolic Constitution *Quo graviora*, collecting the acts and decrees on this subject of the Popes who had gone before him, ratified and confirmed them for all time. Pius VIII., Gregory XVI. and, on many occasions, Pius IX. have spoken in the same sense. . . . Therefore, whatever the Roman Pontiffs, our predecessors, have decreed for hindering the undertakings and attempts of the sect of the Freemasons; whatsoever they have sanctioned, either for the purpose of deterring men from, or calling them back after they have entered those societies,—all these, each and every one, we hereby notify, and with our apostolic authority confirm; in which, indeed, trusting especially to the good will of Christian people, we beg each by his own salvation that they will make it a matter of conscience not in the smallest way to depart from the previous commands of apostolic authority in this matter."

The following is an extract from the Apostolic

Constitution of Leo XII., "*Quo graviora*," confirmed by Leo XIII., as above stated: "Moreover, we will and command that all bishops, prelates, superiors and inquisitors of heresy give information and proceed against said transgressors of whatever estate, condition, rank or dignity they may be, that they repress and punish them with merited punishments as strongly suspected of heresy; for we give to them and each of them, the free power to inform and proceed against said transgressors, to repress and punish them with the merited punishments, in invoking even for this purpose the help of the secular arm." We see therefore that Leo XIII. begs all Christian people "each by his own salvation that they will make it a matter of conscience" to proceed against all Freemasons, "invoking even for this purpose the secular arm."

By consulting the Encyclical on Freemasonry, it will also be found that Freemasons are condemned for the reason that they form a part of the sect of Naturalists, who are thus described: "It is the first principle of those who call themselves Naturalists, since by their very name they declare it, that human nature and human reason should be in all things the teacher and ruler; and this laid down, they either pay less attention to duties towards God, or they pervert them by indefinite and erroneous opinions. For they deny that any thing has been revealed to us by God Himself; they admit no dogmas of religion—that nothing is true but what human intelligence can understand; that there is no teacher whom we are to believe on account of the authority of his office."

In his Encyclical on Human Liberty, dated June 20, 1888, all men who call themselves Liberals in politics are expressly condemned as belonging to this school of Naturalists. It follows therefore logically that all who advocate these "liberal principles" of the Naturalists, ought also to be handed over to "the secular arm."

How welcome are converts driven into the Church for fear of "the secular arm." See "Armenia and the Powers" in the *Contemporary Review* of May, 1896, and Nippold's "Handbuch der Neuesten Kirchengeschichte" (published by Wiegandt and Schotte, Berlin, 1890), second volume, p. 225.

How wide should be the separation which is to exist between Roman Catholics and their fellow citizens, even in this country, is shown by the following command of Leo XIII., published during the past year, with especial reference to circumstances in America. The wide scope of this prohibition will be better understood when we consider how broad a field the term "correct morals" covers in Roman Catholic phraseology; it is held to embrace all intentional human acts, as will be shown below in this chapter, and as has been already indicated in the above cited Encyclical to the Belgian Bishops, in which the Social Question is declared to fall under the head of "religion and morals,"—the very two terms used in the following letter:

"We have learned that in the United States conventions are sometimes held in which people assemble promiscuously, Catholics as well as those of other denominations, to treat upon *religious subjects* as well as upon *correct morals*. In this we recognize the desire for religious things by which this people is

animated more zealously from day to day, but although these promiscuous conventions have unto this day been tolerated with prudent silence, it would nevertheless seem more advisable that the Catholics should hold their conventions separately; and that, lest the utility of these conventions should result simply to their own benefit, they might be called with the understanding that the admittance should be open to all, including those who are outside of the Church." It follows, therefore, that consistent Roman Catholics should attend no meeting for benevolent, social or political purposes, which is not called and managed exclusively by Roman Catholics, although others may be admitted.

It will, perhaps, be claimed, in spite of the foregoing evidence of modern intolerance, that the infallible head of the Roman Church was ignorant of these passages in the writings of the Angelic Doctor as to the relation of Church and State; but this would be, firstly, a grave reflection upon the theological education of his Holiness; how important a knowledge of scholastic literature is deemed in the church is shown by the fact that one of the propositions condemned by Pius IX. in his Syllabus of Errors was that "the methods and principles by which the old Scholastic Doctors cultivated theology are no longer suitable to the demands of the age and the progress of science," and every one admits that Leo XIII. is probably one of the best read ecclesiastics in his Church.

Moreover, if we look at the Encyclicals of Leo XIII. we find that as becomes a faithful scholar of the Jesuits, they breathe the very spirit of St. Thomas, and that when speaking of the relation

of Church and State he takes his figures of speech literally from that author. It may here be noted that the obedience to God, to which his Holiness so often refers, will be shown in a later part of this chapter and in chapter fourth, to mean obedience to the Pontifex Maximus.

In the opening sentence of the Encyclical last above cited, he announces that Christ "left the Church which He had founded as the supreme ruler of all people." This idea is developed in the Encyclical on the Christian Constitution of States, beginning with the words, "*Immortale Dei*" (translated from Latin Text of the "*Osservatore Romano*" by Rev. T. F. Mahar, D. D., Catholic Universe Publishing Co., Cleveland, Ohio):

"This society (the Church), though consisting of men, like civil society, nevertheless on account of its aim and the means which it uses for its purpose, is supernatural and spiritual and, therefore, it is distinct and different from civil society, and what is of very great moment, is a perfect society in kind and in law, since it possesses of itself by the will and benefit of its founder, all the aids necessary to its security and its action. Since the aim of the Church is by far the noblest, so its power is of all the highest, and can never be considered inferior to civil authority, or in any way subject to it. In truth Jesus Christ gave to his Apostles free mandate as to sacred things, adding the power of making laws in the true sense of the word and the consequent twofold power of judging and of punishing. The leader of men to heavenly things is not the State

but the Church, and to her the charge has been assigned, by God, that she should look to and decree in those things that concern religion; that she should teach all nations; that she should extend the bounds of Christianity as far as possible, in short that she should administer all Christianity freely and readily according to her own judgment. This authority, absolute in itself and plainly independent, which has long been denied by the philosophy that flatters princes, the Church has never ceased to assert for herself and also to publicly exercise, first of all the Apostles themselves asserting it, who, when forbidden by the rulers of the synagogue to spread the Gospel, answered with constancy, ‘We ought to obey God rather than men.’ The Holy Fathers of the Church according to opportunity labored to establish by arguments this same power, and the Roman Pontiffs, with unconquerable constancy, never failed to vindicate it for themselves against opponents. Still more, princes themselves and Governors of States approved this power by words and by deeds, by compacts, by transaction of affairs, by sending and receiving ambassadors and thus acting with the Church as with a supreme lawful power. Nor surely is it to be held that it was without a special providence of God that this same power was made secure by a civil principedom as the best assurance of its liberty.

“Therefore God has divided the guidance of the human race between two powers, the ecclesiastical and the civil, the one looking to divine and the other to human affairs. Each is greatest of its kind;

each has certain bounds determined by the nature and proximate cause of each, whence a circle, as it were, is drawn in which each may lawfully act. But since the power of both is over the same persons and hence it may happen that one and the same thing may come, although in different ways, under the law and judgment of both, a God of supreme providence, who is the author of both, must have accurately and harmoniously traced the course of both. 'Those that are, are ordained of God.' Were it not so, causes of destructive contention and strife would often arise and man would frequently have to stop in doubt and hesitancy like one with two roads before him, anxious as to what he should do in the presence of two conflicting authorities, neither of which can be conscientiously rejected. Such a condition is in the highest degree repugnant to the wisdom and goodness of God who even in the physical world, though it is of far inferior rank, nevertheless has so disposed and harmonized natural powers and causes that one is not an obstacle to another, and all fittingly and accurately combine to attain the purpose of the universe. There must be, therefore, a harmony between the two powers *and it is not unduly compared to the union between the body and soul in man.* Its character and extent cannot be judged except by considering, as we have said, the nature of both and taking into account the excellency and nobility of their purposes; one having as immediate and chief aim the benefits of mortal things, and the other aiming to provide heavenly and eternal blessings."

The same figure of speech is used in the Encyclical *De Libertate Humana*, dated June 20, 1888 (Leonis Papae Allocutiones, vol. III., p. 96): "And the concord (of civil and religious government) not inaptly has been compared to that which exists between soul and body, for the benefit of both; the division of which is especially injurious to the body, whose life is thereby extinguished."

It will be noted that after following the same line of argument about the division of the guidance of the human race between the Church and State, the figure which Leo XIII. and Aquinas both employ to express the relation of Church and State is that of the soul and the body. The nature of this relation of the soul to the body is not an open question to Roman Catholics: the Ecumenical Council of Vienne (1311) declared (Plassmann's *Psychology*, p. 207): "*Quod quisquis deinceps asserere, defendere seu tenere pertinaciter præsumserit, quod anima rationalis seu intellectiva non sit forma humani corporis per se et essentialiter, tanquam hereticus sit censendus*" (that whosoever shall presume to assert, defend or pertinaciously to hold that the rational or intellectual soul is not by itself and essentially the form of the human body, is to be considered a heretic). This doctrine is repeated in the Fifth Council of the Lateran (1512). We see therefore that it has been dogmatically declared that the soul is the *form* of the body. The same doctrine has been repeated in the Apostolic Letters of Pope Pius IX. to the Archbishop of Cologne, in which the Pontiff, condemning the errors of Guenther, declares it to be Catholic doctrine that

the rational soul in man is the true, per se and immediate form of the body ; see *Liberatore on Universals* (translated by Dering), page 108.

St. Thomas Aquinas develops this theory at length in his *Contra Gentiles* (Lib. II., Cap. LVII.), following, of course, his master Aristotle (*De Anima*, II., Ch. 2), who had declared that the soul was that by which man lives, feels, perceives, wills, moves, and understands.

Now, what does it mean to be the form of a body, according to Roman Catholic psychology ?

St. Thomas's teachings on this subject are shown by the following extracts from his writings: *Summa I.*, q. 78 a. 1: "For the whole bodily nature is subject to the soul, and stands to it in the nature of matter and instrument."—*Prologus in 12 libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*: "When several parts are united it is necessary that one of them should be the regulator or ruler, and the other the regulated or ruled. This also appears in the union of soul and body. For the soul naturally commands and the body obeys." *Summa I.*, q. 76, a. 1: "But it must be considered that as the form becomes nobler so much the more it dominates the corporal substance . . . the human soul is the noblest of forms." *Summa I.*, II. q. 58 a. 2: "The soul rules the body with a despotic government as a master rules a slave who has no right of contradiction." Aristotle had taught the same in his *Ethics* (Book 8, ch. 13), where he declares that the relation of a tyrant, not a king, to his subject, or an artisan to his tool, to be the same as that of the soul to the body. In modern Roman Catholic philosophies this teaching

is, of course, repeated, as in Dr. Plassmann's Psychology (p. 228), where it appears how broad and important this doctrine is to the whole scholastic or Aristotelian theory: "In every living being, even when it unites all kinds of life,—as is the case in man,—there is only one soul. This single soul performs all acts of life, whether it be vegetable, sensitive or rational."

Ignatius Loyola had evidently the same illustration in view which Aristotle used, as above cited, when he declared that his followers must be as ready to fulfill the will of their superiors as a stick or a corpse in the hands of a man; and Dr. Döllinger, in his "History," while still a Roman Catholic, used this comparison of the relation of Church and State to that existing between the soul and the body to sum up the most extreme claims of the mediæval Papacy as declared in the bull of Boniface VIII., known as "Unam sanctam."

Dr. Döllinger's statement is as follows (IV. p. 91):

"In the Church, it (the Bull 'Unum sanctam') says, there are two powers, a temporal and spiritual, and as far as they are both in the Church they have both the same end; the temporal, the inferior, is subject to the spiritual, the higher and more noble; the former must be guided and directed by the latter *as the body is by the soul*; it receives from the spiritual its consecration and its direction to its highest object, and must, therefore, should it ever depart from its destined path, be corrected by the spiritual power. It is a truth of faith that all men, even kings, are subject to the Pope."

We see, therefore, that any student acquainted with the first principles of Roman Catholic dogma and philosophy would at once understand the declaration of Leo XIII. that Church and State are related to each other as soul and body; it means that the Church is all powerful, and that the State exists and moves only thanks to the Church, and that one's duty as a member of the State is to be as completely subservient to the representatives of the Church as a member of the Jesuit Order is to his superiors, *i. e.*, as a stick or a corpse in the hand of a man.

The student of St. Thomas would, moreover, be expressly taught the passage above cited, from his *De Regimine Principum* (Lib. III., Cap. X.): "As, therefore, the body has through the soul, virtue and movement, as appears from the words of the philosopher (Aristotle) and Augustine on the Immortality of the Soul, so the temporal jurisdiction of princes depends on the spiritual jurisdiction of Peter and his successor."

Nor has His Holiness shrunk from using this authority to lay under the ban, as frankly as Pius IX. did, all that modern civilization holds most dear, as appears by the following extracts from the Encyclical *Immortale Dei* (above cited):

"But those pernicious and deplorable revolutionary tendencies which were aroused in the 16th century, when they had once introduced confusion into Christianity, and soon by a natural course entered the domain of philosophy and from philosophy into all the lines of civil society. From this source are to be traced the more recent declarations of unbri-

dled liberty, invented during the great upheavals of the last century and laid down as the principles and fundamentals of the new law, which was before unknown and is at variance on more than one score not only with Christianity, but even with the law of nature. Of those principles the chief is that all men, as they are of one species, are also really equal in practical life ; that every man is so far independent as to be subject in no way to the authority of another ; that he is free to think as he pleases, to act as he pleases ; that the right of governing resides in no person. In a society thus constituted. there is no princedom except the will of the people ; the people are in their own hands and alone rule themselves ; they select persons to whom they entrust themselves, in such manner, however, as not to transfer the right to rule, but merely a charge to be exercised in their name. Divine control is ignored, as if there were no God at all, or he were nowise solicitous concerning human society ; or as if men individually or united together in society owed nothing to God, or as if any princedom could be imagined whose cause, force and authority did not reside entirely in God. In this way the State is nothing but the multitude, mistress and ruler of itself, and since the people is declared as holding within itself the source of all rights and all power, it follows that the State should consider itself bound by no manner of duty to God ; that it should profess publicly no religion ; that it should not seek out of many that which alone is true, nor prefer a certain one to the rest, nor favor one principally, but to give to each

an equality before the law with the limit that public order be not disturbed. It is in harmony with this to leave all questions of religion to the judgment of each individual ; to permit every one to follow such as he pleases, or none at all if he accept none. Hence surely arise, a conscience without law to determine its decision, freedom of opinion as to the worship of God, or not worshipping Him ; a boundless license of thought and of the press.

“ Having once laid down these tenets, which in our time are highly approved, as the fundamental principles of the State, it easily appears into what and how iniquitous a position the Church is forced. For when the conduct of affairs is in accordance with these doctrines Catholicity is placed on an equal footing in the State with associations foreign to her, or even on an inferior footing ; no account is taken of ecclesiastical laws ; the Church which ought, according to the command and mandate of Jesus Christ, to teach all nations, is commanded not to affect the public character of the people. Those things which enter into both ecclesiastical and civil law are legislated upon by the civil rulers according to their own judgment, and they disregard in these matters the most sacred laws of the Church. Wherefore jurisdiction is usurped over Christian marriage, even the marriage bond, the unity, the permanency of marriage becoming the subject of civil determination ; the possessions of the clergy are disturbed, the Church being denied the right of holding property. To sum up the whole matter, they act towards the Church as if having divested her of the character of

a society perfect in kind and law, she were considered precisely the same as other associations which the State contains; and for this reason whatever right she possesses, whatever liberty of action she possesses, she is declared to hold by the concession and beneficence of the civil rulers.

“In view of these dangers, no doubt, is left as to the duty of Roman Catholics. . . .

“Therefore in the difficult course of affairs which is pursued, Catholics, if they will listen to us as they ought, will easily see what are their duties, both as to opinions and as to deeds. As to forming opinions, whatever the Roman Pontiffs have taught or shall teach must all receive a firm assent and be openly professed when occasion demands it. And especially as to modern liberties Catholics must abide by the judgment of the Apostolic See and each and every one hold what it holds. Experience has sufficiently taught their effect upon the State; they have everywhere produced results that are a just cause of grief to the virtuous and wise . . . Wherefore it is clear that Catholics have just reason to enter into political life; for they do not enter it, nor ought they to enter it, for the purpose of sanctioning what in our times is vicious in the character of public affairs; but for the purpose of turning this very character as far as possible into honest and genuine public profit, having in mind the purpose of introducing the wholesome life-blood of Catholic wisdom and virtue into the whole system of the State. . . . All Catholics who are worthy of the name must first of all be and wish to appear most affectionate children

of the Church; reject unhesitatingly whatever is inconsistent with that encomium; use popular institutions as far as virtue permits, for the protection of truth and justice; see that liberty of action does not pass beyond the bounds fixed by the law of nature and of God; work to the end that every state be made conformable to the Christian model we have described. The manner of obtaining these things cannot be determined by one fixed rule, since the method must be suitable to times and places which are very diverse. Nevertheless harmony of determination must first of all be preserved, and unity of work be sought. Both will be easily obtained if everybody will consider the prescriptions of the Apostolic See as his law of life, and will obey the Bishops whom the "the Holy Ghost has placed to rule the Church of God". . . . Likewise that it is not lawful to follow one rule in private life, another in public life, namely, so that the authority of the Church may be observed in private life, disregarded in public life." To the same effect, see the Encyclicals of June 20th, 1888, and Jan. 10th, 1890.

It is unnecessary to point out how the main principles of our Declaration of Independence and of the Bills of Rights, incorporated into our National, as well as our various State Constitutions, are directly negatived by the foregoing declarations, as emphatically as they were in the Syllabus of Errors of Pius IX.; see Hoffman's Sphere of the State.

But popular government, free speech, etc., denounced in this Encyclical, are by no means the only claims of modern liberal states which are de-

clared null and void by the Infallible Papacy, since the very right to enact laws as a sovereign power, without the consent of the Church, is denied to the State.

To prove this from the Encyclical denouncing Socialism and Communism, we cite only one sentence: "But if the ordinances of legislators and princes sanction or command what is contrary to the *divine* or the *natural law*, then the dignity of the Christian name, our duty and the Apostolic precept, proclaim that we must obey God rather than man." This principle is elaborated in the Encyclical of Jan. 10th, 1890.

How much is covered by the expression "the divine law" is seen by turning again to the Encyclical on the Christian Constitution of States: "Whatsoever, therefore, in human affairs is in any manner sacred; whatsoever pertains to the salvation of souls, or the worship of God, whether it be so in its own nature, or on the other hand, is held to be so for the sake of the end to which it is referred—all this is in the power and subject to the free disposition of the Church."

This passage has been taken for their chief authority by the Bishops of Quebec on the Manitoba school question in their "United Declaration" (Catholic Review, June 13, 1896):

"If the bishops, whose authority springs from God Himself, are the natural judges of a question which involves the Christian faith, religion and morality, if they are the recognized chiefs of a society, perfect, sovereign, superior by its nature and by its end

to civil society, it belongs to them, when circumstances demand, not only to express their views and desires in all matters of religion, but also to point out to the faithful, or to approve the proper means to arrive at the spiritual end which they propose to reach. This doctrine is that of the great Pope Leo XIII., in his encyclical *Immortale Dei*:— ‘All that which in human things is sacred by any title whatever, all that which touches the safety of souls and worship of God, either by its nature or by relation to its aim, all that is under the authority of the Church.’

“We must briefly recall these principles, inherent in the very constitution of the Church; these essential rights of religious authority, in order to justify the attitude taken by the members of the hierarchy in the present school question and to make better understood the obligations of the faithful to follow episcopal directions.

“Please remark, our dearly beloved brethren, that a Catholic is not permitted, let him be a journalist, elector, candidate or member, to have two lines of conduct in a religious point of view, one for private life and one for public life, and to trample under his feet in the exercise of duties not social the obligations imposed on him by his title of a submitted son of the Church. Therefore all Catholics should only vote for candidates who will formally and solemnly engage themselves to vote in Parliament in favor of the legislation giving to the Catholics of Manitoba the school laws which were recognized to them by the Privy Council of England.

This grave duty imposes itself on all good Catholics, and you would not be justifiable either before your spiritual guides or before God Himself to set aside this obligation."

Having thus seen how large a field is exempt from the authority of the State, on account of its falling within the province of the "divine law," let us next inquire what is embraced by the term "natural law," which according to the Encyclical against Socialism, above cited, is equally out of the jurisdiction of the State.

According to St. Thomas Aquinas, the natural law embraces all human law as shown by the following quotations :

(Summa I., II., q. 91 a 3) : " Besides the divine and natural law, there is a certain human law found by man, according to which those things which are found in natural law are particularly ordered." (Summa I., II., q. 95 a 2) : " Whether all human law is derived from natural law. . . . I reply that one must say that, as Augustine says in I. de lib. arb. that that does not appear to be law which is unjust; and as far as it has justice, so far it has the strength of law; but in human matters a thing is said to be just because it agrees with a rule of reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of nature, as has been above shown; hence all law humanly enacted has so much force as it is derived from the law of nature. If, therefore, in anything it disagrees with the law of nature, it will not be law, but a corruption of law."

(Summa I., II., q. 95 a 4) : " It is first from the es-

sence of human law, that it is derived from the law of nature; as appears from what has been said and according to this, positive law is divided into law of nations (*jus gentium*) and civil law (*jus civile*) according to the two modes by which anything is derived from the law of nature, as has been said above. For to the law of nations pertain those things which are derived from the law of nature, as conclusions from principles, as that purchases and sales must be just and other things of this kind, without which men could not live together, which is according to the law of nature since man is naturally a social animal, as is shown in the first book of (Aristotle's) *Politics*. Those things truly which are derived from the law of nature by means of a particular enactment, pertain to the civil law, according to what any particular State may determine to be suitable to itself."

(*Summa I., II., q. 96, a. 4*): "Just human laws bind men's consciences, by reason of the divine law from which they are derived."

(*Summa I., II., q. 94, a. 3*): "Since, according to St. Augustine in the temporal law, nothing is just or legitimate which has not gone forth from the divine law; it is certain that all laws, so far as they partake of right reason, are derived from the divine law."

From the foregoing citations it appears that human laws are a part of both the divine law and the law of nature, and more particularly of the latter; but that they can effect, not the general principles of the law of nature which are necessary for the co-existence of civilized men in states, but only the details developed in the practical application of those prin-

ciples. This divine or natural law, as a work of human reason, will hereafter be shown to be nothing but the will of the reigning Pope. In matters entirely independent of religion or the care of souls, there exists, therefore, for the Roman Catholic an unwritten constitutional law, regulating the most important principles of social life, which legislatures may not touch—and if they presume to do so, their statutes are against reason and therefore no laws.

Aquinas was in this case again following in the footsteps of “the Philosopher,” although Aristotle states the principle rather as an oratorical subterfuge (*Rhet.*, I., 15, 1375, a. 27 seq.): “When you have no case according to the law of the land, appeal to the laws of nature and quote the Antigone of Sophocles, ‘Argue that an unjust law is no law, etc.’”

Little did “the Philosopher” think what serious consequences this thoughtless advice was to have, in constituting in each individual a court of appeal against the laws of his own country. Thus the famous Jesuit Suraez says (*De Legibus*, III., c. 19): “*Lex injusta non est lex.*”

How utterly impossible it would be to carry on a government on this principle is shown for example in the chapter on “Toleration” in Ritchie’s “Natural Rights.”

The whole relation of natural, human and divine law is summed up by the present Pontiff himself in his Encyclical *De Libertate Humana*, dated June 20, 1888 (*Leonis Papae XIII., Allocutiones*, vol. III., p. 96): “Therefore it follows that the law of nature

is the same as the eternal law placed within rational beings, and inclining them to proper action and end, and it is the same as the eternal reason of the creator and governor of the world, God. . . . What reason and the law of nature is for individual man, human law does the same for man associated for the common good (in states). . . . If therefore anything is sanctioned by authority which differs from the principles of right reason, and may be pernicious to the state, it has no force of law, since it would not be a rule of justice and would lead men astray, for whose good society was formed."

The whole Roman Catholic doctrine of law is set forth at length by Father Matteo Liberatore, S. J., a favorite writer in the *Roma Civiltà Cattolica*, in his "Principles of Political Economy" (translated by Edward Herneage Dering, New York, Benziger & Co., 1891; p. 129):

"From this it by no means follows that the State may suppress private property, and make itself the proprietor of all the land, on the plea that such a step is conducive to the common good. The reason why this cannot justly be done, is that the right of property arises in us as an individual and domestic right, and therefore as substantially prior to civil society and independent of it; and as the human person and the family are prior to civil society and independent of it. The State has authority over the rights that come from itself. It has no authority over rights that come from nature—rights that preceded the State in history and in reason. . . . Hence

no State is competent to decide about that utility ; and therefore private property cannot be abolished by any political legislation, even if all the States in the world, as States, agreed together to do so. Only by the Divine Legislator could it be abolished, or by the spontaneous renouncement of it by all men, taken one by one. If such abolition were forcibly imposed by the State it would be a tyrannical violation of man's rights, and must as such meet with the reprobation of the Church. . . . In questions of right we must diligently guard against attributing too much power to the State. There are three things with respect to man that are of immediate Divine institution, and therefore have laws independent of the State. These are individual personality, the family and the universal society of all men under the direct but invisible government of God. . . . And indeed if the right to have property is a dictate of reason, it may well be said to be a dictate of nature ; for man's reason flows from his essence, inasmuch as the essence of man is that of a rational animal."

It may be here remarked that the difficulty in drawing conclusions as to the details of this so-called law of nature, is shown for instance in this case of private property as to which Liberatore asserts so positively that it antedates the State ; the most recent researches, such as those of Charles Letourneau, as set forth in his "Property ; its Origin and Development," show that tribal ownership, *i. e.*, a species of communism, precedes individual ownership, as marriage to a whole clan preceded monogamy.

No book among the English Roman Catholics stands higher than Father Rickaby's "Moral Philosophy or Ethics and Natural Law," one of the very able Stonyhurst Series of Catholic Philosophy; he says, on page 149: "No power in heaven above, or on earth beneath, can dispense from any portion of the natural law. . . . (Page 299.) Lastly it is not true that all rights, notably rights of property, are the creation of the State. A man is a man first and a citizen afterwards. As a man he has certain rights actual and political; these the State exists, not to create for they are prior to it in the order of nature, but to determine them when indeterminate, to sanction and to safeguard them. Natural rights go before legal rights and are presupposed to them, as the law of nature before that law which is civil and positive. It is an 'idol of the tribe' of lawyers to ignore all law but that upon which their own professional action takes its stand."

Among German Roman Catholic writers, we would cite as undoubted authority Dr. Plassman's "Die Moral," p. 38: "Since the constitution of society is framed to suit moral purposes, it follows that the science of morals is above the science of law. In regard to law, we must distinguish positive law, the law of nature and the eternal law (*lex positiva, naturalis and æterna*). The positive law must be founded on the law of nature and this in turn on the eternal law. . . . (p. 44.) Although positive law can and may be justified only as a part of the *lex naturalis et æterna*, the chief difference is diametrical, namely: *quæ juris naturæ sunt, ideo sunt præcepta*

quia bona, ideo prohibita quia mala ; quæ vero juris positivi, ideo bona, quia præcepta, ideo mala, quia prohibita. . . . The object of this paragraph is only to show why the whole science of morals can be treated as the *summa juris naturalis*."

If we consult American writers, we find the same theories in the Latin work "*De Philosophia Morali*," by Father Russo (dedicated to Archbishop Corrigan with the "*imprimatur*" of Father Preston, his Vicar General) (p. 60): "Hence you see that positive law derives its validity from natural law. . . . Natural law on the contrary is shown by a certain natural medium which is the light of reason. . . . Hence natural law is the eternal law as participated in by a rational creature." Cardinal Satolli in his "*Loyalty to Church and State*" (p. 226) says: "Now in regard to our youths, there are three rights which have claims on them, viz., the right of nature, the right of the nation, and the right of God; that is, for domestic society under the rule of parents, for civil society under the rule of due authority, and for the Church of Christ under the sway of Divine authority. This last is of all societies the greatest by extent, dignity and faith."

In France, Cardinal Gousset, in his "*Exposition des Principes du Droit Canonique*" declares, on p. 14: "All who occupy themselves in theory or in practice with questions of public or private law are in contact with the divine and canon law and should have a knowledge more or less exact of the laws of the Church. In Christian societies, one has always regarded the principles of the ecclesiastical law as the

basis of civil law, public and private. The canon law, *jus canonicum*, is called also the divine law, *jus sacrum*, the ecclesiastical law, *jus ecclesiasticum*; the pontifical law, *jus pontificium*. This last designation is not less exact than the first three; besides what it has in common with them to distinguish the ecclesiastical law from the civil law, which is the Cæsarian law, *jus Cæsareum*, it also perfectly explains the origin and principal cause, in indicating that the canon law emanates principally from the Sovereign Pontiff, or that an ecclesiastical law has no force except so far as it comes from the Pope or is conformed to the spirit of a law sanctioned more or less expressly by the Pope."

The object of citing these works of leading Roman Catholic authorities in various countries is to show the unanimity with which they adhere to the theory of Thomas Aquinas, and that this relation of civil and ecclesiastical law must be regarded as that enunciated authoritatively by the Church. The entire civil law as embraced within the natural and divine law must, therefore, be understood to be claimed by Leo XIII., in passages above cited from the Encyclical denouncing Socialism, and the Encyclical on the Christian Constitution of States, as being "in the power and subject to the free disposition of the Church." The theory of the Roman Emperors, that "*quod placet principi habet legum vigorem*" has therefore been adopted by the present would-be Ruler of the World.

For the world in general, this principle is explicitly announced in the Encyclical *De Libertate Humana* (above cited): "Besides, it is a most true duty to

venerate authority and to be subject obediently to just laws. . . . But where the right to command is wanting, or if anything is enjoined which is contrary to reason, the eternal law or the rule of God, it is right not to obey men, in order that God may be obeyed."

To the same effect is the Encyclical of January 10, 1890, beginning with the word "*Sapientiae*" (above cited): "Truly, if the laws openly differ from the divine law, if they injure the church, or those things which concern religion, or the authority of Jesus Christ in the Supreme Pontiff, then truly it is a duty to resist, a crime to obey."

In the Encyclical of Leo XIII. to all the Bishops of the Catholic world concerning civil government, dated June 20, 1881 (*Leonis Papae XIII., Allocutiones*, vol. I., p. 210), this teaching is repeated: "There is one cause for which men should not obey, if anything is demanded from them which openly is opposed to natural or divine law: for all things, in which the law of nature or of God is violated, it is equally wrong to command and to do . . . nor does their (rulers') authority then prevail, which where there is not justice, does not exist."

The following extract from "*The Catholic Review*" of February 29, 1896, shows how these principles are to be applied in practical politics:

"The Reverend Peter Finley, S. J., delivered an address on 'The Church and Civil Society' at the Catholic Club in Dublin a few days ago. He summed up his conclusions in these memorable words: 'First, The object which the Church and her rulers must

ever have in view is the object which Christ lived and died for—a spiritual one, the salvation of men's souls. Second, There are many matters wholly spiritual—interpretation of Scripture, mysteries of religion, Sacraments, and the like—and these lie evidently within the Church's jurisdiction. Third, There *may* be others which have no spiritual side, no bearing upon faith and morals, and *if there be* they are no wise subject to the Church's authority. Fourth, But there is a vast multitude of human actions, which go to constitute the life of civil society, in themselves unspiritual, without any direct and immediate bearing on the salvation of the soul—education, poor law administration, care of the sick and dying, reformation of the criminal, Parliamentary legislation, exercise of the poor law, the municipal, the Parliamentary franchise, and a thousand others—which yet may affect spiritual interests, produce consequences most hurtful or most helpful to souls, and so become indirectly spiritual, and subject to the jurisdiction of the Church. Fifth, And whether any given action is of this nature, an object of conscientious obligation, and so subject to interference on the part of Church authority, can only be determined by the Church herself—by the Supreme Pontiff, or by a General Council with supreme authority, and, therefore, without appeal; by each Catholic Bishop in his own diocese, with an authority which cannot be set aside by the State or by the faithful, though it may be appealed against to the religious authority which is supreme.' ”

It will be noted that the last foregoing citation

from Cardinal Satolli, while it expressly mentions the rule of parents for the Family and the Divine authority for the Church, specifies concerning the State only that it is to be under "due authority."

In view of such passages are even the most passionate declarations of so-called liberal Roman Catholics entirely reassuring? Take for example the following declaration of the most patriotic of the Hierarchy, Archbishop Ireland, which was recently read in the United States Senate, as a complete proof of the loyalty of Roman Catholics: "The Church recognizes as her own sphere faith and morals; she possesses and claims no mission in civil and political matter. If the Church encroaches upon the sphere of the State, we should bid her away. If the State enter into the sanctuary of conscience, the proper empire of the Church, the appeal is to God, and the State is ordered to hold off its hands. Separation of Church and State revolving freely in their separate and distinct spheres—Catholics fall behind none of their fellow-citizens in admiring it and demanding its continuance."

What are the limits of "the sanctuary of conscience, the empire of the Church"? Has Father Finley spoken the truth, in the last foregoing quotation, in saying that the Church is to define its own limits in all matters relating to "education, poor law administration, care of the sick and dying, reformation of the criminal, Parliamentary legislation, exercise of the poor law, the municipal, the Parliamentary franchise and a thousand others"? If so, where does Archbishop Ireland's loyalty begin? What

rights does he assign to the Church and what to the State?

The following quotation from the Catholic Review shows how in France, corporations may refuse to pay taxes on the same plea of conscience:

"The French government has passed a law taxing religious orders. Monsignor Tirgero, Bishop of Seez, has addressed an energetic protest to M. Ribot, the Premier. Allow me, Monsieur le Ministre, to explain to you the embarrassing position in which I am placed by your law. Ought I to advise the religious communities in my diocese to offer resistance or to be submissive? If I advise resistance, it will be said that I have no respect for the law. If I counsel submission, my indignant conscience will cry: 'Anathema! to the prevaricator of justice, to the contemner of his duty.' You cannot but be aware that *the law of the empire ends where that of the conscience commences.*"

Are Protestants also to be allowed to set up the claim for "the sanctuary of conscience"?

The following article from "Church Progress" on the grievances of Protestants in Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador, where their public worship is restricted, their marriages not recognized, &c., speaks for itself:

"The only real disability under which Protestantism labors in these countries is that it is not a legalized form of religion, and of this it has not the slightest right to complain. It forgets that it is an impudent intruder amongst a Catholic population in possession of the entire deposit of faith, that it is a religious system, both in method and in doctrine,

odious and repugnant to the people of those countries, an insult to their intelligence and their hearts, propagated as it is, as a reform of their own faith, which the preachers revile with contempt and calumny. It has not the slightest justification for its presence here, and yet is accorded every toleration except actual legalization as a religion by law established."

In fact, no Roman Catholic ought to appeal for anything on the plea of conscience, for, as will be shown in the chapter on the Church and the Individual, conscience is for them no independent God-given guide, but only a sub-department of man's reason, guided by the Pope. The only correct position for them is that of Father Richeby, S. J., in his "Moral Philosophy": "But if the State is sincerely convinced that the convictions openly professed and propagated by some of its subjects are subversive of social order and public morality, whose sincere conviction is it that must carry the day in practice? It is of the essence of government that the convictions, sincere or otherwise, of the governed shall on certain practical issues be waived in external observance in favor of the convictions of the ruling power. After all, this talk of conscience and sincere convictions is but the canting phrase of the day, according to which conscience means mere wild humor and headstrong self-will" (page 368). To the same effect is the Encyclical on Human Liberty and the Letter to the Emperor of Brazil by Leo XIII.

These full-blown Roman Catholic doctrines are taught also in the text-books used in our American

schools and colleges, although the Latin language is expected to keep them somewhat from profane eyes. The whole subject is summed up by the "*Elementa Philosophiæ Moralis*" (Benziger Brothers, New York, 1886), of Father Jouin, S. J., Professor at St. John's College, Fordham, New York (p. 371): "The Church is a visible society . . . it is independent from the political society; because she was instituted by God himself, from whom she received proper authority to order all things which pertain to the object of this society beside those laws which were given by God himself, and because her object is not only distinct from that of civil society, but far excells it. For this (civil society) looks only to the external temporary order; but that (the Church) looks to the ultimate object. And all things should be subject to the ultimate object. Therefore, the object of civil society is subordinate to that of the Church and not conversely. Therefore it is impossible that the religious society or Church should depend on civil society. . . . Wherefore civil authority cannot decree anything which is contrary to the doctrines of the Church, and it ought to watch over and protect the rights of the Church and its members, and if anything is defined as evil by the Church, that also it should hold as such and so far as possible proscribe. . . . For the Church is independent of civil authority, because the civil authority did not receive the duty of directing the minds and wills of men to their ultimate end, and itself (the civil authority) is subject to the authority of the Church in all things which concern the object

of the Church. Therefore the civil authority has no right to oppose itself to legislation of the Church. .

“The Church was instituted by God that she should be the infallible teacher of truth in those matters which concern faith and morals, because she must direct the minds and wills to their ultimate object. Therefore she must with authority teach those things which are to be believed and done that eternal life may be obtained. Therefore she ought not only to propose truth, but also to prevent, so far as possible, that the faithful should not be led into error in matters of faith and morals. . . . The Church is a spiritual society from its object, but it is composed not of spirits but of men ; hence external punishments are necessary. It is not necessary that this punishment should be imprisonment, because there are also other external punishments which can be applied. But in itself it is not repugnant that the Church should be able to decree such punishment. The political power can punish external crimes ; but it is absurd to oblige the Church always to recur to this power, because in that way it would make her in a certain way dependent on the civil power. As to the question, whether the Church has the right to condemn any one to death, one can reply that the Church as a religious society has never exercised this power, but always has been opposed to inflicting the death penalty. . . . But many approved authors also assert that the Church has the power of inflicting even the death penalty.”

Is not the teaching of such doctrine within the State of New York a justification in certain cases of

what our Penal Code declares to be false imprisonment and murder? No dependence of these doctrines on recognition of such ecclesiastical power by the State appears in this text-book. It follows, therefore, that the teaching of Father Liberatore in his *Chiesa è Stato* (p. 77) applies, that wherever the State has apostacized "there arises in society a necessary disorder, namely, the existence of a legitimate power, which is independent of the public depository of force."

Must not the fruit of such teaching be treason?

The source of this natural law is indicated in the Encyclical on Human Liberty as follows: "Reason certainly prescribes to the will what to seek and what to avoid. This decree of reason is called law. . . . Such is the beginning of all natural law, which is written and engraved in the minds of all individual men, for it is human reason itself which commands to do right and forbids to do wrong."

As Aquinas says in *Summa*, I., II., q. 95, a. 2, "the first rule of reason is the law of nature." This statement will be found repeated again and again, down to the Encyclical of Leo XIII. on the Condition of Labor (above cited): "For laws only bind when they are in accordance with right reason."

If law is then a work of human reason it is a human act and therefore it follows according to St. Thomas Aquinas, as shown by the following quotations, that it is a moral act (*Summa*, I., II., q. 1, a. 3), "Moral acts and human acts are the same."

"There begins the rule of morals, where first the rule of the will begins" (in 2 D., 24, q. 3, a. 2).

"Our acts are to be called moral, so far as they proceed from reason and are free" (Q. 2 de Malo, a 6 *et passim*). In the first seventeen questions of his *Summa*, I., II., he treats of physical acts of man and in the remainder of that work he sets out his moral acts which are all those of which good or bad can be predicated (*Summa*, I., II., q. 19, a. 1 ad 3 and *id.* q. 18, a. 5),—or of which it can be said that they are guided by reason. Thus St. Thomas says in his Proem. *Ethic.*: "Morality is the order which reason makes in human acts by ordering them in accordance with the rules of morals;" see Byrne's *Catholic Doctrine of Faith and Morals* (p. 84).

Moreover in his definition of moral philosophy he includes all intentional human acts, whether they are done by men as individuals or as members of an economic group or members of the State; see *Comm. in lib. Ethic. Arist.*, lect. 1. 1. 1.: "Et inde est, quod moralis philosophia in tres partes dividatur. Quarum prima considerat operationes unius hominis ordinate ad finem, quæ vocatur monastica. Secunda autem considerat operationes multitudinis domesticæ, quæ vocatur œconomica. Tertia autem considerat operationes multitudinis civilis quæ vocatur politica." All of the modern leading Roman Catholic writers on morals adopt the same broad definition. Thus Dr. Plassman says in his work on "Morals" (page 29): "The definition of the formal object (of the science of morals) is a human action, done intentionally with knowledge of its consequences." And in a passage above cited he says: "The whole science of morals can be treated

as the *summa juris naturalis*." Father Rickaby says in his "Moral Philosophy" (p. 2): "Moral philosophy is divided into ethics and natural law."

Father Russo, in the introduction to his "Moral Philosophy," above cited, defines moral philosophy as "a practical science derived from the principles of reason, directing human acts to honesty."

Bearing then in mind that every human act, guided by reason, is a moral act, let us now turn to the decree of the last Vatican Council, where we find it to be declared that the Pope is infallible in all matters relating to faith or *morals* ("de fide vel moribus"); as set out in Life of Cardinal Manning (vol. II. p. 450), the text is as follows: "Romanum Pontificem, cum ex cathedrâ loquitur. . . doctrinam de fide vel *moribus* ab universa ecclesiâ tenendam definit; per assistentiam divinam, ipsi in beato Petro promissam, eâ infallibilitate pollere quâ divinus Redemptor ecclesiam suam in definiendâ doctrina de fide vel *moribus* instructam esse volent."

The conclusion seems, therefore, inevitable that according to Roman Catholic theory, the Pope is not only the source of all law and has power to dispense with any law, but can direct every human intentional or rational act, including, of course, the casting of a ballot.

As the Pope can therefore direct every act of reason, he controls the source of natural law which, as we have seen, is above civil law.

Thus Leo XIII. himself declares in his Encyclical concerning the principal duties of Christian citizens, dated January 10, 1890 (Leonis Papae XIII. Allocutiones, Vol. IV., p. 15): "As the concord of minds

requires perfect consent in matters of faith, so it also demands wills perfectly subject and obedient to the Church and to the Roman Pontiff as to God. . . . But this must also be placed among the duties of Christians (besides a belief in all the dogmas of the faith) that they allow themselves to be ruled and governed by the power and authority of the Bishops and especially of the Apostolic Seat " (Rome).

For practical applications of this teaching, one has not far to seek.

The " New World " (cited in the Catholic Review), speaks more plainly : " We hold that, where a Catholic is nominated for an important public office, if he be in every respect as well qualified for that office as his opponent, Catholics are justified in taking into account the fact of his being a Catholic in deciding how they will vote."

As Cardinal Logue, the Primate of all Ireland, words it in his letter to the Irish Bishops (" Catholic Review," July 13, 1895): " A control (over education) which the Church has not from any department of the State nor from the delegation of the people, but from her divine right to teach and safeguard the faith and morals of all her members, especially the young."

The negative proposition also follows, as the " Catholic Review " states in an editorial of November 24, 1895: " They (the opponents of State aid to Roman Catholic schools) have no right to make the State the supreme arbiter in morals."

It would seem, therefore, that all the powers of the State are enjoyed on sufferance of the Church ;

for their relation—to repeat the comparison of Leo XIII. and Thomas Aquinas—is that of dependence, *i. e.*, as the body depends on the soul.

P. Matteo Liberatore, in his *Chiesa è Stato* (above cited), says: “The State must understand itself to be a subordinate sovereignty exercising ministerial functions under a superior sovereignty and governing the people conformably to the will of that lord to whom it is subject.” In his Encyclical concerning the duties of citizens, dated January 10, 1890, Leo XIII. says: “The same (the Church) is not only a perfect society, but even superior to any human society.” A similar declaration is in the Encyclical on Marriage and Divorce.

What were the authorities of St. Thomas Aquinas for this theory of the relation of Church and State? In the passage from *De Regimine Principum* above cited (Lib. III., Chapter X.), St. Thomas mentions the two principal authorities for his opinions on the relation of Church and State, namely, the Philosopher, Aristotle, from whom he derived his philosophical theory, and the writings of the Supreme Pontiffs and of the Emperors, from which he derived his historical facts. Among the latter were included the forged Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals, in which he implicitly believed, although no Roman Catholic writer of this century ventures to defend their authenticity; see Pope and Council by Janus. In the next sentence (Lib. III., Chap. X. of *De Regimine Principum*), in the extract above given, he cites the cession of Constantine to Sylvester, which fiction was a part of this most gigantic swindle; and in his

book against the Greek Church, he relies completely on the forged passages from Cyril, to sustain his argument for the sovereignty of the Pope. No one would cite these writings as authorities to-day and yet the Infallible Head of the Roman Catholic Church utters no word of warning when recommending the Angel of the Schools with such elaborate praise, as the Patron of all institutions of learning.

If we consider the source of his political theories, is that entitled to any greater respect? Aristotle was the tutor and pensioner of Alexander the Great, who was the destroyer of Greek republics and the first universal monarch; "the Philosopher" was filled with contempt for the democracy of Athens, which naturally returned the feeling, and on the death of Alexander, he had to flee from that city. How great was his contempt for the masses, may be seen by the following two quotations (Politics, III., 5, 5): "For no man can practice virtue who is living the life of a mechanic;" (*id.*, VI., 4, 12): "There is no room for moral excellence in any of their employments whether they be mechanics or traders or laborers." In his Politics, he has given us a picture of the absolute sovereignty of a Greek city, in which everything that we consider individual liberty is sacrificed to the Government; he intimates, however, that an absolute monarchy was his actual ideal, and evidently expected this from Alexander. His theories moreover were intended only for the small city-states of his day, as he expressly says (Politics, VII., 6) that no state should have more than 100,000 inhabitants.

Aquinas entertained the same opinion, as appears

from his *De Regimine Principum*, where he compares the relation of a ruler to his people to that of a captain to his crew (Lib. I., Cap. XIV.), and in his "Contra Gentiles" (Lib. IV., Cap. LXXVI.), where he expresses himself as follows: "But the best government of a multitude is that it be governed by one; this appears from the end of government, which is peace; for peace and the unity of the subjects is the aim of a ruler; but one is more likely to produce unity than many. It is manifest, therefore, that the government of the Church has been so arranged that one presides over the whole Church." The same idea remained in the Church and in modern times is voiced by Joseph de Maistre in his "Du Pape" (p. 16): "It is the same with the Church: in one way or the other it must be governed like every other association, otherwise there would be no aggregation, no assembly, no unity. That government is then in its nature infallible, that is absolute; otherwise it would no longer govern . . . (p. 166). No sovereign, without a nation, as no nation without a sovereign."

The Encyclical of Leo XIII. on Church Unity, an abstract of which, made by Cardinal Gibbons, is published in the daily press of June 30, 1896, is substantially a repetition of this idea:

"As no true and perfect human society can be conceived which is not governed by some supreme authority, so Christ of necessity gave to His Church a supreme authority to which all Christians must be obedient. For the preservation of unity there must be unity of government *jure divino*, and men may be

placed outside the one fold by schism as well as by heresy."

This argument in favor of the Papacy would be conclusive if all societies must be absolute monarchies; to us, living for over a century in a federal republic, without king or emperor, this argument has no force. A cursory glance at the writings of Ante-Nicene Fathers shows that the early Church was organized not as an absolute monarchy, but as a group of federal States. As Canon Gore well states in his *Roman Catholic Claims* (p. 124): "The original idea of the Episcopate would have secured for the Church a duly representative government, and would have provided, by the confederation of relatively independent churches, a system of checks upon one-sided local tendencies. The Papacy represents the triumph of imperial absolutism over representative, constitutional authority, and of centralization over consentient witness and coöperation." For us republicans, who do not believe that the rule of one is the best, but that a representative, constitutional government is to be preferred, does it not follow, according to the reasoning of St. Thomas, last above cited, that God must have intended His Church to have a representative, constitutional government, instead of an absolute monarchy?

Aristotle also believed in the division of citizens into castes ("Politics," Book 7, Ch. 9), which idea was probably derived from Egyptian precedent, and among republics he considered the aristocratic Lacedæmon to be the model. Thomas Aquinas, in his *Summa*, I., II., q. 95, a. 4, refers to the different laws

applicable to various classes, as to priests who pray for the people and to warriors who fight for the people.

Froude's Council of Trent gives a correct picture of the result of these teachings: (p. 8.) "There is a maxim now that every one is equal before the law. From the twelfth to the sixteenth century the clergy were a separate caste. They made and administered their own laws. They could neither sue or be sued in any secular court.

(p. 11.) "But if the clergy were exempt from lay jurisdiction, the laity were not exempt from the jurisdiction of the clergy. The law of the land might deal with common rights and obligations definable by statute or precedent. The clergy as the spiritual fathers of the people, were the guardians of morality. They had courts of their own, conducted upon their own principles, before which clergy and laity were alike bound to appear. . . . Morality was a word of widest latitude. . . . The spiritual law extended to sins, and not to notorious moral offenses only, but to everything which could be construed into sin by the Church's interpretation.

(p. 4.) "The original reformation was a revolt of the laity against the clergy, a revolt against a complicated and all-embracing practical tyranny, the most intolerable that the world has ever seen. It was embraced on an assumption, no longer seriously held even by Catholics themselves, that the Church was the source of all authority, secular as well as spiritual,

(p. 174.) "The laity of Germany, the laity of England, had risen against ecclesiastical supremacy in all its forms. The Church's doctrines had only been offensive so far as they symbolized the usurpation of an overbearing and self-indulgent hierarchy."

In "Kirche und Kirchen," written by Dr. Döllinger while still a Roman Catholic, we see how the Church continued to assert its claims for the priesthood as a privileged caste in the Papal States even into this century, so far as it had the power so to do.

(p. 534.) "As the priests constituted a class with privileges such as could exist in no other country of the world, the two classes were divided by a wide and deep gulf, and the laity was filled with a jealousy against the priesthood, which often went over into decided hate. . . . (p. 580.) The clergy had its privileged court, so that when a priest and a layman were both guilty of the same crime, they were tried before different courts. But also the penalties were different. Priests had the privilege of lighter punishments."

(p. 612.) "All higher offices are filled by priests, and laymen cannot fill them. . . . (p. 614.) The demand is, therefore, not the exclusion of priests from holding public office, but the termination of a rule of caste, the introduction of the principle of equality in civil affairs, the participation of the people in its own government. . . . (p. 615.) The dissatisfaction is caused by the great inequality of social position which makes the priests always the rulers, and the laymen always the servants, which in every pub-

lic or private contest between layman and priest all the advantages are in the hands of the latter and makes the defeat of the former almost certain."

How wide the gulf between the Roman Catholic clergy and laity still is, even in England, is shown by a letter of Mgr. Talbot, in the *Life of Cardinal Manning* (Vol. II., P. 318):

"They (the laity) are now beginning to show the cloven foot, which I have seen the existence of for a long time. They are only putting into practice the doctrine taught by Dr. Newman in his "Rambler." . . . What is the province of the laity? To hunt, to shoot, to entertain. These matters they understand; but to meddle with ecclesiastical matters they have no right at all."

Cardinal Manning lamented that this spirit still existed even in England (*Cardinal Manning's Life*, p. 783): "I have often said that our priests are always booted and spurred like cavalry officers in time of peace."

This castelike division of classes Ignatius Loyola had done his part to complete, by supplying the highest priestly or ruling class. How strictly he bound his order to follow Thomas on every point, we have heard in the Encyclical above cited, and his pupil, Leo XIII., has shown us. The absolute subjection in the Jesuit order of the individual to the whole, is therefore a result of the same theories which produced in Greece the blind obedience of the Lacedæmonians to their laws, with its total eradication of the spirit of individualism and progress.

How strongly Leo XIII. believes in this castelike

division is shown by the epistle concerning the obedience due by laymen to bishops, dated December 17, 1888 (Leonis Papae XIII., p. 183): "It is plain that there are in the Church two orders of men, one distinct by nature from the other, shepherds and flock, that is, rulers and masses. The duty of the first order is to teach, to govern, to moderate the discipline of life, to give precepts; the duty of the other is to be subject, to obey, to follow precepts, to give honor."

The express recognition of the principle of religious persecution is, moreover, an echo of the old Greek city constitution, which could not allow within its narrow borders any who did not recognize the city's gods; not to swear by them was the sign of a traitor. Rome was in theory never anything more than a magnified city-state and when the cloak of the Cæsars fell on the shoulders of the Pontifex Maximus rather than on those of the German rulers of the Holy Roman Empire, the refusal of heretics to recognize the Pope was punished in much of the same spirit as the refusal of early Christians to offer incense to the Roman Emperors; Torquemada was acting for the successor of Diocletian. Christianity has, therefore, in this, as in so many other points, been forced to bear the blame for acts which were the consequences of following too closely the teachings of the ancient heathen civilizations, instead of those of the Gospel.

No greater contrast than that between our Germanic Federal Constitution, as outlined in the "Federalist," with its respect for the individual and its limited organizations for the government of local,

state and national affairs, and the inorganic, absolute government of a Greek city can be imagined; see the author's "Trade Organizations in Politics or Federalism in Cities." The "*Ancien Regime*" of France, which was overthrown by the Revolution, based its pretensions on the theories of Aristotle and Aquinas. "L'etat, c'est moi" of Louis XIV. is of the same ancestry as "L'eglise, c'est moi," or rather "La monde, c'est moi" of Leo XIII.

As the Most Reverend Dr. Sheehan, Bishop of Waterford, at the Mayrooth Centenary declared, in the presence of the whole English and Irish hierarchy (Catholic Review of July 20, 1895): "For us and for all Catholics he (Leo XIII.) is the vicar of Christ, the divinely appointed Head of the Church and *the leader and ruler of nations.*" The echo of the cry *urbi et orbi* for universal dominion has not yet died out among the Seven Hills.

But right or wrong in theory, have we Americans not had enough of sovereignties *within* our federal constitution that we should now accept a sovereignty (for that is what Leo XIII.'s "perfect society" under the Sovereign Pontiff amounts to) *above* our Constitution? How can we reconcile such theories with our principle of the separation of State and Church, which leaves to the latter to insure obedience to its commands only appeals to the love of God and man, residing in each of us, as set out for example in Seabury's "Introduction to the Study of Ecclesiastical Polity"? How are such theories compatible with a government "of the people, by the people, for the people"?

The Rt. Rev. Abbott Snow, O. S. B., recognizes the incompatibility frankly in "The Catholic Times" of August 10, 1894: "All authority and power (it is said) must be derived from the people, be exercised in their name, and be terminable at their will. In such a state what place is there for ecclesiastical authority? Religion supposes an authority derived from God to regulate a system for the worship of God. The Catholic Church has a hierarchy of officials—Pope, Bishops and Clergy—with authority to command the obedience of the people independent of the State. These officials cannot rule at the will of the State nor can their authority be derived from it." As Justin McCarthy says in his *Leo XIII.* (p. 85): "The empire of the Pope is not merely greater than any other empire. It folds in all the empires and all the monarchies and all the republics in the world."

The negative declarations of the Syllabus, which caused so much alarm to Mr. Gladstone, have been developed and put into the form of positive, universal commands by Leo XIII.; he has completed the scheme which Aquinas planned and of which Loyola commenced the execution; its aim is in the dominion of the world under a caste of priests ruled by a supreme Pontiff. In short, the Roman Catholic Church has been Jesuitized and now it would Jesuitize the world, through this apt pupil of the Jesuits, Leo XIII. Nippold's *Kirchengeschichte* (second volume) shows how the study of St. Thomas has always preceded ultra-montanism and a Jesuit invasion.

But even if we succeed in resisting the active assertion of the Papal claims as to the respective domains of Church and State, is not the very idea of the complete separation of the religious from the national life of a people, negatively, a mistake? Kidd, in his *Social Evolution*, has shown that the real principle of life in a nation is its religion; it is this supernatural sanction which makes men ready to sacrifice their selfish individual instinct for the good of the whole, for the benefit of generations yet unborn. He says (p. 111): "A religion is a form of belief providing an ultra-rational sanction for that large class of conduct in the individual where his interests and the interest of the social organism are antagonistic, and by which the former are rendered subordinate to the latter in the general interests of the evolution which the race is undergoing."

The nations with national religions like Russia and England have certainly in this century taken a decided lead in progress of every kind before Roman Catholic countries, like France and Austria. Is not a certain connection between the nation and a national church desirable and theoretically correct, so that the idea of an international church organization is in itself to be rejected? If all the men of a certain race have once become convinced sincerely of the truth of Christianity, and become enlightened by the gift of God's Holy Spirit speaking to their consciences, why should they not meet to consult and determine what is best for the spiritual welfare of all the race and in what form they can best worship their Creator? As Westcott says in

his "Social Aspects of Christianity" (p. 76): "A national church alone can consecrate the whole life of a people."

If the theory advanced in the fourth chapter of this book is correct, that the Holy Spirit was promised not only to the priesthood, but to all laymen who would avail themselves of God's holy ordinances, does it not also follow that on all men devolves directly the duty of making the State as nearly as possible what God has willed that His kingdom on earth should be, and that therefore the laity are not bound to wait (as the Belgians have been required by the Pope to do) for a Congress of Bishops to direct them as to the proper health, labor and poor laws which they should enact? The old contest of the Reformation, of the laity against the caste of priests, of the light of grace against the light of nature, is therefore not ended.

The nearest approach to the realization of this ideal relation of Church and State, has been in the colonies of Portugal and Spain; from such a government—*Good Lord deliver us!*

Under how many reservations in favor of the eternal and natural law and of the directions of the infallible Roman guide in morals, must not a sincere Roman Catholic take the oath of allegiance? Is not his conception of the State necessarily very far from that of a brotherhood of men, working out God's will according to light of their consciences, and willing to sacrifice everything "one for all and all for one,"—to carry out the spirit of the cry "*E pluri-bus unum*"? The oath of allegiance of a faith-

ful Roman Catholic must read about as follows: "I solemnly swear that I will support the Constitution of the United States, except where it is contrary to the pontifical or natural or eternal law, and that I renounce allegiance and fidelity to all foreign sovereigns, except that in all rational or intentional acts I will obey the infallible direction of the Pontiff of Rome."

The following lines from Doctor (now, the author believes, Cardinal) Hergenroether, in his Catholic Church and Christian State, seem worthy of "a Daniel come to justice": "No State can be required to permit what will endanger its own existence and destroy the foundations of all social order. Yet there are sects and religions which would do this. . . . Who would dream of requiring that these sects should be tolerated or recognized by the State, or deny that the State not only might but ought to resist them by all the means at its disposal? No liberty is granted to doctrines . . . which threaten the constitution of the State and the observance of the civil laws."

To cure this attachment of Roman Catholics to a foreign potentate but two remedies suggest themselves: One is to inculcate the theory that, although the Pope controls reason and consequently conscience, still, on questions relating to the State, the reason or conscience is not to be exercised. This teaching results, of course, in complete obedience of the subject to the ruler; it can only be justified through the argument that the Crown is as truly a divine institution as the Papacy. The Di-

vine Right of Kings is therefore directly due to the Divine Right of Popes; it was the only possible antidote to the latter; see "The Divine Right of Kings," by J. N. Figgis (Macmillan & Co., New York, 1896). It is therefore perfectly natural to find many Jesuit writers asserting the rights of the People as against the Crown, but by "the People" was always understood a "Pope-guided people." The partiality of Leo XIII. for Democracies is therefore easily understood; with the Divine Right of Kings disappears his chief and only rival. A Democracy has no such dangerous enemy, the idea of popular sovereignty can never take the place of a personal sovereign; moreover, the Pope, as guide of the human conscience or reason, can interfere whenever he pleases in the formation of this popular idol. An independent republic and Roman Catholicism are therefore, from their very nature, incompatible. The only other remedy is, therefore, to convince our Roman Catholic fellow-citizens of the truth of the proposition set forth below, in the chapter on the Church and Individual, in which it is shown that on *no* questions has a person the right to exile his reason or conscience, and place it, gagged and bound, in foreign hands; but that, on the contrary, it is his most important duty to develop this talent to the utmost, through God's most holy ordinances, and to obey implicitly the warnings of this inspired monitor. No State has anything to fear from an appeal to man's conscience, in direct communion, without human mediation, with God the Holy Ghost.

If this second remedy is not applied thoroughly and speedily, then, as the author believes, is the prospect dark indeed. Then must echo the streets again with the cries, "Hi, Guelph!" "Hi, Ghibelline!" Then must ring the pulpits again with denunciations of the Divine Right of Popes, as in the days of Elizabeth and James, and with praise for its only possible substitute, the Divine Right of Kings.

The contest would be for the right to follow the inner light, to listen to the small, still voice,—for which Socrates drank his cup of hemlock.

CHAPTER II.

THE CHURCH AND THE WORKINGMAN.

From the prominence which the labor question bears in modern life, it was not to be expected that Leo XIII. would overlook it; in fact, in the first year of his reign, he wrote denouncing socialism and communism, and in 1891 he issued his famous Encyclical "Novarum rerum," in which he undertook to provide remedies for the distressing conditions of the laboring classes of the world. How strongly he felt this to be his duty and privilege the Encyclical expressly shows: "It (the condition of labor) is a matter which we have touched once or twice already. But in this letter the responsibility of the Apostolic offices urges us to treat the question expressly and at length, in order that there may be no mistake as to the principles which truth and justice dictate for its settlement. . . . We approach the subject with confidence and in the exercise of the rights which belong to us; for no practical solution for this question will ever be found without the assistance of religion and of the Church. It is we who are the chief guardians of religion and the chief dispenser of what belongs to the church, and we must not by silence neglect the duty which lies upon us."

In the Encyclical to the Belgian Bishops (above cited) the social question is expressly claimed for

the Church as falling within the domain of religion and morals.

Nor is this view peculiar to Leo XIII. ; under the definition of morals as explained in a former chapter, the whole social system is included and the ordinary Roman Catholic text-books on Morality include chapters on all important social questions ; for example, the above cited work on Moral Philosophy by Father Russo, Father Rickaby's Moral Philosophy, F. Costa Rossetti's *Institutiones Ethicæ et Juris Naturæ*.

How imperative and final the plan is to be regarded by Roman Catholics, is shown also by the same Encyclical to the Belgian Bishops, cited in the Introduction, in which he prohibits the laity from discussing the social question in that country and summons a council of Bishops to consider it. How implicitly this infallible voice is followed also in these matters, appears from the unconditional acceptance of its teachings, even by Roman Catholic writers who had previously entertained most opposite views, such as M. Charles Revin, who, in his *L'économie politique d'après l'Encyclique* (Paris, 1891), referring to this Encyclical, declares, on page 21 : " The Church, behold our guide, our true master for the social question ; let us follow her and no one else. Let us have no other political economy than that which flows from her teachings on the labor question."

Father Zahm, in his article on " Leo XIII. and the Social Question," in the *North American Review* for August, 1895, says : " We recognize in the earnest but tender words of the Pontiff, the divine

perfume of the Master, the precise lessons of the Fathers of the Church, and the carefully pondered and soundly democratic teachings of the Doctors of the Middle Ages."

To understand the scheme of the Holy Father aright, we must bear in mind one sentence of this Encyclical: "Let us now, therefore, inquire what part the State should play in the work of remedy and relief. By the State we here understand, not the particular form of government which prevails in this or that nation, but the State as rightly understood; that is to say any government conformable in its institutions to right reason and natural law, and to those dictates of the Divine Wisdom which we have expounded in the Encyclical on the Christian Constitution of the State."

To fill in any lacking details of the plan proposed, we must therefore suppose that before it can be carried out completely, the State must have been reorganized according to the principles laid down in the foregoing chapter, so that the relation of Church and State shall have become like that of the soul and body, and the Church would then of course be able to supply in its good judgment all that might be necessary to this scheme of social reform.

One passage from this Encyclical is worth citing at this point to remind us of the superiority of the soul: "It is the soul which is made after the image and likeness of God; it is in the soul that sovereignty resides, in virtue of which man is commanded to rule the creatures below him, and to use all the earth and the ocean for his profit and advantage."

The plan of the Encyclical, to state it in a few words, agrees substantially with the teachings of the State-socialists, laying special stress on the development of trades-unions. But these organizations must consist exclusively of Roman Catholics; he says: "But there is a good deal of evidence which goes to prove that many of these societies are in the hands of invisible leaders and are managed on principles far from compatible with Christianity and the public well-being; and that they do their best to get into their hands the whole field of labor and to force workmen either to join them or to starve. Under these circumstances Christian workmen must do one of two things; either join associations in which their religion will be exposed to peril, or form associations among themselves—unite their forces and courageously shake off the yoke of an unjust and intolerable oppression. No one who does not wish to expose man's chief good to extreme danger will hesitate to say that the second alternative must by all means be adopted. . . . It is clear that they (workingmen's association) must pay special and principal attention to piety and morality . . . Let our associations then look first and before all to God; let religious instruction have therein a foremost place, each one being carefully taught what is his duty to God, what to believe, what to hope for and how to work out his salvation . . . Let him learn to reverence and to love mother Church, the common mother of us all . . . Such mutual associations among Catholics are certain to be productive in no small degree of prosperity to the State."

Moreover these organizations must be as independent as possible from the State: "Particular societies, then, although they exist within the State, and are each a part of the State, nevertheless cannot be prohibited by the State absolutely and as such. For to enter into 'society' of this kind is the natural right of man; and the State must protect natural rights, not destroy them; and if it forbids its citizens to form associations, it contradicts the very principle of its own existence; for both they and it exist in virtue of the same principles, viz.: the natural propensity of man to live in society . . . But every precaution should be taken not to violate the rights of individuals and not to make unreasonable regulations under the pretense of public benefit. For laws only bind when they are in accordance with right reason and therefore with the eternal law of God. . . Let the State watch over these societies of citizens united together in the exercise of their right; but let it not thrust itself into their peculiar concerns and their organization."

In a previous passage of the Encyclical, after recommending a minimum wage, he proceeds: "In these and similar questions, however, such as, for example, the hours of labor in different trades, the sanitary precautions to be observed in factories and work shops, etc., in order to supersede undue interference on the part of the State, especially as circumstances, times and localities differ so widely, it is advisable that recourse be had to societies or boards such as we shall mention presently, or to some other method of safe guarding the interests of wage

earners; the State to be asked for approval and protection."

Each association is to consist of employers as well as employed. "If it should happen that either a master or a workman deemed himself injured, nothing would be more desirable than that there should be a committee composed of honest and capable men of the association itself, whose duty it should be, by the laws of the association, to decide the dispute. Among the purposes of a society should be to try to arrange for a continuous supply of work at all times and seasons; and to create a fund from which the members may be helped in their necessities, not only in cases of accident, but also in sickness, old age and misfortune."

From the foregoing extract it is evident that the Infallible Head of the Roman Church has decided in favor of that school of political economy which in Germany is represented by Abbé Schings, the director of the *Christlich Sociale Blätter*, and in France by Léon Harmel, the proprietor of the great factory at Val-des-Bois; both of these writers represent the free guild system as opposed to the plan of compulsory guilds, under the superintendence of the State; the latter plan is advocated in Germany by Baron Hitze and in France by the Count de Mun. If we therefore turn to the writers first mentioned we find a plainer and bolder picture of the plan which Leo XIII. evidently had in his mind and of which he drew the outline in his Encyclical. Thus Schings writes: "The old corporations (guilds) were created by the Church. And it was because

they were religious associations and maintained their character as such that they preserved their vigor and stability. . . . The Christian spirit is a family tie, uniting together masters, fellow workmen and apprentices, and the destruction of this spirit by the Renaissance and the Reformation was the death blow to the corporations. How then can these new compulsory corporations, which must necessarily comprise all workmen without any distinction of creed—how then can they be expected to produce the same beneficial results? How then can you expect to find a family spirit in the workshop where the master is a Protestant, the foreman a Jew, the apprentice a Catholic, or *vice versa*? A guild composed of Catholics and Protestants could have no real consistence and would merely have an external appearance of union maintained perhaps by the police." To the same effect speaks Léon Harmel in the Association Catholique des Patrons du Nord: "We will not upon any account accept the compulsory guilds because the combining of unequal and frequently opposed elements can only, from the moral point of view, produce disastrous effects. Those who would build in company must first speak the same language; now, Catholics and free thinkers have an entirely different language: the first call honor that which the others deem cowardice, the second call liberty what the others consider as slavery; the former are ready to give their life for their duty, while the latter hold rebellion as the first of duties. On all arguments concerning virtue, probity, disinterestedness, the origin and aim of life,

they each speak a separate language. How then could they act in concert in re-constructing a moral fabric which demands unity and community of effort?"

Father Liberatore in his *Principles of Political Economy*, which is supposed to have served as a suggestion for the Papal Encyclical, speaks to the same effect (page 289): "Clearly corporations ought to be founded on religion. . . . Here the Austrian corporations are wide of the mark, being compelled to admit 'oves et boves universas, insuper et pecora campi.' Catholics, Protestants, Jews, and even atheists are indiscriminately brought together therein; so that the basis of these societies is not religious, but purely economic. This is the result of the compulsory system, which is also against harmony of thought and feeling. . . . The danger of intimacy between people of different religions may be much obviated by instituting for the Catholics, pious congregations to serve as an antidote and bind them together as a separate unity. Thus whereas in former days Corporations arose out of Confraternities, Confraternities would now come out of Corporations . . . (page 293): The Christian Corporation, so far as its organizing and its internal administration are concerned, should be formed and maintained independently of the State. This is essential; for the State, separated from the Church and from God, would influence it badly. A Christian Corporation should be professedly and thoroughly religious, faithfully keep the laws of the Church, and obey devoutly the Vicar of Jesus Christ. How then can it

accept the interference of governments that are either hostile to the Catholic religion or at least indifferent to it? The Corporation must keep clear of rulers whose touch defiles. 'May God preserve us,' says Claude Janet, 'from seeing the modern State add this social policy to its other numerous invasions of the rights of the individual and of the family.' "

In the Encyclical of Leo XIII. addressed to the American Bishops, dated Jan. 6th, 1895, and beginning with the word "Longinqua," there are several sentences which add a few touches to the sketch contained in the Encyclical on Labor, showing still more plainly that the plan of the writer last above cited is the one he bears in mind: "But it is very important to take heed with whom they (Roman Catholic workingmen) are to associate, else, while seeking aids for the improvement of their condition, they may be imperilling far weightier interests. . . . Nay, rather, unless forced by necessity to do otherwise, Catholics ought to prefer to associate with Catholics, a course which would be very conducive to the safe guarding of their faith. As president of Societies thus formed among themselves, it would be well to appoint either priests or upright laymen of weight and character, guided by whose councils they should endeavor peacefully to adopt and carry into effect such measures as may seem most advantageous to their interests, keeping in view the rules laid down by us in our Encyclical *Rerum Novarum*."

As Father Zahm says in the North American

Review of August, 1895: "The Encyclical *Longinqua Oceani Spatia* recently issued is, in a measure but a supplement of *Rerum Novarum*."

How important a part the priestly president of such a society would play will be plain when we remember that both employers and employed are to be members, as in the so-called mixed syndicates of France, and that the priest would have to act the part of mediator or umpire between them. Father Liberatore, in his above cited work, seems to have again been followed on this point: "The mixed Syndicate is the only sound one. By uniting masters and workmen it paves the way for a true Corporation. . . . (Page 294): This (government of Christian corporation), however, must be understood in a hierarchical manner; so that the highest places be filled by the masters, who are superiors born of the Corporation; the next by the principal and best workmen, the lowest by the whole multitude as having the right to select their representatives, and thus by means of them watch over the management and distribution of what is owned in common."

In an earlier Encyclical entitled *Humanum Genus*, in 1884, Leo XIII. had already said: "In the third place there are certain institutions wisely established by our forefathers, and which in the course of time have been dropped, which may become at the present time the type and model, as it were, of similar institutions. We speak of those guilds or associations of workingmen which aim at protecting, with the guidance of religion, their worldly interests and morality. And if our ancestors, after the experience of ages, appreciated so fully the utility

of such institutions, our age values it even more highly on account of the peculiar power they afford of *crushing the strength of the sects*. . . . For these reasons and for the common welfare we fervently wish to see these guilds, so suited to the time, re-established under the auspices and patronage of the Bishops." ("Leo XIII.," by Rev. James F. Talbot, D. D., page 338.) The term "sects" does not refer to religious bodies, but includes all who are known as Naturalists in philosophy or Liberals in politics, as was shown in the first chapter.

No modern student of political economy will doubt that Leo XIII. was right in assigning the most important place in the solution of the social question to labor organizations. But the question is submitted, if the papal plan to form trade organizations consisting exclusively of Roman Catholics and formed expressly for the purpose of "crushing the sects" under the leadership of the priest, succeeds, what will be the fate of other workingmen? In his Labor Encyclical, above cited Leo XIII. has already declared that unorganized labor in competition with labor unions will be driven to starvation. As Protestants are not to be admitted to these Roman Catholic organizations, what is left to them but to form organizations of their own or be persecuted as "scabs?"

Is it not a plan to grind the State between the Church as an upper and the Trade Organization as a lower millstone? How can the State surrender in effect the whole control of its industry and the whole field of labor to this papal, international organization of priests?

What an important part such priest-guided labor organizations would play in politics is evident enough. Many recognize that the political units of the future in great cities will be, not the sub-divisions of the city according to geographical lines, but the groups of men organized according to their trades and professions; the author would refer on this point to "Trade Unions," by William Trant, and to the author's "Trade Unions in Politics." No one, then, can charge the Papal Church with lack of foresight, in endeavoring to keep these future powers under her control and "clear of rulers whose touch defiles." In Germany, the hundred thousand members of the Catholic Labor Unions take part in politics most actively as such, whenever a question arises in which the Church is interested.

The argument of the Holy Father in his Labor Encyclical to prove this independence of the trade-unions from the State is as follows: "These lesser societies and the society which constitute the State differ in many things, because their immediate purpose and end is different. Civil society exists for the common good, and therefore is concerned with the interests of all in general, and with individual interest in their due place and proportion. Hence, it is called public society, because by its means, as St. Thomas of Aquinas says, men communicate with one another in the setting up of a commonwealth. But the societies which are formed in the bosom of the State are called private, and justly so, because their immediate purpose is the private advantage of the associates. Now a private society, says St.

Thomas again, is one which is formed for the purpose of carrying out private business, as when two or three enter into a partnership with a view of trading in conjunction."

To class trade organizations with business partnerships and to say that because the one is a private organization and independent of the State, therefore the other ought also to be so, is not very convincing. The history of the Middle Ages is one long story of the struggle of the trade organizations to take part in the government; it is the glory of Germanic laws to have afforded scope for this desire, instead of crushing it, as did the Roman law, which latter law the Roman Catholic socialists are generally so fond of denouncing. See Beseler "Deutsches Privatrecht," p. 251.

If we turn now from this particular scheme of Roman Catholic trade unions, to the general teachings of the Church on social questions, how are they adapted to our modern civilization? It is submitted that the modern communism, against which Leo XIII. so frequently inveighs under the name of Socialism, is practically identical in its fundamental principles with teachings of the Church, except that it disregards the sovereignty of the successors of St. Peter.

St. Thomas Aquinas had before him the ideals of Plato and Aristotle and accepted their Utopias in principle without reserve; thus he says, in *De Regimine Principum* (lib. IV., Cap. X.): "He (Plato) divided his state into five classes of men, viz.: princes, counsellors, warriors, mechanics and farmers. This division seems sufficient for the protection of the

State, since it comprises all varieties of men necessary to a political government." He makes substantially the same division in the Summa (I., II., 9, 95, a. 4): "Human law can be divided according to the difference of those who devote themselves especially to the common weal, as priests who pray for the people to God, princes who rule the people and soldiers who fight for the safety of the people and therefore to these men certain especial rights are due."

This whole system of special rights or privileges was known as "justitia distributiva" as opposed to the other great division of law "justitia commutativa" which concerns the legal relation of individuals to each other. The definition of distributive justice, with which no communist would quarrel in Summa II., II., q. 96, 1 a. 1, is as follows: "Or again we have the relation of the whole to the part; and such is the relation of the community to the individual, which relation is presided over by distributive justice or the justice that *distributes the goods of the common stock* according to proportion."

The authority for this whole system of distributive or class justice is the philosopher Aristotle, who is continually cited. How Aristotle regarded this class system can be seen from the following extract from his Politics (Book VII., Chap. 9): "Now, since we are here speaking of the best form of government and that under which the State will be most happy, it clearly follows that in the State which is best governed the citizens who are absolutely and merely relatively just men must not lead

the life of mechanics or tradesmen, for such a life is ignoble and inimical to virtue. Neither must they be husbandmen, since leisure is necessary both for the development of virtue and the performance of political duties. Again, there is in a State a class of warriors and another of counsellors who advise about the expedient and determine matters of law, and these seem in an especial manner parts of a State . . . whereas mechanics or any other class whose art excludes the art of virtue have no other share in the State. . . . The husbandmen will of necessity be slaves or barbarians or Perioeci.

“Of the classes enumerated there remains only the priests, and the manner in which their office is to be regulated is obvious. No husbandman or mechanic should be appointed to it. Now since the body of the citizens is divided into two classes, the warriors and the counsellors, to the old men of these two classes should be assigned the duties of the priesthood—husbandmen, craftsmen and laborers of all kinds are necessary to the existence of states, but the parts of the State are the warriors and counsellors. And these are distinguished severally from one another, the distinction being in some cases permanent, in others not.”

Plato, in his Republic, as is well known, gave the masses no share in the government and considered them unworthy of the slightest attention, and made a similar division of ruling classes, who constituted the actual state.

In reading these lines of Aristotle, do we not seem to hear the very words of some grand seigneur or of

some aristocratic abbé of the *Ancien Regime* which, under the rule of the Eldest Son of the Church in France, had developed so successfully the doctrine of several estates, with their caste-like divisions of the people? No wonder the Roman Catholics are loud in their denunciations of the work of the French Revolution and lavish with their glowing pictures of the "good old times."

Our legal system, with its doctrine of equality of all before the law, has no place for "Distributive Justice." Is it not then apparent that the French Communists were orthodox theologians? They wanted merely a share of "the goods of the common stock," and only differed with the First and Second Estates as to the proportion which each should receive.

How conversant Leo XIII. was with this principle of division of a people into classes and distributive justice appears by the following extract from the Labor Encyclical, in which he cites the chapter of the *Summa* last above mentioned: "To cite the wise words of St. Thomas of Aquin: As the part and the whole are in a certain sense identical, the part may in some sense claim what belongs to the whole. Among the many and grave duties of rulers who would do their best for the people, the first and chief is to act with strict justice—with that justice which is called in the schools distributive—toward each and every class."

This idea of a central government to which all classes look for their support is irradicably ingrained in the Roman Catholic mediaeval system which con-

sidered the particular government of the "Holy Roman Empire," as directly instituted by God, being symbolized in the coronation of the Emperor by the Pope as vicar of Jesus Christ; and under the Emperor every official held office by Divine Right. The individual was consequently absorbed in the whole; as St. Thomas Aquinas says in *Summa* II., II., q. 58, a. 5: "All who are comprised in a community stand to the community as parts to the whole; now all that the part is, belongs to the whole; hence everything good in the part is referrable to the good of the whole;" and he continues in the same chapter, article ninth; "the common good is the aim of all individuals existing in a community, as the good of the whole is the object of all the parts." He also frequently reiterates that the individual exists for the good of the species.

Is not this doctrine the same as that of the most radical Socialist, who, flying to the opposite extreme from individualism, would merge the citizen completely in the State, and treat him only as a cell in an organism, ignoring his personality and direct responsibility to a Heavenly Power? Is not this system the extreme of paternalism and centralization, with its inevitable deadening of all individual effort, from which our government is supposed to be a direct revolt?

All Catholic Socialists unite in denouncing Liberalism and in repeating the boast that the subjection of rulers and nations to the Papacy would result in the attainment of all that the French Revolution vainly demanded.

When the Count de Mun, the leader of one of the wings of French Catholic Socialists, introduced a bill regulating labor, into the French Parliament in 1890, Ferroul, the Socialist Deputy, exclaimed: "I have read M. de Mun's declarations, and together with my friends cannot but commend them; his demands are in reality identical with those formulated by the Socialist Congresses."

On the other hand, Baron von Vogelsang, the leader of the Austrian Catholic Socialists, laments that the French Revolution overthrew the old social order which rested on the fundamental principles that all property should be as a part of the common fortune of the nation, granted for private enjoyment in exchange for services rendered to the community. (See the *Association Catholique*, May, 1888.)

Nitti in his *Catholic Socialism* (p. 29) states correctly: "All the great Catholic economists, as Von Ketteler, Hitze, Weiss, De Mun, De Curtins, hold that so-called economic liberty is an iniquitous principle, contrary to all the laws of Christianity."

The greatest Roman Catholic publicist of this century, De Maistre following Aquinas and Aristotle, (in his "*Essai sur le principe generateur* and *Soirees de St. Petersburg*"), claimed that the nobility as a separate class with all its privileges, was a divine institution with which it was impious to interfere.

One of the main causes of the dissatisfaction among the subjects of the Pope, while he still had temporal power, was that the priests constituted a privileged caste; see the citation from Dr. Döllinger's description of the Papal State, in the first

chapter of this book. In the Province of Quebec in Canada, ever since the " Customs of Paris " were restored in 1774, the class distinctions and extensive legal privileges of the clergy, which existed in France before the Revolution, have been continued. The many bloody revolutions in Mexico were only struggles to overcome the tyranny of the priests and soldiers, whose claims to be tried in special courts of their own, composed exclusively of either clergy or officers, was most strongly supported by the Church ; see the article in the North American Review for January, 1896, by the Mexican Minister at Washington, on the " Philosophy of Mexican Revolutions."

All therefore who believe that society exists for men, and not men for society, and in the equality of all before the law should oppose this Church Socialism, which calls upon the Fourth Estate to undo the work of the Third Estate in the French Revolution, not only that it may introduce a rigid mediæval communism, but also that it may restore the First and Second Estates to their former positions.

There is another objection to Roman Catholic Socialism which will be better understood after a perusal of the chapter on the Church and the Individual, in its denial of the existence of the spiritual part of man's nature. The consequence is that even while men remain good Roman Catholics and under the guidance of the Church, they are thrown too much for the satisfaction of the wants of their entire being upon the physical and intellectual treasures of this world, and when once they throw off the control

of the Church, as has been the case in all countries with the spread of education, they become too eager in the pursuit of that which will please their senses, regardless of the claims of their higher or spiritual nature.

Over thirty years ago, Bishop Ketteler declared from his cathedral at Mayence: "The Social Question is a stomach question" (Nitti, Catholic Socialism, p. 355). The teachings of Roman Catholic philosophy are, as will be shown hereafter, that men are simply physical and sentient organisms, and the result of such teachings is always practically a materialism, identical with that of the extreme communist. The eagerness with which that part of the Roman Catholic clergy which was least bound by the Papal authority, took up the Henry George movement and defended it on theological grounds, may serve as an example to show how naturally Roman Catholics become communists, so soon as the restraint from above is relaxed. Mr. George's book, by the way, has never been put upon the Index. The most extreme and dangerous communists are the products of Roman Catholic countries; see Flint's Socialism (p. 449).

If Leo XIII. is right in the statement which he lays down in the Encyclical on Labor (above cited) that "the first and chief duty" of a ruler is "distributive justice,"—*i. e.*, the distribution of the goods which constitute the common stock, to the various classes, how does he differ in principle from St. Simon or any other communist, except that in his trade unions "no Protestant need apply"? Is

not this exclusive spirit the severest charge against the A. P. A.? In brief, his plan is a priest-ruled communism; of which good practical illustrations are found in the history of the Jesuit colony of Paraguay or of the Missions of Mexico; their civilization consisted of priests and peons.

If the priest, will but, like the cobbler, "stick to his last" and attend to the development of man's spiritual nature, instead of attempting the direct government of the world, in its minutest details, the germ of sympathy in the heart of every man would blossom out into such love of neighbor that organizations of employers and employees acting together in harmony (as set out in the author's "Trade Organizations in Religion") would make us soon forget that there had ever been a social question.

CHAPTER III.

THE CHURCH AND THE FAMILY.

Having shown in the preceding chapters how the rights of the State would be ground down between the Church and the Workingmen's Guild, acting like an upper and nether millstone, let us now consider whether there is a third institution which would still further lessen these rights.

The following extract from the Encyclical of Leo XIII. on Labor speaks for itself: "A family, no less than a State, is, as we have said, a true society governed by a power within itself, that is to say by the Father. Wherefore, provided the limits be not transgressed which are prescribed by the very purposes for which it exists, the Family has at least equal rights with the State in the choice and pursuit of those things which are needful to its preservation and its just liberty. We say, at least equal rights; for since the domestic household is anterior both in idea and fact to the gathering of men into a commonwealth, the former must necessarily have rights and duties which are prior to those of the latter, and which rest more immediately on nature. If the citizens of a State, that is to say, the Families on entering into association and fellowship, experienced at the hands of the State hindrance instead of help, and found their rights attacked instead of being protected, such association was rather to be repudiated

than sought after. The idea then, that the civil government should, at its own discretion, penetrate and pervade the Family and the household, is a great and pernicious mistake and to speak with strictness, the child takes its place in civil society not in its own right, but in its quality as a member of the Family in which it is begotten. And it is for the very reason that 'The child belongs to the Father,' that, as St. Thomas of Aquin says: 'Before it attains the use of free will, it is in the power and care of its parents' (St. Thomas's *Summa Theologiae*, II., II., q. 10, a. 12)."

The theory of St. Thomas Aquinas on the Family is set out more at length in the *Summa* I., II., q. 105, a. 4, where his conclusion is as follows: "Concerning domestic persons which are either servant and master, or man and wife, or finally father and child, the Old Testament gave precepts, rightly and conveniently for the preservation of human life."

The important part which the Family and Tribe played in Jewish history, preceding the organization of the State, is well known; and in most of the Greek cities, men bound together by ties of blood, were important political factors in their early history. See Aristotle's *Politics* I., 2. It is therefore not to be wondered at that St. Thomas should place the Family as a society on an equality with the State, as he does in *Comm. in Lib. Ethic. Aristot.*, Lect. I., L. I., making the State, the Family, and the Individual the three subdivisions of moral philosophy. He concludes: "And hence it is that moral philosophy is divided into three parts. Of which one

treats of the intentional acts of a single man, which is called *monastica*; but the second considers the operation of a domestic group, which is called *œconomica*; but the third considers the operations of a civil group, which is called *politica*."

As the Supreme Pontiff is the infallible guide in all matters of morals, it is really unnecessary to say anything more to show that in all matters relating to family life, as a part of the domain of morals, the Church has the deciding voice and the State can act only on sufferance; particularly is this plainly declared with regard to the marriage relation, which is the foundation of family life. In the Encyclical of Leo XIII., issued February 10th, 1880, on Marriage and Divorce (printed in the London Tablet), he says:

"Then, to make sure that such singular blessings should remain on earth as long as mankind itself, He established the Church as the Dispenser of His gifts, and, foreseeing the future He ordained that she should regulate all disturbances in human society, and reestablish whatever might fall into decay.

. . . Jesus Christ, then, when he had again restored marriage to such great perfection, remitted and entrusted its entire disposition to the Church. The Church, in fact, exercised this power over the marriages of Christians, in all times and in all places; she exercised it in such a manner that it could easily be seen that this power was her own; that it did not come to her through the consent of men, but that she had come by it by the divine will of her Author. . . .

"It was then with full jurisdiction that the Council

of Trent defined that it is in the power of the Church to establish invalidating impediments and that matrimonial causes should come under the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical tribunals.

“Nor must any one allow himself to be moved by that distinction, or rather sundering, proclaimed by royal civilians, which consists in separating the nuptial contract from the Sacrament, leaving the Sacrament to the Church, and giving the contract over to temporal princes.

“Therefore neither does reason prove, nor does history, which is the witness of the times, give testimony that authority over Christian marriage has ever been given over to temporal princes. And if the rights of any one have been violated in this manner, no one can ever say that the Church violated them.

“It cannot be doubted that Jesus Christ, the Founder of the Church, desired the religious authority to be distinct from the civil authority, and that each, be free in the fulfilment of its mission; it must, however, be added, that it is useful to both, as it is to the interest of all men, that union and concord exist between them and that in such questions as from divers reasons, are common to the laws and jurisdictions of both, the one to whom human affairs have been entrusted should justly and reasonably depend upon the one having the guardianship of heavenly things. By this arrangement and agreement not only is a perfect organization of each power arrived at, but also the most opportune and the most efficacious means of securing the happiness

of the human race in regard to our conduct in this life and to the hope of eternal salvation.

“Devote your zeal and your energies that the people may abundantly receive the precepts of Christian wisdom and that they may ever bear in mind that marriage was established not by the will of men but by authority of God, and that its fundamental law is to unite one with one only, that Christ the Author of the new Alliance, transformed into a Sacrament that which was merely an act of nature, and in so much as concerns the bond, he has transmitted to his Church the power of legislating and passing judgment upon it. It is necessary to be very watchful on this point, and to see that minds be not misled into error by the deceitful theories of enemies who seek to rob the Church of this power.”

It will be noted that the Encyclical is quite vague in stating the ground for its claim of authority in favor of the Church in matrimonial matters as in fact none can be found; but His Holiness insists that the State must prove its title to such right, and should depend upon the Church in such matters, as in all others which are subject to the jurisdiction of both.

How faithfully and boldly these doctrines are taught, even in this country, may appear from the following extract from two leading Roman Catholic writers. Thus Father Jouin, S. J., Professor at St. John's College, Fordham, writes in his “*Elementa Philosophiæ Moralis*” (p. 181): “Matrimonial society was instituted by God and its nature was determined by him; therefore, it does not depend on civil soci-

ety. Matrimonial society antedates civil society ; since civil society grew from the union of families into one community, and the whole human race traces its origin from one family. Therefore, nature and the rights of matrimonial society were already existing before civil society existed. Therefore, so far as the nature of matrimonial society and its principal rights are concerned, the civil authority can establish nothing. Moreover, the family fully constituted and endowed into all its rights, enters civil society ; therefore, civil society is to protect the rights of the family, not to create or change them. . . The right of contracting marriage is derived by man from nature, independently of the civil authority. Therefore, the right cannot be taken away by the civil authority. But it is taken away if impediments to marriage are created by the civil authorities ; therefore, the latter cannot create impediments to marriage . . . matrimony is a Sacrament in the New Testament. The Church in the Sacrament can change nothing which pertains to the subject of the Sacrament, since the Sacraments were instituted by our Lord Jesus Christ ; but it has the power of decreeing those things which are necessary to rightly receiving and administering the Sacrament. If, therefore, the Church decrees that certain persons in certain cases are not proper to partake of the Sacrament, then their marriage is not valid ; for according to the New Testament there is no marriage where there is no Sacrament. Marriages, therefore, which are not recognized by the Church are null and void before God, although the civil law declares them

valid. On the contrary, if a marriage is recognized by the Church, although the civil law declares it invalid, it is and remains valid in spite of the civil law."

The independence of the Family of the State is declared with equal courage by Father Nicolaus Russo, S. J., in his "*De Philosophia Morali Prælectiones*," printed with the approbation of the Vicar-General of this diocese in 1890 (p. 216): "If, therefore, it is unlawful to bring civil authority into any marriage—in regard to the Christian marriage, this must be called not only illegal but impious." On page 236, he also declares that one cannot doubt that persons, not separate, but as families entered society, and that it is absurd to consider the State as a source of all rights (p. 215); here the author is of course again following Aristotle (*Politics*, I., 2).

In the relation of parent and child, the Church draws a conclusion of no less practical importance than that above advanced on the marriage relation, from the alleged independence of the Family of the State; *i. e.*, the right of the parent to direct the education of his children, free from the control of the State. This claim rests ultimately on the theory of St. Thomas Aquinas, announced in *Summa* II., II. q. 10, a. 12 (above cited), that the law of the Old Testament still governs the family life; thus he says in *Summa* I., II., q. 105, a. 4: "Concerning sons, it (the Old Testament) instituted that fathers should teach them, by instructing them in the faith; whence it is said in Exodus 12: 'When your sons shall say to you, what is this service? You shall say to them;

it is the sacrifice of the passover of the Lord. And also that they should instruct them in morals.' "

Father Jouin, of St. Johns College, in his *Elementa Philosophiæ Moralis* argues in the same spirit (p. 314): "The right of educating the youth belongs to the parent, who, since they give being to it must also perfect it. But the duty of educating the youth and the rights of parent are independent of civil society (citing the passage above quoted from the same book). Therefore parents cannot be deprived of this right by the civil authority."

Father Russo, in his *De Philosophiæ Morali Prælectiones* (above cited), following the same theory of the independence of the Family, on page 221 sums up as follows: "The duty and consequently the right of educating the youth (1) rests on the parent. Therefore (2) the State cannot claim this right; and much less (3) compel parents to send their children to so-called public schools."

Of course this right of the parent is claimed only for the purpose of asserting that the parent can delegate it to the Church and exclude the State from even such control as is required to see that the child is brought up with the knowledge which is necessary to make it a useful and patriotic citizen; see the article by Dr. Lyman Abbott in the *Century Magazine* of April, 1895. Where the Church is not yet all powerful, it is true that to the State is conceded some supervision, but this decreases as the power of the Church increases, until to the State is left only the duty of collecting the taxes to pay the clerical instructors.

Into the merits of Roman Catholic education it is unnecessary here to enter ; according to the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, in Spain there are 82 schools to every 1,000 inhabitants, and yet 72 per cent. of the population can neither read or write. According to the same authority, in Italy, in 1861, before the invasion of the Piedmontese Robber, nearly 80 per cent. were "analphabetes." Any one who has traveled in Roman Catholic countries needs no statistics to tell him of the alarming illiteracy there prevailing. When the author was at Bolsano, near Rome, the richest man in the place, the innkeeper, told him that his daughter had completed her education at a neighboring convent, but no attempt was made to teach her to read or write.

The most popular Lenten preacher at Rome in the chief Jesuit Church very recently declared that women ought not to be taught to read or write, because they would only use this knowledge to write letters to their lovers after they were married.

How easily any supervision, even when the right to prescribe the text books to be used is expressly reserved to the State, can be rendered nugatory, is frankly stated by Cardinal Satolli in the "*North American Review*" for December, 1894, in an article entitled "The Catholic School System in Rome":

"It (the Directive Council appointed by the Pope to supervise Roman Catholic education in Rome) therefore selects the text books with the greatest circumspection, and when it has been compelled by law to adopt any one which is erroneous or lacking in principle, it has strictly enjoined the pro-

fessors to make the necessary corrections and observations when explaining the same. For example, in the official text-books of national history no reference is made to the gigantic and magnanimous struggle sustained by Christian society in honor and defence of religion and of the Roman Pontiff as well as in defence of the Fatherland and of Italian culture. . . . Catholic Teaching modifies and corrects errors and opinion in such a way that the historic truth may stand out with the utmost clearness. For the Church fears only error."

Verily, the end justifies the means!

How far one may go in distorting history and suppressing facts, to gain control of schools, is shown by a Review of the Manitoba School Question, published by the Winnipeg Tribune, entitled "Is Manitoba Right?"

That so important a claim as that to the whole secular education should be based today ultimately upon the command given by God to the Children of Israel when about to journey through the Desert, on one point of ceremonial law, seems a little extraordinary; but no less extraordinary is this whole claim for the independence of the Family from the State. Certainly no one can glance at our state or federal Constitutions without perceiving that our governments were in no way formed by families, and that the Family, as such, possesses no rights or privileges. Our legislature is supposed to be all powerful, except so far as expressly limited by our state or national constitutions. As Justice Ward, of the Supreme Court of this State, expressly decided in the

case of St. Adelbert's Church (as cited in the Catholic Union and Times of July 18th, 1895): "Independent of statutory requirements, the canon law of the Roman Church is without force or authority in this country."

If the Family is of such great importance to the State, as it undoubtedly is, can the State be entirely indifferent to it?

It is moreover hard to understand how a consistent Roman Catholic can reconcile his duty as laid down by the above cited papal decrees with the allegiance which he swears to the law of the State. Is he to recognize a marriage which has been lawfully entered into according to the laws of the State, but not according to the rules of the Church?

Nor is it to be presumed that his fellow citizens of other beliefs will look kindly upon teachings which echo the words of Pius IX., pronounced before the Apostolic Chancery (*Discorsi del sommo Pontifici Pius IX.*, p. 193): "But, thanks to God, the marriage celebrated only by the civil authorities, without the intervention of the Church, is held for what it truly is, a mere concubinage (*uno pretto concubinato*)."

If we turn to the third family relation, that of master and servant, we find that St. Thomas expressly recognizes the propriety of slavery as it existed under the Old Testament dispensation; he particularly discusses, in the article above cited (*Summa I., II., q. 105, a. 4*), whether any penalty should be inflicted upon a master who punishes his man or maid servant so severely that he or she dies within

a few days after receiving the chastisement and comes to a negative conclusion.

The Angelic Doctor recognizes slavery as a natural institution in many other places, such as *Summa*, II., II., q. 57, a. 3, where he cites Aristotle's *Politics* as authority for the proposition that it is useful for a man to be the slave of one who is wiser. Aristotle's opinion was expressed in full as follows (I. *Politics*, c. 5): "It is clear then that some men are by nature free, and others slaves, and that for these latter slavery is both expedient and right." We need not, therefore, be surprised that Father Jouin, of St. John's College, in his *Elementa Philosophiæ Moralis*, makes an elaborate defense of slavery (pp. 195 to 203). Thus he says in paragraph 25: "Therefore the duty of giving all of one's exterior work to another is not against natural law. . . . Therefore slavery, properly so called, is not against natural law."

It is curious to consider whether, if one institution of natural law is as holy and as little to be interfered with by the State as another, all the anathemas which have been leveled against those who dared to interfere with the relation of parent and child and husband and wife, as sanctioned by natural law, do not apply with equal force to those who have abolished the institution of master and slave which has at least an equal sanction of levitical and natural law.

The connection between "Romanism" and "Rebellion" would therefore not seem so incredible.

If on the other hand slavery, though justified by

natural law, could be destroyed, may not the State interfere with other institutions which are alleged to have the same high sanction, such as the Family and the Guild, when they have become oppressive and unsuited to the times?

How little the Church itself regards the Family, when it is to the Church's interest so to do, appears for example, in the Regulations concerning the Third Order of St. Francis, laid down by Leo XIII. (Leonis Papae XIII. Allocutiones, vol. I., p. 13), which provide that wives may be admitted to that order, even against the will of the husbands, if their confessors consent. How can the Christian ideal, that "the husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the Church" (Ephesians, v. 23), be carried into effect if every moral, *i. e.*, intentional or rational act of the wife is subject to the control of another? Do the hybrid populations of Central and South America, where the Church has had full control of the marriage relation, or the decadent royal families of the Bourbons, Wittelsbachs or Hapsburgs speak so well for its practical management of this relation?

In short, should not the priesthood, especially a celibate priesthood, keep its hands off the Family, as well as off the State, and even in matters of education should it not remember that its first duty is to educate the spirit or conscience, and only when that is accomplished, should it devote its surplus energy to the education of the intellect?

May it not be that this ill success is in part due to the philosophy of Aquinas and Aristotle which, as set

forth in the next chapter, holds that individuals are composed merely of body and intellect? This theory denies to women the possession of those intuitive or spiritual faculties, in which she surpasses man and by which she is intended to develop and expand also in him the same organs, from their natural rudimentary condition to a growth and strength comparable to her own. To deny to women the possession of these faculties is to rob her of her chief glory and individuality, and to justify the mercenary contracts of marriage, so prevalent in southern Europe, where the property of the parties is considered of so much more importance than their personal qualifications and inclinations. It is submitted that the union of this spiritual part of man and woman constitutes the main object of matrimony, and that, when this union of spirits is blessed and invigorated by God's Holy Spirit, it becomes a new entity as really one, as the asexual monad with which, according to the Darwinian theory, animal life began; so that the cycle of development which commences with physical unity and continues through generations of beings, sexually differentiated, is concluded in the Christian era, by a spiritual union, guided and blessed by the Holy Ghost and intended for eternity.

The light condemnation of sexual sins, so often urged against the Jesuits and other Thomists, may also be charged to the philosophic disregard of this spiritual part of men and women, with which the Holy Ghost may directly communicate. Aquinas was confined in his argument for sexual purity to the claim that the offspring of illicit unions would not

be properly cared for, and he expressly declares that illicit intercourse is a carnal and not a spiritual sin, and not a sin directly against God (Summa, II., II., q. 154, a. 3), thereby putting violations of the law of sexual purity—that law which constitutes the great cornerstone of happy matrimony—among the lightest offences and in no way as a sin particularly against the Holy Spirit. And yet Chapter VI. of St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians, of which Aquinas considered several verses in the article last above cited, closes with the emphatic lines, as given in the Douay version: "Or know you not, that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost, who is in you, whom you have from God and you are not your own? For you are bought with a great price. Glorify and bear God in your body."

CHAPTER IV.

THE CHURCH AND THE INDIVIDUAL.

In order to understand the relation of the Church to the Individual, we must first consider the Roman Catholic definition of the latter.

In the Encyclical of Leo XIII., in honor of St. Thomas Aquinas, he praises particularly the latter's treatment "of man and the senses, of human acts and their principles." Turning then to the works of the Patron Saint of all Roman Catholic Schools and Colleges, we find, as already set forth in the first chapter, that the soul is the form of a man (*Summa I.*, q. 76, a. 4), *i. e.*, that by which a human being is, moves and exists. This human form reasons and is, therefore, distinguished as *forma rationalis* from the form of plants, which is called *forma vegetativa*, and from the form of animals, which is called *forma sensitiva*. In fact, the Council of Vienne, as set forth in the first chapter, has raised this scholastic definition to a matter of faith, by condemning as a heretic any one who should deny that "the rational or intellectual soul is not the form of a human body."

This definition, as is well known, was only following Aristotle's teaching. *e. g.*, in his *Politics I.*, 5; Boethius had already repeated it, by calling a person "an individual substance of a rational nature;" it reappears in the Œcumenical Council of the

Lateran V. (1512), "anima rationalis est pars et forma substantialis hominis, radix omnium proprietatum, omnium operationum, ex qua et corpore constitutum substantia humana."

This definition, it will be found, has been adhered to with customary fidelity by the writers on psychology of the now ruling Jesuit School in the Roman Catholic Church. Thus Dr. Plassman, the Theological Lecturer in Rome, in his *Psychology* (p. 207), says: "For the rational soul is in fact the substantial form of man and the human body. . . . The substantial form is the radical principle of being and consequently of action." Father Maher, S. J., in the *Psychology of the Stonyhurst series of Catholic Manuals of Philosophy* (p. 521), declares: "A person may accordingly be defined in scholastic language as a suppositum of a rational nature or an individual substance of a rational nature." This theory is defended with his customary vigor by Liberatore in his work on *Universals* (translated by Dering), page 108, where the statement of the same doctrine by Pius IX. is set forth.

Into the merits of this definition it is not necessary here to enter; the citations are given merely to show that the reasoning soul is the form of man and consequently that there can be according to their teachings, nothing in man except the body and the reasoning soul. The slightest acquaintance with scholastic philosophy will teach one that there can only be one form in a being and St. Thomas Aquinas devotes a chapter to the question (*Summa I., q. 76, a. 4*): "Whether in man there can be another form

beside the reasoning soul." He answers it of course in the negative, declaring it to be impossible, unless we erroneously assume as the Platonists did, that the soul merely moved the body.

Leo XIII. adopts the same theory of the all powerful reasoning soul in man, to which the will is only the minister, in his Encyclical on St. Thomas Aquinas (above cited) and says: "For since it is innate in the nature of man to follow reason as his guide, if his intellect is in anything, his will yields thereto." And again in the Encyclical of January 10, 1890, he says: "The mind is the beginning of action."

The next point which should be observed is that according to the Peripatetic School and the Schoolmen, this rational soul of man has no innate ideas, but receives all that it knows through the senses. St. Thomas Aquinas accepts absolutely the famous saying of Aristotle: "Nihil in intellectu nisi in sensibus," *i. e.*, "Nothing is in the mind except through the senses." Thus Aquinas says in his *Contra Gentiles* (Lib. IV., c. 41): "Our intellect understands nothing except through appearances" (*phantasmata*), and again in Lib. I., c. 3: "Our intellect takes knowledge from sense," and again in *Summa* I., II., q. 51, a. 1: "And therefore Aristotle shows that the knowledge of principles comes to us through the senses." In *Summa*, I., q. 79, a. 2, he says that the intellect is at first a "*tabula rasa*."

As Harper says in his *Metaphysics* of the School (vol. I., p. 450); "In the origin of human thought, the senses stand midway between the Intellect and Being; so that the saying is true—*There*

is nothing in the intellect, that has not first passed through the senses."

It is true that Aquinas also recognizes the existence in man of an "abstractive virtue" by which the intellect can sequester the object recognized by the senses from the material conditions which bound it and consider it in its "quiddity"; but all this has nothing to do with innate ideas of right or wrong. As St. Thomas briefly expresses it: "Sensus est de particulari, intellectus de universali" (Plassmann's First Volume of Philosophy, p. 334); see also *Liberatore on Universals* (translated by Dering), page 167 and *Soirees de Saint Petersburg* by De Maistre, page 140.

Leo XIII. in his Encyclical on St. Thomas emphatically commends this theory in its extreme form, saying: "As soon as the Scholastics, adopting the system of the earlier Fathers, found in their studies on anthropology that it is *only through the medium of sensible things that the human intelligence is led to the knowledge of things without body and matter*, this at once was understood that nothing was more useful to the philosopher than a careful investigation of the secrets of nature." And again he says in his Encyclical on Church Unity (*The Tablet* of July 4, 1896): "But it is obvious that nothing can be communicated amongst men save by means of external things which the senses can perceive. Jesus Christ commanded His Apostles and their successors to the end of time to teach and rule the nations. He ordered the nations to accept their teaching and obey their authority. But this correlation of rights

and duties in the Christian commonwealth not only could not have been made permanent but could not even have been initiated except through the senses, which are of all things the messengers and interpreters."

Following this principle, Aristotle taught that man can know nothing except through that which he already knows. Dr. Plassmann, in the introductory volume of his *Philosophy* (p. 256), as a faithful follower of the Peripatetic School, even claims that all the grand and beautiful thoughts of the heathen were traditions derived through the Jews from Revelation.

For a full statement of all the evil consequences of this Peripatetic sensualism, reference is made to Cousin's *Elements of Psychology*, especially pp. 386-387.

We see therefore that there is in Roman Catholic philosophy no room in man for anything except body and reason, and that therefore there is in him no spirit or conscience, distinct from reason.

St. Thomas considered the question whether *synderesis* or conscience are powers and answers in the negative (*Summa* I., q. 79, a. 12 and a. 13), declaring conscience to be an act of reason and of nothing higher than reason, applied to moral questions, following Aristotle's *Ethics*, Book VI., Chapter 6. And again in *Summa*, I., II., q. 19, a. 5, he says: "Since conscience is a dictate of reason, for it is an application of knowledge to action, it is the same to ask whether a will, opposed to a mistaken reason is evil, as to ask whether an erring conscience is binding." He is followed of course in turn by such writers of

the Stonyhurst School as Father Rickaby in his *Moral Philosophy* (pp. 135-137). The latter writes: "What then is conscience? It is not a faculty, not a habit; it is an act, it is a practical judgment of the understanding. . . . There is a hot controversy as to how these primary moral judgments arise in the mind. The coals of dispute are kindled by the assumption, that these moral judgments must needs have a totally other origin and birth in the mind than speculative first principles, as, that the whole is greater than the part, that two and two are four, that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another. The assumption is specious but unfounded."

To the same effect writes Father Maher in his *Psychology* (p. 322): "The assumption of an additional new faculty (conscience) is gratuitous. The intellect or reason which perceives the self-evident necessary truth that 'Equals added to equals give equals,' is the same power which cognizes the validity of the self-evident axiom that 'We should do as we believe we ought to be done by.'"

From this theory that conscience is a sub-department of reason arises the whole learning of "probabilism," as set out for example in Gury's *Cases of Conscience*, so strange to one acquainted only with the Christianity of the New Testament.

It follows, therefore, that the Roman Catholics are necessarily dichotomists or believers in the twofold division of man's personality into body and soul (or intellect) as opposed to the school of trichotomists who maintain with St. Paul that man has a tripartite

nature, viz., body, soul and spirit, as set forth, for example, in Heard's Tripartite Nature of Man (p. 83) :

"To sum up our remarks, then, on the contrast between psyche and pneuma in the five passages of New Testament (I. Thes. v. 23; Heb., iv 12; I. Cor. ii. 11; James iii. 15; Jude 19) which we have considered at length, we gather the following distinction from Scripture. The psyche is the life of man in its widest and most inclusive sense, embracing not only the animal, but also the intellectual and moral faculties in so far as their exercise has not been depraved by the fall. In this sense Aristotle's generalization of the psyche is not wide of the Scriptural meaning. The soul, he says, is that by which we live, feel, or perceive, will, move and understand. . . . Were man made up of body and soul only, then the psychology of Scripture would be identical with that of Aristotle and a controversy of long standing might be set at rest at once and forever. But it is exactly where Aristotle leaves off that Scripture begins to treat of human nature, and tells us of a faculty—let us call it God-consciousness—which is dead or dormant in a great degree since the fall, and which it is the work and office of the Holy Ghost first to quicken and then to direct, sanctify, and govern. This faculty to which Scripture gives the name of Ruach or Pneuma, is altogether ignored by Aristotle, and confounded by Plato with the intellectual Nous. . . . He (Aristotle) was profoundly and we believe sincerely unconscious of the divine faculty in man, for the reason given by the apostle that the psychical man perceives not the things of the Spirit

of God. He knew not of the Spirit's work, because he was 'dead,' as all men by nature are to divine things."

Among the early Christian Fathers Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Gregory Nyssen and Basil maintained the threefold nature of man, *i. e.* body, soul and spirit. Thus Irenæus says in his Fifth Book against Heresies, chap. six: "For that flesh which has been molded is not a perfect man in itself, but the body of a man; neither is the soul itself, considered a part by itself, the man, but it is the soul of a man and part of a man. Neither is the spirit a man, for it is called the spirit and not a man; but the commingling and union of all these constitutes the perfect man. And for this cause does the Apostle, explaining himself, make it clear that the saved man is a complete man as well as a spiritual; saying thus in the first Epistle of Thessalonians, 'Now the God of peace sanctify you perfect; and may your spirit, soul and body be preserved whole without complaint to the coming of the Lord Jesus Christ.'"

Tatian, in his Address to the Greeks, Chap. XII, (A. D. 110-172) declares "We recognize two varieties of spirit one of which is called the soul (*ψυχή*) but the other is greater than the soul, an image and likeness of God."

Among modern writers the matter is succinctly stated in Blunt's Theological Dictionary:

"But the 'soul' of St. Paul's system is not the mere animal principle of Aristotle's system. It is, rather, an union of the *νοῦς* and the *ψυχή*, of the reasoning

✕ faculty and the animating life; the *πνευμα* being a divine principle belonging to a new creation of supernatural being, which sprung from the incarnation of Diety (Mediation) and was the gift bestowed in the new birth of human nature (Spirit). This trichotomy is the only psychological system which is reconcilable with the general statements of holy Scripture respecting the soul."

The practical difference which results from the adoption of one or the other of these theories is immense. According to the latter, the Christian needs no written code, "long as the moral law." Love is the moral law to guide him in every circumstance of life. Christ's promise that the Comforter would come after His departure is held good for all time. If men will but follow Christ's precepts and thus avail themselves of the means of grace which He provides, "The Holy Ghost, the Lord and Giver of Life" will still speak directly to men's individual consciences, obliterating selfishness, the root of all evil, and substituting self sacrifice, love of God and the brethren; how much higher this is than knowledge as knowledge is above sensual pleasures, is beautifully set out in the closing chapters of "God in His World." This was the Spirit which animated the Christians of the days described in the Acts of the Apostles, Epistles and the Ante-Nicene Fathers, entering into man's spirit and making it cry "Abba, Father," as described so fully in the eighth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, and endowing all men with an identical spirit of right and wrong, more or less developed, as they avail themselves of the means of grace, prescribed by Christ himself.

According to the former theory, as there was nothing in man except body and intellect, there was no conscience, no almost superhuman faculty, to which the Holy Ghost could speak. It follows, therefore, that the Holy Spirit was promised only to the Apostles and to the successors of one of them as bishops of Rome, to whom was thus committed the "magisterium" or power to guide the intellects of all people, as claimed in the Encyclical on Christian Unity.

The evidence for the first part of this proposition is found in the words of our Lord as addressed to his Apostles, before His crucifixion, in which He promised to them the coming of the Holy Ghost. The evidence in favor of the second part of the proposition is found in the logical argument that God must have intended unity in the Church as a perfect society in order to preserve the unity of the faith, and that such unity is impossible without an absolute, infallible head. As Leo XIII. says in the Encyclical last above cited: "Indeed, no true and perfect society can be conceived which is not governed by some supreme authority. Christ, therefore, must have given to His Church a supreme authority to which all Christians must render obedience. For this reason, as the unity of the faith is of necessity required for the unity of the Church, unity of government is necessary, *jure divino*. But since He willed that His Kingdom should be visible, He was obliged, when He ascended into Heaven, to designate a Vice-Regent on earth."

This argument is almost a literal translation of the

following passage from St. Thomas Aquinas in his *Contra Gentiles* (Lib. IV., c. 76), which chapter Leo XIII. also cites immediately afterwards :

“ To the unity of the Church it is requisite that all the faithful should agree as to the faith. But concerning those things which are of faith, it will happen that questions will be raised ; but by differences of opinion the Church is divided, unless it is preserved in unity by the opinion of one. Therefore it is necessary for preserving the unity of the Church that there should be one to preside over the Church. But it is manifest that Christ does not fail to provide necessities for his Church. . . . It is, therefore, not to be doubted that one presides over the whole Church by the ordination of Christ.”

It is submitted that a study of the *Summa* shows that St. Thomas Aquinas believed the philosophical system of Aristotle to be correct, that men consisted only of body and the intellectual soul, and adapted the teachings of Christianity to it, merely substituting for public opinion, or for the opinion of the most eminent men, which was Aristotle's arbiter of right and wrong, the opinion of the most eminent of the Apostles, St. Peter, and his successors in office, which was to enlighten and guide all intellects.

It is true that in the writings of St. Thomas are to be found passages which refer to the action of angels and of the Holy Ghost on the minds of men ; but these remnants of the older and purer theology are absolutely incompatible with the Aristotelian theory of body and soul. This appeared in the contest which occurred within the Roman Catholic

Church in the last century over Jansenism, and which is so eloquently described in the Provincial Letters of Pascal. The contest ended in the utter discomfiture of the Anti-aristotelians, and the acceptance of the Jesuit theory that all men are born with sufficient grace, and hence logically need no help from the Holy Ghost.

By the declaration of the papal infallibility in all questions of morals, this system has been completed ; for, as shown above in the first chapter, the word "morals" includes all human intentional acts. As St. Thomas says in *Summa*, I., II., q. 1, a. 3 : "Moral acts and human acts are the same." What human acts of the slightest importance can there be for which an infallible rule cannot be obtained from Rome ? What need is there, then, of a Holy Ghost ?

In the Encyclical concerning the principal duties of Christian citizens, dated January 10, 1890 (*Leonis Papæ XIII. Allocutiones*, Vol. IV., p. 15), His Holiness demands "wills perfectly subject and obedient . . . to the Roman Pontiff as to God."

In a letter to Cardinal Nina, Pontifical Secretary of State, dated August 27, 1878 (*Leonis Papæ Allocutiones*, Vol. I., p. 39), he claims to be "the Master of the faith and the Ruler of the consciences" of all Catholics. Justin McCarthy in his *Leo XIII.* (p. 89) calls him "the ruler over consciences."

The logical consequence of this Roman Catholic teaching is the rule of the Jesuits, in their Constitutions (VI., 1) : "Let every one believe firmly that those who live under obedience should let themselves be guided and governed by their superiors

exactly as though they were corpses which let themselves be turned in every direction and treated in any manner ; or like the staff in the hands of an aged man, which serves him who holds it in his hand for all purposes and in all purposes."

Among the general public this doctrine has been inculcated under the guise of "probabalism" which allows a man to act in accordance with the sayings or writings of some one in authority, disregarding the promptings of his conscience ; for the general public, one author of "exceptional authority" will do—even if the act be with fear of one's conscience that the opposite course is correct ; see Gury's *Compendium of Moral Theology*, I., p. 36, cap. 4 *De Consc. Prob.*

The practical elimination of the Third Person of the Blessed Trinity from popular modern Roman Catholic Theology, which necessarily follows this denial of conscience, is therefore not to be wondered at. In the City of Rome, with its hundreds of Churches, not one is dedicated to the Holy Ghost.

As Mgr. Talbot, private chamberlain of Pius IX., writes to Cardinal Manning in "Life of Cardinal Manning" (Vol. II., p. 155, note) :

"What a beautiful sermon Father Faber preached on the Feast of Pentecost ! I read it with great interest, and I have had it translated into Italian, as I think it quite as applicable to the Romans and Italians as it is to the English. Really, one of the great characteristics of the age is to ignore the existence of the Holy Ghost in the Church."

To one acquainted with Cardinal Manning's

strong devotion to the Holy Ghost, his constant contest with the Jesuit faction of the Roman Catholic Church, so often mentioned in his "Life," was a foregone conclusion. In all the voluminous writings of Leo XIII., the author does not recollect seeing more than one or two references to the Holy Ghost, except in formal invocations of the Blessed Trinity, or where he is shown as speaking to the Apostles or their successors; certainly there is no recognition of the Holy Spirit as a teacher of all Christians, speaking directly to the souls of men.

In the Encyclical *De vita sancta instituenda* (Leonis Papæ XIII. Allocutiones, Vol. III., p. 190), there is no mention of the Third Person of the Blessed Trinity as influencing man's spirit.

The burning question during the early Reformation was whether laymen should be allowed to sit in the Council, which all agreed should be called, for the reformation of morals; Pope Paul IV., in his communication to Charles V., asserted that the guidance of the Holy Spirit had been promised only to the clergy (Froude's Council of Trent, p. 125).

Does this Roman Catholic condition not suggest the state of mind of the men at Ephesus, referred to by St. Paul in the nineteenth chapter of Acts, who said: "We have not so much as heard whether there be any Holy Ghost." Might it not even be that this is the "sin against the Holy Ghost"?

This is still the real battleground between Protestants and Roman Catholics.

The answer to this Roman Catholic theory is of course that according to the New Testa-

ment, especially the Acts and Epistles, there is overwhelming evidence of the mission of the Holy Ghost to the individual consciences of all Christians, with ample power to guide them to all truth, so far as they avail themselves of the means of grace.

This theory disregards utterly such texts as the two following: 1 Cor., 6, 19. "What? know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which ye have of God and ye are not your own?"

1 Cor., 3, 16.

"Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?"

It substitutes for the divine guidance of the Spirit, a blind obedience to others and an utter failure to develop our inborn tendencies to act honestly, benevolently, etc., of our own accord, even in cases where no rule has been laid down for us by authority; it teaches us that such a development is impossible, because there is no such thing in us as a spirit or conscience, in the true sense of the word, to develop.

It is submitted moreover that this system of dichotomy crushes the most important part of a man's personality, that it dries up and destroys that very part of his nature to develop which Christ came to earth, that it strikes at the very root of all independent healthy development of character.

As Fairbairn says in his "Morality":

"Religious education must educe and bring into conscious operation the perception of truth and the practice of truth. The soul must know the truth by its own operations and it must learn to abhor false-

hood and hypocrisy. It does not educe and bring into operation the moral powers *by merely putting into the mind a knowledge of what truth is*. Christian education brings into operation the conscience. . . . This is where Christian education may exercise its functions in bringing into operation the higher parts of our nature, and in making them the rulers and guides of human action. It is thus that benevolence, justice, truth, purity and order become the characteristic virtues of life." See also "Lux Mundi" (page 396) and Richmond's "Christian Economics" (page 7).

Nor does this destruction of conscience as an independent power within us affect only our ideas of right and wrong; it tears up the roots from which spring all our most beautiful ideals which we long to express in art; it deprives us of that discontent and enterprise, the mother of invention, which is ever driving the individual to improve his condition, to do his duty in that state of life in which it has pleased God to call him, better and more expeditiously, and thus creates one main difference between progressive nations and those which remain waiting patiently until some one from above shall teach them what to do.

The importance of the cultivation of this spiritual faculty, even from a mere worldly point of view, is well shown in Hudson's "Laws of Psychic Phenomena," where the power of this part of man over the physical world is fully described.

The neighboring races of French Canadians and New England Protestants are good examples of the practical effects of these doctrines; committees of

priests have recently been appointed to teach the "Habitans" of Canada some of the modern improvements in agriculture.

A characteristic story was related by the author's father, who was educated at the Jesuit College in Montreal: one day in replying to a question put by the priest, he gave the answer as it appeared in the book, and then continued, "therefore so-and-so is so-and-so"; the priest immediately interrupted him with the words: "See that boy who says 'therefore'! What has he to do with 'therefore'? Let him answer the question as it stands in the book and nothing more!"

May not a Roman Catholic country be called a land where there is for laymen no "therefore"?

As William Arthur says in his "Popes, Kings and People" (p. 458):

"But when men have once really believed in a God who leaves the rule over His redeemed offspring to a vicar, and have believed in man as a creature whose conscience another man is to keep, it is hard to find in them foothold for Christian convictions. They are kneaded to the hand of the priest."

How subservient to papal authority individuals become even in the United States, and even among a class generally so independent as newspaper editors, may be shown by the following extract which appeared in the daily press, from an address to the Pope recently forwarded through Cardinal Satolli:

"To His Holiness Pope Leo XIII. :

Most Holy Father—Prostrate at the feet of Your Holiness we, the editors of the Catholic Press of the

United States of America, taking the occasion of the presence of your Apostolic Delegate whose residence we regard as a special mark of your favor, beg to present through him, the expression of our filial devotion and steadfast loyalty to the person and policy of the Sovereign Pontiff, the Vicar of Christ upon earth, and at the same time profess ourselves filled with a determination, not only to vindicate the inalienable rights of the See of Peter, but to advance, as far as in us lies, the welfare of the Holy Church in the United States."

But even these editors "prostrate at the feet of Your Holiness" are apparently not subservient enough to suit the Hierarchy of this country, for two days after the editors had determined on this address, the Archbishops published the following proclamation: "And lest the present evil, a daily growing source of scandal to Catholics and others, should continue to flourish, we judge well to meet it, not by cautions and advices merely, but also by ecclesiastical penalties. Wherefore, for the future, laymen or clerics who through themselves or through others, associated or encouraged by them, in public print assail by wanton words, ill-natured utterance, railleries, those in authority, much more if they presume to carp at or condemn a bishop's method of administration, all those, principals, partners, and abettors, disturbers, contemners, and enemies of the ecclesiastical discipline, as they are, we declare guilty of gravest scandal, and thereby, their fault being proved, deserving of censure."

For practical effect in charitable work compare

the Teachings on the Mount or the spirit which breathes in the Epistles of the New Testament or in the Ante-Nicene Fathers with the cold and elaborate dissertations of St. Thomas Aquinas, on Morality, balancing one excess against the other, in very much the same language which Aristotle had used three hundred years before Christ's coming!

The Ethics as the work of the heathen Aristotle is doubtless much to be admired; he knew of no conscience, speaking with authority from the Holy Ghost; the best ethical rule he could imagine (Book II., Chapter 9) was the opinion of those among mankind who are most honored by their fellows; his highest ideal (Book X., Chapter 8) was a selfishness consisting in the gratification not of the senses, but of the intellect, attainable by a few at the expense of the toil and degradation of the many. His exaltation of the contemplative life, undisturbed by emotions whether right or wrong, above the life of action as being more continuous, more independent, more reposeful, more final, is evidently an echo of the Nirvana doctrine of the Buddhists of India, brought back by the army of Alexander. St. Thomas says in Summa, I., II., q. 3, a. 5: "Happiness consists more in the work of the speculative than of the practical intellect"; and again he says in Summa I., II., q. 3, a. 8: "The last and perfect happiness cannot be, except in the contemplation of the divine essence."

In comparing the active and contemplative life, the difference is stated in question three, article five (above cited), as follows: "In contemplative life, man

communicates with his superiors, that is with God and the angels, with whom by happiness he is assimilated; but in those things which pertain to active life, even other animals have something in common with man, although imperfectly."

This conclusion, which is reached only after an elaborate consideration of all the various human capacities, is the same as that of Aristotle who, in his *Ethics* (Book X., Chapter 8) says: "It follows that the activity of God being preeminently blissful will be speculative, and if so then the human activity which is most nearly related to it, will be most capable of happiness. We conclude then that happiness is co-extensive with speculation."

The teaching of Aristotle and St. Thomas, by which the life of contemplation is exalted above the life of action, is certainly largely responsible for the state of facts which Cardinal Manning laments in his "Life" (Vol. II., p. 781): "And further all the great works of charity in England have had their beginning out of the (Roman Catholic) Church—for instance, the abolition of the slave trade and slavery; and the persevering protest of the Anti-Slavery Society. Not a Catholic name, so far as I know, shared in this. France, Portugal and Brazil have been secretly, or openly, slave-trading, or, till now, even, slave-holding. The whole temperance movement—it was a Quaker that made F. Mathew a total abstainer. Catholic Ireland and the Catholics of England, until now, have done little for temperance. The Anglican and dissenting ministers are far more numerous total abstainers than our priests.

The Act of Parliament to protect animals from cruelty was carried by a non-Catholic Irishman; the Anti-Vivisection Act also. Both are derided, to my knowledge, among Catholics. The acts to protect children from cruelty were the work of Dissenters. On these three societies there is hardly a Catholic name; on the last, mine was for long the only one. So again in the uprising against the horrible depravity which destroys young girls—multitudes of ours—I was literally denounced by Catholics; not one came forward. If it was ill done, why did nobody try to mend it? I might go on. There are endless works for the protection of shop assistants, overworked railway and train men, women and children ground down by sweaters, and driven by starvation wages upon the streets. Not one of the works in their behalf was started by us, hardly a Catholic name is to be found on their reports. Surely we are in the Sacristy. It is not that our Catholics deliberately refuse, but partly they do not take the pains to know, partly they are prejudiced. ‘Can any good thing come out of Nazareth?’ Partly they are suspicious; ‘who knows it is not a proselytising affair?’ And finally they live on easily, unconscious that Lazarus lies at their gate full of sores.” The predecessor of Cardinal Manning, Cardinal Wiseman, had made a complaint in the same spirit against the Monastic Orders for their lack of participation in strictly spiritual work among the poor (Life of Cardinal Manning, Vol. II., p. 4): “Now look at the position in which I am. Having believed, having preached, having assured bishops and clergy, that

in no great city could the salvation of multitudes be carried out by the limited parochial clergy, but that religious communities alone *can* and *will* undertake the huge work of converting and preserving the corrupted masses. I have acted on this conviction. I have introduced, or greatly encouraged, the establishment of five religious congregations in my diocese; and I am just (for the great work) where I first began! Not one of them *can* (for it cannot be want of will) undertake it. It comes within the purpose of none of them to try. Souls are perishing around them, but they are prevented by their Rules, given by Saints, from helping to save them, at least in any but a particular and definite way. . . . Almost every religious community has no end of dispensations, some from fasting and abstinence, some from choir, all from the habit, some have female servants, etc., etc. If you ask them why all these exceptions, you are told the circumstances of the country require them. But who thinks of recurring to the same dispensing power of the Holy See for exemption and liberation from provisions as much intended for different countries as these, from restrictions on the power of doing good in the way that the country requires it?"

The ethics of the Jesuits, so severely criticised, for example in Pascal's "Provincial Letters," or Bunsen's "Zeichen der Zeit," find ample authority in Aristotle, if not in the New Testament. Cardinal Gibbons in a public letter, containing a threat that Roman Catholics would leave one political party (published in the Catholic Review of May 23, 1896),

declares: "Patience is a virtue, but it is not the only virtue; when pushed too far it may degenerate into pusillanimity." It is submitted that His Eminence would find difficulty in citing a text of the Sermon on the Mount in support of this principle, that patience has its limits—but he would find numerous authorities to that effect in the writings of the Prince of Philosophers; as for example in his "Ethics," Book IV., Chapter 5: "It is like a slave to endure insults offered to one's self." As Father Harper declares in his *Metaphysics of the School* (Introduction, p. LXXII.): "His (St. Thomas Aquinas') moral Theology—to repeat what I have said before—is built upon the Ethics of the great Stagyrte."

Is it then to be wondered at that the Jesuits, believing that there is in man no divine spiritual part which, at the touch of the Holy Ghost, is ready to flame heavenward, should build all their churches, not in Gothic architecture in which the spirit is ever striving upward to throw off the weight of inert matter, but in the Grecian style, expressive of pagan contentment with the earthly, sensual beauty of this world, and that, in accordance with the same taste, every piece of Christian Gothic architecture has been eliminated from modern Rome?

The answer of Christianity to Aristotelianism is therefore also its answer to the Roman Catholic Scholasticism.

To any one familiar with the writings of the Aquinate the following extract from "Aristotelianism," by Rev. I. Gregory Smith might be supposed to be written with reference to St. Thomas:

(P. 28). "There is not indeed the unhesitating and unequivocal enunciation of self-knowledge, self-acquittal, self-condemnation, which is the inheritance of Christian ethics.

"The word (conscience), which the New Testament has made familiar for this moral introspection, is not in Aristotle. As we have seen, he makes the reason the judge, presiding over this court ever in session within the man, rather than the advocate laying his case before the will, whose verdict is final. Above all, apart from any deficiencies in the character of the morality, which it inculcates, the great defect in the Aristotelian conception of conscience is the want of authority. Conscience with Aristotle is not the voice of God. So long as conscience is supported by no sanction higher than man himself can give, so long as conscience can appeal only to the general consent of mankind, to the intelligent approval of those who are esteemed above their fellows, to the legislative enactments of the State, to considerations, however obvious of expediency, conscience cannot dictate, can only expostulate and remonstrate, often like Cassandra, in vain. Without a sanction more permanent, more comprehensive, more unquestionably obligatory than human enforcements, singly or collectively, can supply, conscience cannot claim obedience as a due, which must be rendered, come what may."

(P. 46). "Virtue is instrumental in regulating the passions, which would otherwise frustrate the pursuit of happiness by their infatuation. Be good that ye may be happy is the key-note of his philosophy.

Self is the center of his system ; regard for self shapes and colors it from first to last. The 'Ethics' are Aristotle's answer to the question, 'How is man to be happy?'

"It is a lofty selfishness. There is nothing sordid, nothing gross about it. It marks, as by a highwater line, how high ideal selfishness can be raised. But it is genuine unalloyed selfishness, and this lies at the very core of the philosophy. . . . It is, in a word, the unruffled serenity, inseparable from virtue. Where could there be a more beautiful ideal of life, if the culture of self, the beautification of self, were all in all? Even when, leaving sublunary things, Aristotle soars upwards into the life contemplative, self clings to him. He places contemplation above action as more continuous, more independent, more reposeful, more final. . . . Emotion disturbs it. Therefore emotions rightly directed or not, must be hushed into absolute stillness. This is a glorious ideal, so far as it represents the supremacy of reason over passion. But it is a selfish glory after all ; even as the devout raptures of the monk in his cell are selfish, so far as they are purchased by the soldier's abandonment of his post in the turmoil and peril of life. The contemplative life is a refined selfishness, the selfish enjoyment of a transcendental bliss incommunicable to mankind generally. The happiness which Aristotle proposes as the end of being is not something which all have a title to share in ; it is the privilege of a few. He rejects the hedonism or utilitarianism of the vulgar, only to substitute the same thing in disguise."

Another doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas, derived as usual from Aristotle, which has helped greatly to destroy individual initiative in Roman Catholic countries is that all movement comes from above, and, therefore, above everything moved must stand one who moves it, God alone is not moved by any one. (*De Regimine Principum*, Lib. III., cap. 1 to 3, and *Contra Gentiles*, Lib. I., cap. 13).

The connection of this doctrine with astrology will be shown in the last chapter.

A further Aristotelian teaching which St. Thomas adopted and which has had a most far-reaching consequence is that of the "Final Cause," from which every action must be judged. Thus he says in *Summa I.*, II., q. 1, a. 3: "According as the end is praiseworthy or to be blamed, our works should be praised or blamed," and *id.* q. 18, a. 4: "Human actions depend from their ends . . . from their ends they take the quality of good or evil . . . whose end is good, he is good, and whose end is bad, he is bad." The notorious use which the Jesuits have made of this principle by claiming that their organization had the very highest end and justified any action, need not here be commented on. To quote again Mgr. Talbot (*Life of Cardinal Manning*, II., p. 388): "The motto of the Jesuits ought to be changed from *ad maiorem Dei gloriam* to *ad maiorem Societatis gloriam*."

This doctrine, that the end justifies the means, for which the Jesuits have been most strongly blamed and which even they have feared to defend, is one of the foundation stones of the philosophy of him

who, by the Paladin of the Jesuits, has been declared the Patron of all Roman Catholic schools and colleges.

Moreover, this theory of dichotomy strikes at the root of the importance of the Lord's Supper; if we adopt the theory of transubstantiation, we must first believe that our Lord, in common with all men, possessed a substantial form which takes the place of the substantial form of the bread in the Blessed Sacrament; but if all men possess a substantial form, *i. e.*, a reasoning soul, which, together with the physical body, constitutes the individual, it follows that the body of our Lord must feed and nourish either this reasoning soul (or intellect) or the body of the communicant. Now it is generally agreed that it does neither. What permanent benefit can then be derived by the participant in a Mass? If man, on the other hand, has a spiritual, as well as an intellectual and physical part to his nature, the whole divine mystery becomes as intelligible as we mortals need expect; Christ is spiritually taken and received by the faithful in the Lord's Supper, to the renewal and regeneration of their spirits.

Another closely related evil of scholastic theology may be mentioned here: the minimizing of the human element in our Saviour. Aquinas on this point followed the writings of the Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, with his Neo-Platonic teachings, with Saints to satisfy man's craving for a human mediator. This is fully set out in Canon Gore's "Dissertations on Subjects connected with the Incarnation" (p. 206).

Leo XIII. closes his Encyclicals with appeals to the Virgin Mary, St. Joseph and other Saints for intercession with God,—but he rarely, if ever, appeals Christ as the Great Intercessor, although we have His express promise that whatsoever we should ask in His name we shall receive. (Gospel of St. John XVI., 24.)

Need we wonder that in a religion which recognizes in man only a rational soul, (as it does in plants a vegetable soul and in animals a sensitive soul,) the divine lineaments of the Saviour are fading away, as it were, in a dissolving view, to be replaced by the sharp, cold features of “the Philosopher,” and that the Holy Spirit comes only—as was said at the Council of Trent—in the mail-bags from the Vatican, and that even the worship of God the Father is being reduced to a faint Deism by the hero-worship of a crowd of *dei minores*? What chance has the patient when the physician not only ignores the only possible remedy but even denies the existence of the one organ through which the remedy could be taken into the system?

Why should we be surprised at the slow progress of Christianity under Roman Catholic guidance any more than we should wonder at the slow progress of an ocean steamship, whose captain was ignorant of, or denied the existence of the great engine beneath his deck, and insisted on propelling his ship only by the methods and rules, in vogue three hundred years before the Day of Pentecost?

The Church herself, through the exaltation of reason and the degradation of conscience, has raised

that mighty brood of Rationalists or Naturalists, such as Grotius, Hobbes, Puffendorf and Rousseau, who now threaten to devour her; see the chapter on the history of the Social Contract Theory, in the author's "Trade Organizations in Politics."

Was it not natural that when the forged bands of the False Decretals, which bound St. Thomas, and, as he thought, all human reason to the Chair of St. Peter, were proven by history to be but shams and illusions that man should fall back to the position of Aristotle, with reason, deprived of all divine aid, as his only guide?

In vain would the Church hand over all such Naturalists or Rationalists "to the secular arm"! There is but one remedy: Let it assist in replacing conscience on the throne of human nature, but prostrate, with imploring arms, without any human intermediary, at the foot-stool of God, the Holy Ghost.

As Maurice says in "The Conscience," p. 83:

"There is that in me which asks for the Right, for that which ought to have dominion over me; there is that in me which says emphatically, 'This is not that Right, this ought not to have dominion over me!' I may be long in learning what the Right is; I may make a thousand confused efforts to grasp it; I may try to make it for myself; I may let others make it for me. But always there will be a witness in me that what I have made or anyone has made, is not what I ought to serve; that is not the right, not what I am seeking for, not what is seeking me."

CHAPTER V.

THE CHURCH AND SCIENCE.

Leo XIII., in his Encyclical on St. Thomas Aquinas, above cited, declares: "So, too, the physical sciences, so much in vogue now, and which by their ingeniously contrived inventions have everywhere excited so much merited attention, will have not only nothing to lose, but much to gain by the restoration of the ancient philosophy. For in their use and improvement, the mere consideration of facts and study of nature is not enough; but after the facts are established, it is needful to go a step higher, and sedulously employ every means in finding out the nature of corporeal things, investigating the laws and principles by which they are governed, and by tracing up their system, their unity and variety, and their mutual affinity in diversity. To all these investigations scholastic philosophy, if handled with skillfulness, will bring power and light and empire—we most earnestly beseech you, venerable brethren, to restore and extend far and wide the golden wisdom of St. Thomas . . . for the improvement of all the sciences."

What is "the golden wisdom" of St. Thomas as to the physical world?

The importance of this question will at once be recognized when we remember that one merit of scholastic philosophy which no one can dispute, is the

logical unity and consistency with which it proceeds from the most fundamental principles of metaphysics to the most practical acts of every day life ; and moreover that one of the most important teachings of the Roman Church, the doctrine of transubstantiation, is bound up with and depends upon its well defined, closely argued theory of the physical world.

It is submitted that the so-called science of astrology formed an essential part of the theory of St. Thomas, as to the constitution of the physical world, and that with the elimination of that belief the main-spring of his entire cosmic theory was removed and the fragmentary remains of the system are unintelligible, and tend only to clog the progress of true science.

To prove this assertion it is necessary only to consider the following citations from the second largest work of St. Thomas, known as the *Contra Gentiles* or *Summa Philosophica*, in which the Angelic Doctor sets forth his philosophical system, as he did afterwards his theology in the *Summa Theologiae*.

In brief, following Aristotle, his theory is that everything in the world, except to a certain extent the soul of man, receives its original motive power (*i. e.*, its substantial form), by which it exists as such or such a being, from the stars, and that each of the stars is in turn guided by an intelligent spirit (not an angel); so that the whole creation is a hierarchy working together for the glory of God. It follows that if this motive power from the stars does not exist, the whole system falls to pieces, and the terms such as "substance" and "accident" are as useless

and worthless as the wheels and levers of a perpetual motion machine; a chain is no stronger than its weakest link!

St. Thomas could as little imagine the physical world without this hierarchical system as he could imagine the Church with an organization as simple as that of the Society of Friends, or the State, as a democracy with universal suffrage; and to endeavor, therefore, to force modern science to adapt itself to the terms and requirements of scholastic philosophy is as sensible as it would be to educate the future citizens of a republic, with universal suffrage, on the precepts of some writer on Feudal Law.

In fact, the fall of the Feudal System as well as that of the hierarchical mediæval Church is closely connected with the discrediting of astrology; it is, therefore, easy to understand the hate of the Church against Galileo, and how Descartes trembled at publishing his theories of the heavenly bodies even as an hypothesis. Only when this baneful influence was removed, could a man stand up and say: "Cogito, ergo sum."

The following quotations from the third book of St. Thomas's *Contra Gentiles* will, it is believed, justify the foregoing assertions, even to persons who have not made a study of scholasticism, and to whom, therefore, many of the terms will seem strange. The quotations are given somewhat in full because the book "*Contra Gentiles*" is not generally attainable.

Chapter XXII.: "The celestial bodies truly move and are moved, . . . in so far as they move by moving,

the object of their movement is to obtain a likeness to Deity, in that they are the cause of other objects. But they are the cause of other objects by this, that they cause the coming into existence and cessation of existence, and other movements in these inferior objects. The movements of heavenly bodies, therefore, so far as they move is intended for the coming into existence and the cessation of existence, which is in those inferior objects. . . . But in the same way the heavenly bodies although they are more worthy than the inferior bodies, yet do not intend to bring the latter into existence and to give them forms as an ultimate end; but in this they (the heavenly bodies) aim at an ultimate end in that they are the cause of others. . . .

“If, therefore, the movement of heaven itself is intended for the purpose of bringing things into existence, but the existence of all things is intended for man as the ultimate end, it is plain that the movement of the heaven is intended to have man for its object and as the ultimate end of things that are generated and moved.

“Hence it is said that God made celestial bodies for the service of all races (Deut. 4-19).”

Chapter XXIII.—“From the foregoing, also it can be shown that the first movement of heaven is intellectual, for nothing acting according to its own species intends to produce a higher form than its own; for everything which acts intends something like itself. But a heavenly body, since it acts by its own movement, is intended for the highest form which is the human intellect: which indeed is

higher than any other form as appears from the foregoing(Chap. XXII.). A heavenly body therefore does not act for producing a body according to its own species as a principal agent, but according to the species of some superior intellectual agent, to which the heavenly body bears itself as the instrument to the principal agent. But a heavenly body acts in bringing into existence as it is moved, therefore the heavenly body is moved by some intellectual substance. Moreover, everything that is moved must be moved by something, as was proved above (Lib. I., Cap. XII.). A heavenly body therefore is moved by something. This other is either separated from it or united to it, so that the composite body is said to move itself, in so far as one part of it is moved and the other the mover. But if this latter is the case (since everything which moves itself is alive and animated) it follows that the heavenly body is alive and animated. But it can be animated by no soul except an intellectual one—it follows therefore that it is moved by an intellectual soul. But if it is moved by an external motor, the latter is either corporeal or incorporeal; and if it is corporeal it does not move, unless it is moved, as appears from the foregoing (Lib. I., Cap. XIII.); it is necessary therefore that it should be moved by another; but as one must not resort to the theory of an infinite number of bodies, one will and must come to a first incorporeal mover; but what is separated from a body must be intellectual as is shown above (Lib. I., Cap. XLIV.). Therefore the movement of a heavenly body which is the first of bodies, is by an intellectual substance."

Chapter XXIV.—“ But if a heavenly body is moved by an intellectual substance, as has been shown (Chap. XXIII.), and the movement of a heavenly body is intended to bring into existence inferior bodies, it follows that the coming into existence and movements of these inferior bodies proceeds from the intention of an intelligent substance. Therefore the *forms* and movements of inferior bodies are caused and intended by an intelligent substance as the principal agent, but by a heavenly body as the instrument. But it is necessary that the species of those that are caused and intended to exist by an intellectual agent, preexist in the intellect of that agent, as the forms created by artificers preexist in the intellect of the artificer and from them are brought into effect. Therefore all forms which are in these inferior bodies and all their movements are determined by the intellectual forms which are in the intellect of one of these substances or of several of them. And on account of this Boetius says (De Trinit., C. 3) that the forms which are in matter come from forms that are without matter, and in so far, the statement of Plato is verified that separate forms are the origin of material forms, although he claims that they exist by themselves and immediately cause perceptible forms; but we place them as existing in the intellect and causing inferior forms by the movement of the heaven. Since truly everything which is moved by another *per se* and not by accident, is directed by it to the end of its movement, but a heavenly body is moved by an intellectual substance and causes by its movement all movements in these

inferior bodies, it is necessary that a celestial body is directed towards its end by an intellectual substance, and consequently inferior bodies are directed in the same way to their various ends.

“So therefore it is not difficult to see how natural bodies without sense are moved and act toward an end. For they tend to an end as directed by an intelligent substance, as an arrow tends to the mark directed by the archer; for as an arrow follows its inclination to a mark or the end determined by the force of the archer, so natural bodies follow the inclination to natural ends from natural movers, from which proceed their forms and virtues and movements. Hence also it appears that every work of nature is the work of an intelligent substance; for the principal effect is attributed to the first mover, directing toward an end rather than to the instruments by which he directs; and on account of this the works of nature are found to proceed orderly to an end as the works of a wise man. It is plain therefore that also those who lack sense can act for an end and seek a good by natural appetite and the divine likeness and its proper perfection—hence it appears that all things seek the divine likeness as their ultimate end.”

Chapter XXVIII.—“All things are governed by God through the mediation of intellectual creatures. Since it pertains to divine Providence that order should be preserved in things, but a proper order is one which descends from the highest to the lowest proportionately, it is necessary that divine Providence should extend by some proportion even to the

lowest things. But this proportion is that the highest beings are under God and governed by him, so inferior creatures should be under higher ones and governed by them. But among all creatures the highest are the intellectual ones, as appears from the foregoing (Chap. XLIX.). The reason of divine Providence, therefore, demands that other creatures should be ruled by rational creatures. . . . Moreover, what exists by itself is the cause of that which exists by something else. But only intellectual creatures operate by themselves, as if they were masters of their own acts by their free will; but other creatures operate from the necessity of nature; as if moved by another. Therefore intellectual creatures by their work are the movers and rulers of other creatures.

Chapter LXXXII.—“Inferior bodies are ruled by God through superior bodies.

“Since intellectual substances are superior and inferior, so also in corporeal substances. But intellectual substances are ruled by the superior ones, as the disposition of divine Providence descends proportionally even to the lowest, as shown above (Cap. LXX. *et seq.*). Therefore, by equal reason, inferior bodies are governed by superior bodies.

“Moreover, so much as one body is higher in its place than another, so much more perfect is it found to be in its form; for water is of better form than the earth, and air is of better form than water, and fire is of better form than air. But the heavenly bodies are in place higher than all the bodies. They are therefore of better form than all other bodies;

therefore more active. Therefore they act on inferior bodies, and thus by them inferior bodies are ruled.

“Also what is in its nature perfect and without contradiction is of more universal virtue than that which in its nature does not exist without its contrary. . . . But celestial bodies in their nature are without opposite qualities; for they are not light nor heavy, nor hot nor cold; but inferior bodies are not completed in their nature without some contrary quality; and this even their movement shows; for in the circular movement of the heavenly bodies there is no opposite principle, hence there can be in them no violence; but the movements of the lower bodies are in opposite directions, as the movement up or a movement down. Therefore heavenly bodies are of more universal virtue than lower bodies. But universal virtues are the movers of particular virtues, as appears from what has been said (Cap. LXX.). Therefore heavenly bodies move and govern lower bodies.

“Moreover, it was shown above (Cap. LXXVIII.) that all things are ruled by intellectual substances. But heavenly bodies more nearly resemble intellectual substances than other bodies, in so far as they are immutable; they are also nearer to them, in that they are moved directly by them, as shown above (Lib. II., Cap. LXX., et Lib. III., Cap. LXXX.). Therefore by them inferior bodies are ruled. . . .

“But heavenly bodies only among corporeal bodies are unchangeable, as is shown by their disposition, which is always found to be the same. The heavenly body is therefore the cause of every change in

those things which change. But change in these inferior bodies is the beginning of all movement. . . . It is, therefore, necessary that the heaven is the cause of all movement in these lower bodies.

Chapter LXXXIV.—“From the foregoing it appears that in those things which concern the intellect, the heavenly bodies are not causes. . . .

“But it must be known that although the heavenly bodies cannot be directly the causes of our intellect, yet they can indirectly affect it. For although the intellect is not a corporeal virtue, yet it cannot fulfil its work in us without the cooperation of corporeal virtues, which are imagination and the power of memory and thought, as appears from the foregoing (chap. LXXIII. Lib. III.); and hence it is when the operation of these virtues are impeded on account of any indisposition of the body, the operation of the intellect is also impeded, and on account of this also the goodness of the disposition of the body makes one apt to understand well . . . hence it is said in the second book *De Anima* (text, comm. 94) that ‘we see men with soft skin to have bright minds.’ But the condition of the human body is subject to the heavenly movement . . . therefore indirectly heavenly bodies work for the goodness of the intellect; and so as doctors can judge of the goodness of the intellect from the complexion of the body, as being its immediate cause, so the astrologer from the movements of the heavenly bodies can judge of the goodness of the intellect as this movement is the remote cause of this goodness of the intellect. And by this way one can verify what Ptolemy said in *Centiloqu-*

ium: 'When Mercury shall have been at the time of birth of any one in any one of the houses of Saturn . . . he gives an intelligence apt to penetrate things even to the core.' "

Chapter LXXXV. "But from this it appears that heavenly bodies are not the causes of our wills or of our decisions . . . but yet it must be known that although the heavenly bodies are not the direct causes of our decisions, as if they worked directly on our wills, nevertheless indirectly from them some influence is brought to bear on our decisions, from their influence on our bodies; so when by the heavenly bodies the air is made intensely cold, we decide to warm ourselves at the fire or do something else which suits the season; in another way, according as we are impressed by them there arise in us certain passions or we are made liable to certain passions, as choleric men are prone to anger; or again when their influence on our bodies causes a certain disposition, we act accordingly, as when we are sick and consult a doctor; moreover even human actions are caused by the heavenly bodies, as in so far as any one is deprived of reason and a lunatic and is moved by natural instinct as a brute. But it is plain that man resists these occasions or obeys them according to his reason; but the greater number of men follow such natural impulses; but few, that is only wise men, do not follow the occasion and natural impulses of acting badly. On account of this Ptolemy says in the Centiloquium that 'The wise soul helps the works of the stars;' and that 'an astrologer could not give decisions according

to the stars, unless he knows well the strength of the mind and complexion ;' and that ' an astrologer should not say things specially but generally because while the impression of the stars produces its effect on most people because they do not resist the inclination of their bodies, still it does not do so always in those who strongly resist the natural inclination by their reason.' "

Chapter XCII. "How a man is called fortunate and how he is helped by superior causes." . . .

"Since therefore a man is ordered according to his body under heavenly bodies, according to his intellect under angels, but according to his will under God, something can happen outside the intention of man but according to the order of the heavenly bodies, or the disposition of the angels or even of God. For although God only acts directly in the decision of man, yet the action of angels influences man in his decision by persuasion, and the action of the heavenly bodies by means of affecting his disposition, as bodily impressions of the heavenly bodies on our bodies dispose men to certain elections. When, therefore, any one from the impressions of heavenly bodies and superior causes as above indicated is inclined to decisions useful to himself, whose use he does not recognize by his own reason, and when from the light of intellectual substances his intellect is illumined to understand them, and from the divine operation his will is inclined to choose something useful to himself, the reason for which he is ignorant of, he is said to have good fortune ; and otherwise, he is said to have bad fortune when from

superior causes his decision is inclined to the opposite, as it is said of one, 'Write that man sterile, a man who shall not prosper in his days.' Jer. 22, 30.

" . . . It is manifest that inanimate bodies acquire certain powers and virtues from the celestial bodies even besides those which they certainly obtain from the celestial bodies as active and passive and elementary qualities ; so the power of the magnet to attract iron comes from the virtue of a celestial body, and certain stones and herbs have other occult virtues. Hence nothing prevents that a certain man should have from the influence of a heavenly body, capacity for certain work which another has not, as a doctor in healing, a farmer in planting, a soldier in conquering."

Further information concerning the "intellectual substances" which guide the stars, showing that they are intelligent, incorruptible, and are endowed with free will, is found in the second book of the same *Summa Contra Gentiles*.

The whole doctrine is repeated concisely in the *Summa Theologiæ* I., q. 115, a. 3, which is entitled : "Whether celestial bodies are the causes of those things which here are done by inferior bodies ?" The answer is that "All motion proceeds from the immovable. And, therefore, the more immovable things are, the more are they the cause of those things which are movable. But the heavenly bodies are amongst bodies the most immovable. For they are not moved except by a local motion (*i. e.*, they are incorruptible). And, therefore, the movements of these lower bodies which are variable and multiform,

are referred to the motion of the celestial body which is its cause. : . . Active principles are not found in these lower bodies, except the active qualities of the elements which are heat and cold and things of that kind ; and if it were so that the substantial forms of lower bodies do not differ except by these accidents, it would not be necessary to place above these lower bodies any active principle, but they would suffice for their action. But to those who consider things rightly, it appears that accidents of this kind are related as material dispositions to the substantial form of natural bodies. But matter does not suffice for action. And, therefore, above these material dispositions it is necessary to place some active principle.

“ Hence, the Platonists place separate species according to whose participation the lower bodies acquire substantial forms. But this does not appear to suffice. For separate species are always the same, since they are immovable. And so it would follow that there would be no variation in the generation and corruption of these lower bodies. Which is evidently false. Hence, according to the philosopher (Aristotle) in II. De Generatione, it is necessary to place some active principle which by its presence and absence causes the variation of generation and corruption in lower bodies. And of this kind are the celestial bodies, and, therefore, whatever in these lower bodies generates or produces one of its species, is, as it were, the instrument of a celestial body. As it is said in II. Physic. (Aristotle) that man and the sun produces a man.”

The foregoing quotations amply prove that according to St. Thomas, the force which in this world moves and generates everything, except the soul of man, comes from the intelligent spirits which guide the stars; they create the substantial forms through which matter is differentiated into all the objects of the material world. The stars, therefore, furnish that without which the world cannot be imagined, and to strike it out of the system is to remove the motive power of the universe.

Modern Roman Catholic writers try to hide this vital defect in their system by pretending that the forms themselves give life and motion to matter, but to St. Thomas this would have seemed as absurd as if one had said that the mold, instead of the artist made the statue.

St. Thomas could imagine no forms, except as the expression of an intelligent being; without the force from the stars the world would have seemed as dead as a steam engine would be if no steam existed. He seems expressly to deny the possibility that substance could act by itself (Summa I., q. 54, a. 1).

It is true that neither matter nor accident are stated to be generated by the stars; but the substantial form is the keystone in the arch, with matter on one side and accident on the other, so placed that neither of them can stand alone. As to matter, this could be proved by many citations; *e. g.*, S. Thom., q. 4, depot. a. 3: "Matter cannot exist without form." As to the dependence of accident on substantial forms, the authorities are very numerous; thus in Summa I., q. 29, a. 1 ad 3; "For accidents are the effects of substantial forms and show them forth."

The doctrine is summed up in Summa, I., q. 105, a. 1.: "Plants and mineral bodies resemble the sun and the stars, by whose virtue they are formed."

Leo XIII. in his Encyclical on Anglican Orders declares that it is the form which gives character to matter.

Old Galileo in prison, with his failing eyesight, may well have congratulated himself that in destroying astrology he had done a work, worthy of a dying Samson's last revenge.

Nor can this central pillar of their system, the force which created it, the *forma substantialis*, be replaced by anything else, nor can its absence be disregarded. The functions and powers of the spirits which guided the stars and created these astral bodies must be disposed of in some manner—either they can be returned to the Diety or they can be attributed to the Forms themselves; if the former plan is adopted, and God is supposed to act directly upon matter, one falls into the occasionalism of Mallebranche, which the present reigning school of Jesuits has condemned more severely even than Protestantism; and if the latter plan is adopted, one builds up an unintelligible system dangerously near to a materialistic pantheism, in which the form is supposed to create itself and which, therefore, explains nothing.

The latter theory is the one now in vogue in Jesuit schools, as illustrated by the following extracts from the Metaphysics of the School by Father Harper, S. J. (Macmillan & Co., 1884). So far as this system is at all intelligible, it seems to represent the substantial form as emerging *proprio motu* like a Jack-in-

the-box, from imperceptible matter and then instantaneously diving back into it again and thereby "informing" it and rendering it appreciable by the senses and endowing it with all its essential qualities. It is submitted that the following extracts show that the foregoing statement is not exaggerated.

(Vol. II., p. 563.) "But the Form according to its essential nature is the act of matter in such wise that, as the Angelic Doctor repeatedly monishes, it is not so much an entity itself, as that by which another entity (that is to say, the composite) is constituted. It has no independent existence. By the mere fact that it is, it actuates or informs matter. It is educed out of the potentiality of matter; and so educed that, for so long as it exists, it essentially exists as the Form of matter. But the actuation of matter and the constitution of the composite are really one and the same thing, considered from two different points of view."

(Vol. II., p. 504.) "For these reasons the Form is said to be educed out of the potentiality of the matter; while the composite substance is said to be *created, produced, generated*. Nevertheless the productive action is one and the same."

(Vol. II., p. 386.) "The Form, then, may be said to practically render it (matter) actual to sense."

(Vol. II., p. 567.) "The causality of the Form is not, strictly speaking, the union of the Form with the matter, but the actuation of the matter by the Form; as will be shown in a later Thesis. Now this information virtually contains in its concept that the Form is educed out of the matter; that it is

essentially dependent on the matter for its first existence as well as for its continuance in being; and, finally, that it is the act of matter. But these three elements equally connote the local presence of the Form with the matter, as an integral part or at least accompanying property of the formal causation."

(Vol. II., p. 503.) "Now, to educe the Form out of the potentiality of matter is in every way identical with the actuation of matter. . . . It needs no distinct unitive action to compound two entities that cannot be made to exist apart even by miracle.

Therefore the eduction of the Form is the constitution of the substance."

(Vol. II., p. 561.) "It (this definition) is borrowed from Suarez. A substantial bodily Form, then, is a simple and incomplete substance which, as the act of matter, constitutes together with the matter the integral essence of the composite substance."

(Vol. II., p. 520.) "From a diversity of substantial Forms there follows a diversity of natural operations."

(Vol. III., p. 195.) "Substance can in a manner produce accidents, without any change in itself, by natural resultance; and accidents in consequence can be the causes of accidents."

How dangerously near to materialistic pantheism these theories lead is apparent. St. Thomas, who believed that the Forms were created and guided by immaterial spirits could use such quotations as the following in *Contra Gentiles*, Lib. III., Cap. XCVII.: "Again: From the diversity of Forms we gather

the reason of order in beings. For since the Form is that by which an entity has being and every entity, by reason of its having being, approaches to the likeness of God who is His own simple Being; it necessarily follows that the Form is no other than a participation of the Divine likeness in entities. Hence in unison with this conclusion, Aristotle, in the first Book of the Physics, speaking of Form declares that 'it is something Divine and object of desire.' "

But it means a very different thing when such passages are repeated with approval by a modern writer, such as Father Harper in his *Metaphysics of the School*, who believes no longer in these star-guiding spirits, but only in Forms, continually immersed in matter, as the direct motive power of the world. If there is in every particle of matter, "something Divine and the object of desire," what is the difference between this teaching and materialistic pantheism? Such passages as the following from Father Harper's volume II., p. 520, which could be multiplied indefinitely, certainly breathe such a spirit:

"Since then, there is an essential order in material substances; the substantial Form, which is the intrinsic principle of the essential nature of each, and, in consequence, of the diversity, must likewise be the intrinsic principle of the cosmic order."

Why blame Spinoza for Pantheism when he only identified Deity with all-containing matter?

To find an answer to these theories, so lauded by Leo XIII., one must go back two centuries and take down the dusty folios which laughed scholasticism

into "the modest retirement in the Italian and Iberian Peninsulas."

The answer to the theory last referred to is well given by Father Mallebranche, a devout believer in all the dogmas of the Roman Catholic Church of that day, in his "Search after Truth" (Second Part, Book VI., Chap. III.): "Philosophers not only speak without understanding themselves, when they explain the effects of nature by some beings of which they have no particular idea; but also establish a principle whence very false and pernicious consequences may directly be drawn.

"For supposing with them that there are in bodies certain entities distinguished from matter, and having no distinct idea of those entities; 'tis easie to imagine that they are the real or principal causes of the effects we see. And this is the very opinion of the vulgar philosophers. The prime reason of their supposing those substantial forms, real qualities, and such like entities is to explain the effects of nature: But when we come attentively to consider the idea we have of cause or power of acting, we cannot doubt but that it represents something divine: For the idea of a sovereign power is the idea of a sovereign divinity; and the idea of a subordinate power, the idea of an inferiour divinity, yet a true divinity; at least according to the opinion of the heathens, supposing it to be the idea of a true power or cause. And therefore we admit something divine in all the bodies that surround us, when we acknowledge forms, faculties, etc., that are capable of producing some effects by

the force of their nature; and thus insensibly approve of the sentiments of the heathens, by too great a deference for their philosophy. Faith indeed corrects us; but it may perhaps be said, that the mind is Pagan, whilst the heart is a Christian.

“Moreover it is a hard matter to persuade ourselves that we ought neither to fear nor love true powers and beings, that can act upon us with some pain or reward us with some pleasure. And as love and fear are a true adoration, it is hard again to imagine why they must not be adored.

“There are some who affirm that the substantial form produces forms; and the accidental form, accidents. Others say that the forms produce both other forms and accidents. Others still, that bare accidents are not only capable of producing accidents but even forms. But it must not be imagined that those, for instance, who say that accidents can produce forms by virtue of the form they are joined to, understand it the same way. For one part of them will have accidents to be the very force or virtue of the substantial form. Another that they imbibe into them the influence of the form and only act so by virtue of it, and a third, lastly, that will have them to be but instrumental causes.”

How closely the doctrine of “efficient cause” was bound up with that of the substantial form, so that they both must stand or fall together, appears from the following extract from Harper’s *Metaphysics of the School*:

(Vol. III., p. 57.) “The difficult question that is submitted to discussion and examination in this and

succeeding Theses, turns upon the nature of Efficient Causality—or rather upon the principiants of the Efficient Causality—by which the substantial form is educed out of the potentiality of matter and the composite substance generated.”

(Vol. III., p. 224.) “A property flows from the essence or substantial form, as its natural result. That agent, therefore, which is efficient cause of the existence of the essential nature, is ipso facto Efficient Cause of the property resulting from this essence. But the Efficient Cause of the essential nature is the generator, as is clear. Therefore, the generator is likewise Efficient Cause of the property.”

Schopenhauer’s criticism of Aristotle’s “*causa efficiens*,” applies with equal force to the system of St. Thomas.

On this theory too was based the Aquinate’s famous idea of the “second cause” which is the very citadel of scholastic philosophy and theology, as being an attempt to explain predestination; in the most celebrated passage (*Summa*, I., II., q. 6, a. 1) the argument on free-will is drawn from the analogy of the spirit guiding the stars.

In answer to this theory, we need only cite Father Mallebranche in his “Concerning the Search after Truth” (*id.*):

“There are philosophers who maintain that second causes act by their matter, figure and motion, and these in one sense are right enough. Others by their substantial form. Many by accidents or qualities, some by matter and form; others by form

and accidents; others still by certain virtues or faculties distinct from all this. . . . Nor can the philosophers compromise about the action whereby second causes produce their effects. For some of them pretend that causality ought not to be produced, since it is this which produces. Others will that they truly act by their own action. But they are involved in so many labyrinths in explaining precisely wherein this action consists, and there are so many different opinions about it, that I cannot find in my heart to recite them."

How little there would be left of Scholastic Philosophy if the doctrines of the Formal Cause and the Efficient Cause were eliminated, any one with the slightest acquaintance with Aristotelian or Scholastic Philosophy will know.

Need we wonder that with such a philosophy as that of St. Thomas, Roman Catholics worship relics?

The utter impossibility of understanding such modern works as "The Physical System of St. Thomas," by Father Giovanni Maria Carnoldi, S. J., translated by Edward Heneage Dering (Benzinger Bros., New York), need not be marveled at when we remember that they dare not refer in any way to St. Thomas' belief in astrology, and that they are in effect trying to conceal this awful hiatus in their system—this skeleton in the closet.

But none of these systems can be called that of St. Thomas; his system was at least logical, if you granted the premises, *i. e.*, the influence of minds ruling the stars and through them the physical world; see "New Essays concerning Human Understanding," by Leibnitz (Macmillan & Co., p. 643).

The whole theory of political and social rule,

government from above downward, was based upon this analogy ; in *De Regimine Principum*, liber. III., cap. II., St. Thomas says : " If there is order in corporeal movements, much more will there be in spiritual matter. But as we see in bodies that the lower are moved by the higher and all are reduced to the movement of the highest, which is the ninth sphere according to Ptolemy in 1 distinct *Almagesti* ; but according to Aristotle in 2 *de Caelo*, it is the eighth which movement indeed blessed Dionysius in lib. *de divinis Nominibus* and *de caelesti Hierarchia* relates to us, distinguishing in spiritual substances movement as in bodies, that is circular, straight and oblique. Which movements indeed are certain illuminations which they receive from their superiors for action, as the same Doctor explains. But among all men, kings, princes and other rulers of the world should be more ready to receive this illumination. . . . And so it is manifest in considering motion, that all dominion is from God." White's *History of the Warfare of Science with Theology* gives a picture of this hierarchical organization of the heavens : " Thus was the vast system developed by these three leaders of mediæval thought (the Pseudo-Dionysius, the Areopagite Peter Lombard and St. Thomas Aquinas) ; and now came the man who wrought it yet more deeply into European belief, the poet divinely inspired who made the system part of the world's *life*. Pictured by Dante, the empyrean and the concentric heavens, paradise, purgatory and hell, were seen of all men ; the God Triune, seated

on his throne upon the circle of the heavens, as real as the Pope seated in the chair of St. Peter; the seraphim, cherubim and thrones, surrounding the Almighty, as real as the cardinals surrounding the Pope; the three great orders of angels in heaven, as real as the three great orders, bishops, priests and deacons, on earth; and the whole system of spheres, each revolving within the one above it, and all moving about the earth, subject to the *primum mobile*, as real as the feudal system of western Europe, subject to the Emperor."

It is from this supposed analogy to the government of the physical universe by the stars, or rather by their guiding spirits, that the Papacy was supposed to sanctify and justify the power of temporal princes and these in turn passed down authority to all the subordinate rulers of the people.

The practical objection to teaching this system of physics from a scientific point of view, apart from its theoretical absurdity, the false conclusions in politics and religion which are drawn from it, and the dry-rot with which it strikes all true metaphysics, is that it gives no place for the modern doctrine of force as distinct from or independent of matter. Thus Father Harper says in his introduction to the *Metaphysics of the School* (p. XLVII.):

"Force is often set before us as a substance, existing of itself, and (as it were), in its own right, a concept of it, which is consonant neither with the common acceptance of the term, nor with the examples of it that are subject to human observation."

By no ingenuity can the theory of the transmuta-

tion or conservation of energy as worked out by Grove, Helmholtz, Faraday, and others be brought under a system which recognizes the force of the stars as a sufficient explanation for the attraction of iron by the magnet, and no Roman Catholic writer, if he were bold enough to insert this modern doctrine of force into his system, could thenceforth claim that it was the system of St. Thomas.

To the faithful follower of the latter, the experiments of our distinguished countryman, Count Rumford, whereby he proved that when fire was applied to metal, the heat developed did not come from the iron, do not exist; see Dr. Plassman's *Psychology*, page 180.

Alchemy and astrology were the natural products of the teachings of St. Thomas, instead of chemistry and astronomy.

The following extract from *Introduction à l'Histoire de l'Asie* by Léon Cahun (Paris: Collin & Cie.) shows how this philosophy affected the most energetic of Asiatics, the Turks:

"While the Europeans, under the spur of Helenism, and dazzled by the rediscovery of antiquity, were launching boldly out towards the unknown, towards free research, towards revolt, the Asiatics, their equals till the fifteenth century, let themselves docilely be brought back to the School as conceived by the sages of the orthodox Khalif. They discovered as a novelty Aristotle (as deformed by the Arabs), they returned to the 'Amalgest,' they plunged into Avicenna, their compatriot, they began again in Turkish the epoch of the Sassanidæ; they

‘marked time,’ but never advanced (*ils piétinèrent sur place*). All their intellectual activity, and they had as much as others, spent itself in scholasticism, in jurisprudence, in rhetoric; with great efforts they reconstituted Euclid, Ptolemy, Galen, Hippocrates—they hardly dared touch Plato; to go further would have been to lose themselves. Little by little, with the help of the monks, they came to think only of their salvation and to be content with the Koran.”

St. Thomas frequently cites the ‘Amalgest’ and Avicenne, above referred to; need we wonder, then, that the Shadow of God on Earth and the Vicar of Christ on Earth find so little difficulty in understanding and approving each other’s policy?

Why should our school teachers be taught from text books which cite with approval, as Dr. Plassmann does in his Psychology, page 148, such sentences as: “The matter of all terrestrial things is the same; but the matter of the heavenly bodies appears to be of a different kind than that of terrestrial bodies”? (Summa, I. q. 66, a. 2.) The same principles are taught in the Jesuit Seminary, in Woodstock, Maryland. For them, Helmholtz has never proved, by means of the spectrum, that the stars are composed of the same elements as the earth. Need we wonder at the few practical inventions made in Roman Catholic countries? Aristotle considered the applied sciences, like the occupation by which a man gains his living, vulgar.

That this whole scholastic physical system is of the utmost importance to the Roman Catholic Church is sufficiently apparent; the doctrine of transub-

stantiation has been formulated upon the belief that this system was absolutely true and would continue so for all time. But how can we believe that bread has a substantial form, and that this form is generated by the stars unless we believe in astrology? And if we do not believe in astrology, whence comes the substantial form of the bread which is removed in the Holy Eucharist at the time of consecration, to give place to that of our Lord? One of the arguments against Galileo in his days was that his scientific ideas were "leading to a denial of the Real Presence in the Eucharist." (White's History of Warfare of Science with Theology.) If, on the other hand, we adopt the modern theory of atoms, which has prevailed generally in the scientific world since the time of Des Cartes, how is it possible to believe in the doctrine of transubstantiation? So far as the author knows, no attempt has been made to state the doctrine of this theory of the physical world. Des Cartes is mentioned only with sneers and ridicule in modern Roman Catholic literature.

Nor would the attempt to state the doctrine on any theory of nature in harmony with the theory of correlation of forces and conservation of energy, be more easy; at all events, it would be as little consonant with the teachings of St. Thomas as with those of the whole mediæval Church.

In fact in every Thomistic Roman Catholic argument, if carefully considered, will be found this same defect, like the spot between Siegfried's shoulders, — only in this case it should be designated by a star, instead of a leaf.

It is therefore submitted that until it is certain that these antiquated theories of matter, which were evolved from his inner consciousness by Aristotle about three hundred years before Christ, and elaborated in the Dark Ages by the Aquinate, together with the social, political and theological theories which were based upon them, are positively repudiated by the Church, it is no safe teacher. The attempt to introduce those theories again into modern life can only be compared to the foolish sally of Don Quixote, equipped in the armor of a past generation.

The challenge made by Father Mallebranche three hundred years ago, in his Book IV., Chap. III., is still unanswered and his criticisms apply as well to the Angel of the Schools as to "the Philosopher": "I make no question but there are such as honestly believe that he whom they style *Prince of Philosophers*, is guilty of no Error; and that his works are the magazines of true and sound philosophy. There are men who imagine, that in the space of two thousand years, the time since he wrote, no man has been able to say he has made a blot or been guilty of a mistake; and so making him infallible in a manner, they can pin their faith upon him and quote him as infallible. But 'tis not worth while to stand to answer such gentlemen as these, because their ignorance must needs be exceeding gross, and meriting more to be pitied than oppugned; I desire only of them, if they know that either Aristotle or any of his followers, have deduced any truth from the principles peculiar to him; or if possibly themselves have done it, that they should declare it, explain it

and prove it; and I promise them never more to speak but to Aristotle's praise and commendation. His principles shall no longer be caluminated as useless, since they have at least been serviceable to prove one truth. But we have no reason to hope this, for the challenge has been long since offered, and M. Des Cartes, among the rest, has done it in his *Metaphysical Meditation* almost forty years ago, and obliged himself to demonstrate the falsehood of that pretended truth. And there is great probability that no man will ever venture to attempt what M. Des Cartes' greatest enemies, and the most zealous Defenders of Aristotle's Philosophy never yet durst undertake.

"I beg leave then after this to say, that it is *blindness, slavishness of spirit* and *stupidity*, thus to betray *reason* to the authority of Aristotle, Plato, or whatever other Philosopher; that 'tis loss of time to read them, out of no other design than to remember their opinions; and 'tis to waste that of others too, to teach them in that manner. That the Philosophers cannot instruct us by their authority; and to pretend to is a piece of injustice: That 'tis a kind of madness and impiety to take a solemn oath of allegiance to them. And lastly that 'tis to detain truth in an unjust bondage, from interest and partiality, to oppose the new opinions of philosophy, that may be true, to keep up the credit of such as are known to be either false or useless."

Science has no conflict with religion as such—the field of one is the intellect, the field of the other is the spirit; but it has a fight to the death against

any religion which would substitute logic and authority for investigation and experience—in short, against any religion which would cast it into the shackles of Aristotelianism—shackles rusty with the blood of the truth-seekers of a thousand years.

CONCLUSION.

It is submitted that the foregoing chapters have shown, firstly, that the infallible voice of Leo XIII. has proclaimed anew the most far reaching claims of the mediæval Papacy on the relation of Church and State; secondly, that the much lauded social programme of His Holiness consists in the organization of priest-guided labor unions, for Roman Catholics only; thirdly, that the Family is to be considered as an institution existing independently of the State, so that the latter can do nothing concerning marriage or the education of children, except by and with the advice and consent of the Church; fourthly, that the individual must in every intentional or rational act follow the directions which may be given him by the Roman Pontifex Maximus, and that the very existence of the independent, spiritual faculty through which all men are to be quickened by the Holy Ghost is denied; lastly, the dependence of all these propositions upon an exploded astrological conception has been set forth. If these are the fair conclusions from the foregoing lines, does it not seem as if the rule of the priesthood over the laity, against which the Reformation was the protest, is to be reestablished, that the Roman Catholic Church is itself guilty of the sins of intolerance which it so loudly charges upon its opponents, and that the complaints of the Church are in fact the cry of the wolf against the lamb?

In closing, if a personal remark may be excused, the author would say that he is not a member of the American Protective Association, and so far as he knows has never seen, nor received any communication from any member of that Association; neither does he entertain any feeling of hostility to the members of the Roman Catholic Church or to that Church as a body. On the contrary, many Roman Catholic laymen have honored him with their friendship, and for the Church itself, as a branch of the Holy Catholic Church, he entertains a profound reverence and respect, for the centuries of noble work which it has done for Christ and humanity, through its long lines of consecrated priests, devoted monks and holy nuns.

The only object of these lines has been to show that within this glorious institution, hallowed by so many beautiful and sacred associations, there is at work a corrosive which cannot but in the course of time annihilate all that has made it beautiful, glorious and holy. This evil which has at last, through the success of Leo XIII. in making the text-book of the Jesuits the text-book of the Roman Catholic world, become dominant in the Church, can be described in two words: Aristotelian Scholasticism.

The Roman Catholic laymen are themselves the worst sufferers under this system; they have no more power over the affairs of their parish or diocese than the Perioeci of Aristotle's Utopia, and if the Utopia of Leo XIII. were realized, they would have as little power over the Family, the Guild and the State. System and discipline are beautiful and much to be desired, but is there any teaching in the

New Testament which justifies man's putting his greatest talent, conscience, absolutely in the hands of another?

Eliminate that false Aristotelian philosophy, and who can doubt but that, under the presidency naturally due to the successor of St. Peter, the reunion of Christendom might become an accomplished fact?

For with that philosophy would go the ideas that primacy must mean infallible absolutism and that membership in a political or religious corporation involves suicide of individuality; that the communistic Utopias of Aristotle and Plato, with their privileged classes of priests, represent the highest social organization; that no state can be trusted with the education of its children or the regulation of its family organizations; that the whole world must have the unanimity necessary in a Greek city-state of less than 100,000 inhabitants; that men have no way of knowing what is right or wrong, except by communications from their fellows; that reason, and not conscience, should govern men; that laymen have no rights which priests are bound to respect; that the principles of all scientific truth were grasped by one mind, over two thousand years ago—in short that Christianity and all modern progress must be built upon the quicksand of Aristotelian philosophy.

Christianity has been adapted to Aristotle, instead of Aristotle to Christianity.

Once cast out these ideas, and again would flourish as a spiritual refuge for the nations, the Church, that mighty tree under whose benignant branches

United Christendom for so many centuries sought and found a shelter, but which is now, alas, decaying,—thanks to the worm eating at its heart,—a noxious influence on all who trust themselves within its shades—a danger to modern civilization.

683

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